Apartheid
Apartheid Apartheid
54 and who might even have brought some of the most extreme patriarchal modes of oppression to Afghanistan in the wake of Alexander’s conquest. In any event, as in South African apartheid, there was in Taliban rule the imposition of strict separation between population groups which were biologically and pseudo-biologically defined, as well as discrimination against the country’s majority. ‘Gender apartheid’, however, is different from South African as well as all other kinds of apartheid, in which the oppressed ethnic group, consisting of both men and women, earned money, though hardly ever enough of it. Moreover, women and men are equally indigenous to Afghanistan. There was no invading ethnic minority behind this kind of ‘apartheid’, although a few Taliban leaders, who appear to have joined the movement after it gained power, seem to have been foreigners (among them, mainly Pakistanis and Arabs). In South Africa prior to 1652, furthermore, Blacks ruled sovereign political and economic entities, unchallenged by other ethnicities, enjoying power and privileges. There is no evidence that I am aware of to that effect for women in Afghanistan. The women certainly did not rule the country when the Taliban took over power. The languages of the country and much of the culture in general also remained the same after the Taliban had won. In ‘real’ or ‘original’ apartheid, people are replaced or cleansed: politically, economically and physically, and new power is ultimately established by invaders from afar. Indigenous culture is also replaced by the settlers’ culture. In Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, on the other hand, old power was extended. Lastly, there was no crucial demographic dynamic in Afghanistan like the one in South Africa, where Whites produced fewer children the richer they became, and Blacks produced more children the poorer they became. This dynamic was one of the main factors that would eventually bring down apartheid in South Africa, and a corresponding development might well eventually have precisely the same consequences for the Israeli version of apartheid. 64 ‘Gender apartheid’ thus seems to have less to do with South African apartheid than any of the forms of oppression we have encountered so far. Environmental and Global ‘Apartheid’ Recently, a global kind of apartheid – so-called ‘environmental apartheid’ – has become a further focus of attention. Here, so-called ‘First World’ corporate networks and states profit from ‘artificially’ low (i.e. not purely market-induced) raw material prices, move their most polluting industries to the developing countries in the so-called ‘Third World’, export their most toxic waste to be dumped there, and steal ‘the very basis and processes of life’ legally through patent enforcement from ‘Third World’ farmer communities. 65 Instances of most constituent parts of apartheid are indeed present in some form or other in this phenomenon. They include ethnicist practices such as structural violence, population activities, land appropriation, exploitation, differential access, and racist ideologies. Yet, there is no invasion in a military sense, and therefore not necessarily any direct violence. Furthermore, the land is bought or leased – though cheaply and often illegally – rather than directly stolen, and only very little of it needs to be bought or leased, for factories and waste dumps, anyway. (A great deal more of the land, however, is of course affected ecologically.) The repopulation activities are narrowed down to a few on-site First World corporate executives and engineers, who are perceived by those on the very top, in their First World corporate headquarters, as necessary to oversee operations and to keep certain advanced technologies and other secrets unavailable to industrial spies from competing corporations, not to mention the indigenous people. The population activities are therefore actually much more similar to colonialism than to apartheid. The (apparently rather heavy) 64 Ibid. See also N.N.: Gender Apartheid, no date. See Section II.2, below, on the demographic dimensions of apartheid. 65 Shiva: The World on the Edge, 2000, 112-129, quotes: 113ff, 119. See also Shiva: Deconstructing Market Access: Whose Market, Whose Access?, 2002; Commey: Biopiracy: The New Scramble for Africa, 2003: 12-17; Jere-Malanda: Biopiracy: Neem: The Wonder Tree, 2003: 18.
involvement of strong First World nation-states in furthering and even encouraging this kind of activity is also colonial or neo-colonial oppression, but not apartheid. The independence of transnational corporations and corporation networks as opposed to governments, and their increasing usurpation of traditional governmental practices, especially in the developing countries, do however exhibit aspects of apartheid, though in an entirely new form. This could indeed be ‘neo-apartheid’, the structural legacy of apartheid at a new, globalized level of capitalist, perhaps even historical development, but not apartheid per se, not even in my proposed wide sense, which presupposes a relatively strong and sovereign state. Once corporations have become stronger than states – and on some indications this is already the case on a global scale 66 – politics changes appearance and content radically. For instance, democracy and human rights are increasingly hollowed and replaced by proprietors’, investors’, and shareholders’ exclusive rights and privileges. Under these new conditions, continuity with earlier phenomena should neither be erased nor over-stretched. ‘Neo-apartheid’ would be a good label for this new kind of systematic human rights violations, although the term is now already being used to describe present-day Israel. 