Apartheid

Apartheid Apartheid

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64 consideration here. Both Israel and Graeco-Roman Egypt had high population densities with overwhelmingly settled populations when the invaders first arrived. South Africa also had settled populations, but nomadic pastoralists and hunters-gatherers, as well. It is also a very much larger country than the other two. The huge geographic and epidemiological distance between the Netherlands, the source of most of the invaders, and South Africa, together with the lack of intense contacts before the initial invasion therefore constitutes a main difference from my other two examples. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has probably cost more Jewish lives than the white lives that were lost in the White/Black conflict in South Africa; in all certainty this applies to South Africa between 1948 and 1994. This is a mere quantitative difference, but it has contributed to the very widespread, yet deeply mistaken, impression that the Israelis are being victimized in general, whilst the Arabs in general, and the Palestinians in particular, are the aggressors. A couple of quantitative differences intimately linked to this one are also worth keeping in mind in this context: The Israelis have been much more successful than the South African Whites were at ethnic cleansing. A mere 19 per cent of Israeli residents are now Arabs, whereas there was a two-third Arab majority inside the much smaller state of Israel that the UN had granted when the state was founded in 1948. Conversely, the Whites in South Africa were never more than around 25 per cent of the total population. The number of killed Jews, moreover, remains a small fraction – between 1 to 12 and 1 to 25 – of the Palestinian death toll, since hostilities started. (See Chapter II.1.3, below.) Furthermore, South Africa was never as densely populated as Palestine has been since Jews started arriving in large numbers last century. That meant that land was scarcer in Palestine and competition for it was therefore more intense. In my comparative cases, the initial de facto invasions also assumed varied forms. The Greeks expelled and took over Egypt from the previous Persian occupying forces, South Africa was conquered with firearms and a part of what is today Israel was ‘given’ to the Jews after World War II by the UN and the previous British occupying power against unanimous Arab resistance, which also resulted in warfare. The rest was taken by force. Here Israel represents a middle instance, between the forms of invasion in South Africa and Egypt. From these three slightly different initial conditions the societies then developed more and more similar characteristics as the occupations endured in time. With their crucial strategies of ‘divide and rule’, the apartheid elites always ensure that there is a tiny minority of indigenous people, who are relatively privileged and collaborate with the invaders. Thus, there are always some minor indigenous figures among the apartheid elites. In South Africa and Israel, those groups were (and are) mainly to be found among the indigenous political and business leaders. In Graeco-Roman Egypt, however, they were priests, a fact that reflects the extreme degree of ‘de-secularization’ that characterized that society. Nonetheless, these priests appear to have been the only indigenous political and business leaders as well, in the informal sense of the latter positions. There were also other relatively powerful or rich Egyptians who cooperated, at least with the Greeks. 85 Moreover, collaborators can probably be found among indigenous spiritual leaders in both apartheid South Africa and modern Israel/Palestine. This difference is therefore not as great as it might appear at a first glance. Moreover, the indigenous apartheid elites are almost always men. Perhaps the most important differences are neither spatial nor temporal, but the fates that each of the three apartheid systems under consideration met with (so far). Roman Egypt was conquered by Muslim Arabs in 642 CE. It has since then become an Arabic-speaking country with a 90 per cent Muslim majority, without apartheid but with many other internal conflicts and varieties of oppression. Most importantly, ethnic Greeks and Romans were in no way automatically part of the country’s elites since the Muslim conquest and ‘opening’ of Egypt (the standard Arab reference to the liberation of the country). Greek texts, including 85 They probably included the family of the last indigenous king. See Huß 2001: 213ff.

school texts, have been found in the country from only another century or so after that. 86 There was never any large-scale massacre of apartheid perpetrators or their descendants after defeat. They were never driven into the sea. South African apartheid was reined in by globalized capitalism and the elites were forced to incorporate parts of a black underclass rapidly growing in numbers into the economic and political structures of administration. 87 Again, the Whites were never driven into the sea. To stay with the previous, telling example from Egypt: one may perhaps expect that school textbooks in Afrikaans will only be produced for another hundred years, but English is still expanding its influence on the country’s culture, though much more to due to global than to local conditions. Moreover, Afrikaans is still an official language of South Africa, and Afrikaner culture now enjoys unprecedented protection as a minority culture in this country. Israel is still holding out, but on some indications it seems to be heading the way of its South African predecessor. Whether it will or not is in my opinion among many other things a question of morality and decency. For instance, if the United Nations became a more democratic institution and expelled and/or really punished Israel for ignoring and making a mockery out of its resolutions and declarations as well as a host of human rights declarations and conventions to which both Israel and its present patron, the USA, are signatories; if Israel were forced to stop killing UN employees, journalists and other neutral non-combatants; if the world’s countries, transnational corporations and trade blocs increased bilateral pressure on Israel by economic and other sanctions as they did on South Africa; if Israel’s only real nation-state ally, the USA, stopped providing Israel with $3 to 5 billion of aid every year (most of which is military aid) and if the USA refrained from repeatedly, almost continuously, abusing its undemocratic veto power in the UN Security Council in favor of Israel, then Israel would be likely to follow South Africa’s fate sooner rather than later. (I will expand on my view of apartheid responsibilities at the end of Part I.) There are also domestic, local, and regional parameters to the problems at hand. Though highly unlikely, Israel may one day unilaterally end the daily physical violence by pulling out its troops and settlers from the Occupied Territories. It may end the physical violence in this way due to the wishes of its own business community, which hopes to have access to cheap Palestinian labor, and might be faced with worldwide economic sanctions as Israeli crimes against humanity accumulate further, or due to the Israeli electorate eventually tiring of the war and its costs, or even to its becoming aware of the deep injustice and immorality of Israeli apartheid. The inevitable decline of US imperialism, Palestinian population growth, and relative Israeli-Jewish population retreat as well as the resistance from within and from neighboring Arab countries may also become factors spelling the end, or at least a considerable weakening of apartheid in Israel, but these too are seemingly becoming increasingly remote opportunities. We shall return to the destinies of apartheid societies, and especially to that in Israel and Palestine, in Part III. The conclusions and parallels offered here could become useful in case an institutional search for truth and reconciliation with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be initiated, as it was in Guatemala, Argentina, South Africa, Nigeria and elsewhere. The uses of studying systematic human rights violations in late antiquity are less tangible. I find Egypt a particularly interesting case in point since the colonializers came from the two leading military powers of their eras, European powers, and the oppressed ethnic majority was African, as in South Africa. Although more than a millennium lies between these two societies, several of the contingent parallels are also striking in their similarity. I do not believe, however, that this has any deeper anthropological significance to the effect that ‘Europeans’ should be considered automatically oppressive or even that they 86 Morgan: Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds, 1998: 42. See also Chapter III.5, below. 87 Iliffe 1995: 281-284 65

