Apartheid
Apartheid Apartheid
304 Once the time for possible forgiveness arrives, there should be an opportunity for coordinating the search for truth and reconciliation, on the one hand, and opportunities for amnesty, on the other. A crucial question is how far that amnesty should be allowed to extend. In South Africa, it was obviously allowed too far. Furthermore, it was applied only to one end, the wrong end, of the decision-making hierarchy of the state, i.e. only to the lowest levels. Not that the apartheid assassins did not deserve punishment, but, in effect, the state and the TRC exonerated the entire civil society and all the top and mid-levels of the state from the entire range of apartheid crimes. 753 With regard to reconciliation: just as it is taking centuries for America to get over 400 years of racist slavery, with its total impunity for still existing perpetrators, such as governments, royal families, banks and other large corporations 754 , and with Western Hemisphere Blacks still being systematically disadvantaged, it may take centuries for South Africa to get over 350 years of apartheid, though it does not have to do so. Yet, with regard to South African criminal justice and the TRC, still, something is better than nothing. For some of the family members of victims, the TRC was also useful merely for finally confirming to them that their child or spouse, etc. was indeed dead. The point of unearthing secret burials was not just to prove that crimes had taken place but also to help provide emotional certainty. It brought to rest a great deal of anxiety as well as false hopes. Although not dramatically, it did bring closure to mourning in some instances. 755 In the end, I confess to being somewhat of an optimist, though a long-term one, regarding reconciliation in Israel/Palestine. Jews as well as Muslims have had a much harder time through history in getting along with Christians, especially European Christians, than with each other. As Zionists continue to live their eurocentric, 19 th -century dream of ethnic supremacy, the rest of the world is moving on, and most of it has moved on already. At this stage it is a matter of making the Zionists catch up with the rest of the world, as well as defeating them. And in this way it is a very similar struggle to the resistance against apartheid in South Africa. 5. Justice? As long as South Africa played a strategic role for ‘The West’ in the Cold War, apartheid there was also applauded and financed, and at the very least tolerated by the western elites. For the Palestinians and Israel, the stakes are no less geopolitical, but there is also the added complication of oil in the region to which the USA, most of all, wishes and intends to have ‘strategic access’, with scant regard for the people or for human rights in the region. We will perhaps have to wait for an economy and a technology carrying it that are less dependent on oil in order for the USA to let up its crucial and deadly support for Israel and its apartheid system. In the same way the US elites dropped South Africa’s racist and undemocratic regime when the perceived need to defend the world against communism ‘Plotted to Kill’ UN Chief, 1998; Thomasson: Letters Say Hammarskjold Death Western Plot, 1998; N.N.: License to Kill, October 2002. On Belgium’s role in the matter, see Nguyen: Belgium in Quandary over Role in Lumumba Killing, 2001; Nguyen: Belgian King Knew of Plan to Kill Lumumba, Stood By, 2001, Misser: Mrs Lumumba Speaks, 2002. 753 See Stanley: Evaluating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2001: 525-546, and above. 754 In 2004 , US lawyer Edward Fagan (see footnote 758 on his attempts to sue apartheid profiteers and his success with sueing Third Reich profiteers) helped launch a lawsuit against Lloyd’s bank and insurance of London, the US government, and others for reparations over cultural and physical genocide of Africans and various other crimes against humanity in the context of the Atlantic system of slavery. See Walsh: Slave Descendants Sue Lloyd’s for Billions, 2004. On the heavy involvement in these matters of Barclays Bank, Barings Bank, and others, see Mac Mathúna: Slavery and London, 1999. 755 See Suleman (director): Zulu Love Letter, 2004.
305 disappeared, it may drop Israel’s undemocratic and racist regime when the perceived need for oil disappears, as it certainly will one day. Yet, we certainly are not condemned to wait for the oil wells to run dry. The same goes for demographic development. It seems as if it will eliminate apartheid in time, unless, of course, intensified genocide or ethnic cleansing sets in. But the future itself remains unwritten, and the nearly inevitable overthrow of any apartheid regime still usually happens in an unexpected way. It is not only dependent on geopolitical, demographic and economic trends, but also, as Said insisted, on the actions and the mentalities of people. Israel and South Africa are different, but there are commonalities. . . . One of these commonalities is that a large part of the population feels itself denied access to resources, rights, ownership of land and free movement. What I learned from the case of South Africa is that the only way to deal with a complex history of antagonism based on ethnicity is to look at it, understand it and then move on. What I have in mind is something like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. And I think we, the Palestinians, are the ones who have to do it. Just as Desmond Tutu and the blacks did it. Of course, they had first won. They got rid of apartheid. 