67 ‘Neo-apartheid’ would in my opinion be a more apt label for the new kind of systematic human rights violations, since it presupposes a relatively weak state (on the receiving end) and strong privately-owned companies, or networks of such companies, in a way similar to the concept of ‘neo-colonialism’, and also since Israel’s system of apartheid, as I will try to argue here, is nothing new at all in a structural sense. Some of the features of ‘environmental apartheid’, however, are not as new as they appear to be. For example, the Dutch East India Company was in many ways a typical transnational capitalist enterprise, and it worked so well, in capitalist terms, due to the existence of a globalized capitalist (though not yet industrial or postindustrial) economy, already from the 17 th century onwards. On the other hand, the Dutch government might have been able to rein in the Company if it wished to, something which appears less likely in a similar situation today. Examples would be the uses of wage-slavery by transnational corporations based in the North Atlantic zone. The governments of this area seem almost powerless to do anything against the deeply immoral practices of these companies in developing countries which would have been criminal and would have caused an outcry if they had taken place in the home countries. Other examples would include pollution, sweatshops, or child labor. At the opening of the Earth Summit in Johannesburg in 2002, the second South African post-apartheid president, Thabo Mbeki, called for an end to ‘global apartheid’, where a ‘rich minority enjoys unprecedented levels of consumption, comfort and prosperity, while a poor majority enjoys daily hardship, suffering, dehumanisation…’ Similarly the authors, Salih Booker and William Minter, argue that “…today’s international political economy – in which undemocratic institutions systematically generate economic inequality – should be described as ‘global apartheid’…” although the authors also wisely caution against drawing the parallels with South Africa too closely. 68 This idea can be traced back to an impassioned plea against ‘global apartheid’ by the anthropologist, William A. Haviland, who was the first author to my knowledge to use the expression in pointing out the persistent, extremely unequal distribution of economic, military, and political power between Whites and non-Whites of the world. The importance of this issue could hardly be overemphasized. 69 In what is probably the most sophisticated theory of ‘global apartheid’, a somewhat different conception devised specifically to better understand international migration, racial 66 Ellwood 2001: 55ff. 67 See, for instance, footnote 752, below. 68 Schuettler: Mbeki Slams “Global Apartheid” at Pre-Summit Gala, 2002; Macdonald: End “Global Apartheid” Call Heralds Earth Summit, 2002; Booker & Minter: Global Apartheid, 2001: 11-17 69 Haviland 5 1987: 405-407. 55
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involvement of strong First World nation-states in furthering and even encouraging this kind<br />
of activity is also colonial or neo-colonial oppression, but not apartheid. The independence of<br />
transnational corporations and corporation networks as opposed to governments, and their<br />
increasing usurpation of traditional governmental practices, especially in the developing<br />
countries, do however exhibit aspects of apartheid, though in an entirely new form. This could<br />
indeed be ‘neo-apartheid’, the structural legacy of apartheid at a new, globalized level of<br />
capitalist, perhaps even historical development, but not apartheid per se, not even in my<br />
proposed wide sense, which presupposes a relatively strong and sovereign state. Once<br />
corporations have become stronger than states – and on some indications this is already the<br />
case on a global scale 66 – politics changes appearance and content radically. For instance,<br />
democracy and human rights are increasingly hollowed and replaced by proprietors’,<br />
investors’, and shareholders’ exclusive rights and privileges.<br />
Under these new conditions, continuity with earlier phenomena should neither be<br />
erased nor over-stretched. ‘Neo-apartheid’ would be a good label for this new kind of<br />
systematic human rights violations, although the term is now already being used to describe<br />
present-day Israel. 67 ‘Neo-apartheid’ would in my opinion be a more apt label for the new<br />
kind of systematic human rights violations, since it presupposes a relatively weak state (on the<br />
receiving end) and strong privately-owned companies, or networks of such companies, in a<br />
way similar to the concept of ‘neo-colonialism’, and also since Israel’s system of apartheid, as<br />
I will try to argue here, is nothing new at all in a structural sense.<br />
Some of the features of ‘environmental apartheid’, however, are not as new as they<br />
appear to be. For example, the Dutch East India Company was in many ways a typical<br />
transnational capitalist enterprise, and it worked so well, in capitalist terms, due to the<br />
existence of a globalized capitalist (though not yet industrial or postindustrial) economy,<br />
already from the 17 th century onwards. On the other hand, the Dutch government might have<br />
been able to rein in the Company if it wished to, something which appears less likely in a<br />
similar situation today. Examples would be the uses of wage-slavery by transnational<br />
corporations based in the North Atlantic zone. The governments of this area seem almost<br />
powerless to do anything against the deeply immoral practices of these companies in<br />
developing countries which would have been criminal and would have caused an outcry if<br />
they had taken place in the home countries. Other examples would include pollution,<br />
sweatshops, or child labor.<br />
At the opening of the Earth Summit in Johannesburg in 2002, the second South<br />
African post-apartheid president, Thabo Mbeki, called for an end to ‘global apartheid’, where<br />
a ‘rich minority enjoys unprecedented levels of consumption, comfort and prosperity, while a<br />
poor majority enjoys daily hardship, suffering, dehumanisation…’ Similarly the authors, Salih<br />
Booker and William Minter, argue that “…today’s international political economy – in which<br />
undemocratic institutions systematically generate economic inequality – should be described<br />
as ‘global apartheid’…” although the authors also wisely caution against drawing the parallels<br />
with South Africa too closely. 68<br />
This idea can be traced back to an impassioned plea against ‘global apartheid’ by the<br />
anthropologist, William A. Haviland, who was the first author to my knowledge to use the<br />
expression in pointing out the persistent, extremely unequal distribution of economic,<br />
military, and political power between Whites and non-Whites of the world. The importance of<br />
this issue could hardly be overemphasized. 69<br />
In what is probably the most sophisticated theory of ‘global apartheid’, a somewhat<br />
different conception devised specifically to better understand international migration, racial<br />
66 Ellwood 2001: 55ff.<br />
67 See, for instance, footnote 752, below.<br />
68 Schuettler: Mbeki Slams “Global <strong>Apartheid</strong>” at Pre-Summit Gala, 2002; Macdonald: End “Global <strong>Apartheid</strong>”<br />
Call Heralds Earth Summit, 2002; Booker & Minter: Global <strong>Apartheid</strong>, 2001: 11-17<br />
69 Haviland 5 1987: 405-407.<br />
55