64<br />

consideration here. Both Israel and Graeco-Roman Egypt had high population densities with<br />

overwhelmingly settled populations when the invaders first arrived. South Africa also had<br />

settled populations, but nomadic pastoralists and hunters-gatherers, as well. It is also a very<br />

much larger country than the other two. The huge geographic and epidemiological distance<br />

between the Netherlands, the source of most of the invaders, and South Africa, together with<br />

the lack of intense contacts before the initial invasion therefore constitutes a main difference<br />

from my other two examples.<br />

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has probably cost more Jewish lives than the white<br />

lives that were lost in the White/Black conflict in South Africa; in all certainty this applies to<br />

South Africa between 1948 and 1994. This is a mere quantitative difference, but it has<br />

contributed to the very widespread, yet deeply mistaken, impression that the Israelis are being<br />

victimized in general, whilst the Arabs in general, and the Palestinians in particular, are the<br />

aggressors. A couple of quantitative differences intimately linked to this one are also worth<br />

keeping in mind in this context: The Israelis have been much more successful than the South<br />

African Whites were at ethnic cleansing. A mere 19 per cent of Israeli residents are now<br />

Arabs, whereas there was a two-third Arab majority inside the much smaller state of Israel<br />

that the UN had granted when the state was founded in 1948. Conversely, the Whites in South<br />

Africa were never more than around 25 per cent of the total population. The number of killed<br />

Jews, moreover, remains a small fraction – between 1 to 12 and 1 to 25 – of the Palestinian<br />

death toll, since hostilities started. (See Chapter II.1.3, below.) Furthermore, South Africa was<br />

never as densely populated as Palestine has been since Jews started arriving in large numbers<br />

last century. That meant that land was scarcer in Palestine and competition for it was therefore<br />

more intense.<br />

In my comparative cases, the initial de facto invasions also assumed varied forms. The<br />

Greeks expelled and took over Egypt from the previous Persian occupying forces, South<br />

Africa was conquered with firearms and a part of what is today Israel was ‘given’ to the Jews<br />

after World War II by the UN and the previous British occupying power against unanimous<br />

Arab resistance, which also resulted in warfare. The rest was taken by force. Here Israel<br />

represents a middle instance, between the forms of invasion in South Africa and Egypt. From<br />

these three slightly different initial conditions the societies then developed more and more<br />

similar characteristics as the occupations endured in time.<br />

With their crucial strategies of ‘divide and rule’, the apartheid elites always ensure that<br />

there is a tiny minority of indigenous people, who are relatively privileged and collaborate<br />

with the invaders. Thus, there are always some minor indigenous figures among the apartheid<br />

elites. In South Africa and Israel, those groups were (and are) mainly to be found among the<br />

indigenous political and business leaders. In Graeco-Roman Egypt, however, they were<br />

priests, a fact that reflects the extreme degree of ‘de-secularization’ that characterized that<br />

society. Nonetheless, these priests appear to have been the only indigenous political and<br />

business leaders as well, in the informal sense of the latter positions. There were also other<br />

relatively powerful or rich Egyptians who cooperated, at least with the Greeks. 85 Moreover,<br />

collaborators can probably be found among indigenous spiritual leaders in both apartheid<br />

South Africa and modern Israel/Palestine. This difference is therefore not as great as it might<br />

appear at a first glance. Moreover, the indigenous apartheid elites are almost always men.<br />

Perhaps the most important differences are neither spatial nor temporal, but the fates<br />

that each of the three apartheid systems under consideration met with (so far). Roman Egypt<br />

was conquered by Muslim Arabs in 642 CE. It has since then become an Arabic-speaking<br />

country with a 90 per cent Muslim majority, without apartheid but with many other internal<br />

conflicts and varieties of oppression. Most importantly, ethnic Greeks and Romans were in no<br />

way automatically part of the country’s elites since the Muslim conquest and ‘opening’ of<br />

Egypt (the standard Arab reference to the liberation of the country). Greek texts, including<br />

85 They probably included the family of the last indigenous king. See Huß 2001: 213ff.

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