756 Although the TRC in South Africa has been successful in revealing numerous truths and in bringing about reconciliations, and although a TRC may prevent witch-hunts in which innocent people are harmed or killed, the future application of its basic principles in other conflict zones could still be improved upon. Most importantly, it can never totally replace the function of criminal justice. South Africa’s apartheid perpetrators wanted a blanket amnesty. But the victims would never have accepted that. They would understandably have preferred to continue their militarily hopeless armed struggle. My primary suggestion for internal improvement of TRCs would be to widen the concept of gross human rights violations from focusing only on the occurrence of physical violence for awarding and denying amnesty and to include at least some of the additional aspects of apartheid touched upon here. After all, the Nuremberg Tribunal also worked with a wider concept of gross human rights violations than the South African TRC did. The example of the Nazi media mogul, Julius Streicher, and his execution (See Chapter II.9) illustrates this point sufficiently. In the end, the global criminal court is likely to improve the external conditions for TRC work, both for post-apartheid and for other kinds of societies emerging from institutionalized human rights violations. This is not just an academic exercise in what would happen if guns and bombs would not speak the loudest. On September 7, 2004, the ruling Likud party of Israel sent a mediumlevel delegation to South Africa to meet with prime minister Mbeki and other members of the ruling ANC-led government and ‘discuss how they [Likud] can learn from its relatively peaceful transition’, according to South African officials. It should be remembered that only 15 years earlier, Likud (as well as Israel’s Labor party) was supporting apartheid in South Africa. Likud, of course, wants South Africans to forget this, but according to the delegation leader, the deputy minister of trade and industry Michael Ratzon, discussions at the meeting would include ‘Israel as a state of Jewish people, a review of the conflict between Israel and the Arab people and the political and historic process as well as relations between the two countries’. So even if the Israeli delegation did not come to learn, they might have learned something anyway. However, a communiqué, released after the talks had ended, implied that no apparent progress had been made on improving the strained relations between the two sides. Nevertheless, only a few weeks later, Ehud Olmert, the communications, industry, trade 756 Said, in Shavit, see footnote 744. See also Index On Censorship, 2001: 5. Further: Sahyoun: The Unlikely Road to Peace: Truth and Reconciliation, 2001
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305<br />
disappeared, it may drop Israel’s undemocratic and racist regime when the perceived need for<br />
oil disappears, as it certainly will one day.<br />
Yet, we certainly are not condemned to wait for the oil wells to run dry. The same<br />
goes for demographic development. It seems as if it will eliminate apartheid in time, unless, of<br />
course, intensified genocide or ethnic cleansing sets in. But the future itself remains unwritten,<br />
and the nearly inevitable overthrow of any apartheid regime still usually happens in an<br />
unexpected way. It is not only dependent on geopolitical, demographic and economic trends,<br />
but also, as Said insisted, on the actions and the mentalities of people.<br />
Israel and South Africa are different, but there are commonalities. . . .<br />
One of these commonalities is that a large part of the population feels<br />
itself denied access to resources, rights, ownership of land and free<br />
movement. What I learned from the case of South Africa is that the<br />
only way to deal with a complex history of antagonism based on<br />
ethnicity is to look at it, understand it and then move on. What I have<br />
in mind is something like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.<br />
And I think we, the Palestinians, are the ones who have to do it. Just as<br />
Desmond Tutu and the blacks did it. Of course, they had first won.<br />
They got rid of apartheid. 756<br />
Although the TRC in South Africa has been successful in revealing numerous truths<br />
and in bringing about reconciliations, and although a TRC may prevent witch-hunts in which<br />
innocent people are harmed or killed, the future application of its basic principles in other<br />
conflict zones could still be improved upon. Most importantly, it can never totally replace the<br />
function of criminal justice. South Africa’s apartheid perpetrators wanted a blanket amnesty.<br />
But the victims would never have accepted that. They would understandably have preferred to<br />
continue their militarily hopeless armed struggle. My primary suggestion for internal<br />
improvement of TRCs would be to widen the concept of gross human rights violations from<br />
focusing only on the occurrence of physical violence for awarding and denying amnesty and<br />
to include at least some of the additional aspects of apartheid touched upon here.<br />
After all, the Nuremberg Tribunal also worked with a wider concept of gross human<br />
rights violations than the South African TRC did. The example of the Nazi media mogul,<br />
Julius Streicher, and his execution (See Chapter II.9) illustrates this point sufficiently. In the<br />
end, the global criminal court is likely to improve the external conditions for TRC work, both<br />
for post-apartheid and for other kinds of societies emerging from institutionalized human<br />
rights violations.<br />
This is not just an academic exercise in what would happen if guns and bombs would<br />
not speak the loudest. On September 7, 2004, the ruling Likud party of Israel sent a mediumlevel<br />
delegation to South Africa to meet with prime minister Mbeki and other members of the<br />
ruling ANC-led government and ‘discuss how they [Likud] can learn from its relatively<br />
peaceful transition’, according to South African officials. It should be remembered that only<br />
15 years earlier, Likud (as well as Israel’s Labor party) was supporting apartheid in South<br />
Africa. Likud, of course, wants South Africans to forget this, but according to the delegation<br />
leader, the deputy minister of trade and industry Michael Ratzon, discussions at the meeting<br />
would include ‘Israel as a state of Jewish people, a review of the conflict between Israel and<br />
the Arab people and the political and historic process as well as relations between the two<br />
countries’. So even if the Israeli delegation did not come to learn, they might have learned<br />
something anyway. However, a communiqué, released after the talks had ended, implied that<br />
no apparent progress had been made on improving the strained relations between the two<br />
sides. Nevertheless, only a few weeks later, Ehud Olmert, the communications, industry, trade<br />
756<br />
Said, in Shavit, see footnote 744. See also Index On Censorship, 2001: 5. Further: Sahyoun: The Unlikely<br />
Road to Peace: Truth and Reconciliation, 2001