Apartheid

systematically by people who identified themselves with the same ancient Israelites. 54 And it
is doubly ironic that contemporary Zionists, including the prime minister of Israel, have used
this ideology which has cost the lives of so many of their forebears, and in some cases
probably of their own ancestors.
As any other apartheid society, the kingdom of Jerusalem displayed diversified
production and trade. Unlike colonies and ex-colonies, which are typically made economically
dependent on a very small number of export commodities by the colonial power, apartheid
societies, even small ones such as this, always developed strong economies when given
enough time and stability to do so. After the kingdom had introduced a feudal European-style
economy, dependent on land-rents and taxes on local (native) agricultural production and
trade, the port and city of Acre gradually became a world center of commerce and trade,
comparable at the time with Constantinople or Alexandria, (though not with Baghdad or
Cairo). The Muslim world offered products that Europe came to demand increasingly from
now on, including sugar, dyes, spices, and slaves. The pilgrim and soldier traffic from and to
Europe was also huge and very lucrative. Religious tourists from western Europe came for
redemption as well as for adventure, power, and profit. The annual revenue of the city of Acre
to the kings of Jerusalem even came to exceed the state budget of England, one of western
Europe’s chief powers at the time. 55
As for the differences with regard to white-ruled South Africa, they are comparatively
few, and only of a gradual nature. The kingdom of Jerusalem lasted less than two centuries,
from 1099 until 1291, and it lost its capital twice for long spells during that time, 1187-1229
and from 1244 until the end. Altogether, Jerusalem was only a Christian capital for 103 years.
Apartheid South Africa lasted almost twice as long as this kingdom and had a great deal more
territorial contiguity and political stability. Obviously the military superiority of the invading
forces was not as daunting as in South Africa, or in Israel at present, or as in Egypt under
Greek and Roman rule. The military edge of the crusaders was based on the fanaticism of the
warrior-monks rather than on technology, as the Arab world was more advanced
technologically in general than western Europe. According to an Arab historian at the time,
Osama Ibn Munqidh, the crusaders’ only military advantages were their ‘courage’ and their
‘willingness to fight’. (Other factors that allowed the Latins military success during this
period included the lack of unity in the Arab and Muslim so-called ‘worlds’, and Latin uses of
these divisions.) 56 Another difference is that the imported settlers were generally confined to
the cities. The invader caste was not as present geographically or socially as in the more
modern apartheid societies, and therefore there was less apartheid elite control over the
indigenous majority, which was, in turn, able to organize resistance successfully. Only with
the aid of outsiders, i.e. Muslim and Christian forces from outside the occupied areas,
however, did liberation finally come about. Saladin, for example, was a Kurd from Tikrit in
present-day Iraq.
The Arabs also resisted culturally, and the extent of this resistance is another
difference from South African (as well as Graeco-Roman and Israeli) apartheid. Many Latins
learned Arabic, but the number of Arabs in the Kingdom of Jerusalem who learned European
languages was very small. With mostly valid reasons, the culture of the invaders was
perceived by the indigenous as barbaric, and assimilation with them was probably seen as
treason. However, partly due to these conditions, western Europe may be seen as the longterm
winner of the crusading wars, despite its obvious military loss, and the Arabs (and Turks,
Kurds, and Jews) as the long-term losers. In a way similar to Vietnam with regard to the USA
since the 1970s, or to KwaZulu with regard to the British Empire in 1879, the invaders were
54
Read 1999: 216
55
Ibid: 210-215
56 3
Quoted in Maalouf 2003 (1983): 54. On the lack of Muslim or Arab unity: 74ff. On some of the important
Latin alliances with Muslim leaders: 102ff.
49