Apartheid
Apartheid Apartheid
298 The priority, under all circumstances, must be to stop the gross human rights violations from occurring. Whether that will involve future violence or armed resistance remains entirely up to Israel, or very nearly so. Only if the Israeli army and the Jewish settlers stop killing Palestinians and other dissidents, will there even be a possibility of a negotiated peace. The criminal use of excessive force is the crux of the matter. If a Palestinian throws a stone, he gets killed. If a Palestinian shouts loudly at a demonstration, he or she gets killed. If a Palestinian attends a demonstration, he or she gets killed. If a Palestinian crosses a street, he or she gets killed. If a Palestinian obeys a curfew and stays home, he or she still gets killed. And the beginning of the spirals of violence that emerge from this basic situation remains an overwhelmingly Jewish responsibility, although, as we have seen, western Europeans, including Britain and Germany, the USA and its Arab allies could also be made partly accountable. The Palestinians who have committed or abetted violent acts, are in my opinion primarily to be seen as victims of an ongoing grand crime against humanity. Therefore they should only be considered guilty in a third tier of responsibilities, after Israeli Zionist Jews, and after their supporters in the USA and elsewhere, as well as their Nazi enemies. The charges against Palestinians may indeed include responsibility for crimes against humanity, but only with regard to the targeting of innocent civilians with lethal force. A crucial question is, however, whether anyone but the suicide attackers themselves may be held accountable for their crimes against humanity. Those who assist, influence, and direct them may perhaps only be prosecuted for crimes, but I will leave that question open. In any case, as I argued in Section II.1, the crimes against humanity and all other crimes committed by Palestinians resisting apartheid should be seen as crimes of a lesser magnitude than apartheid itself. The severity of the punishment for their crimes should in my opinion not exceed that meted out to apartheid perpetrators. The Israeli state death squads are at present in clear violation of international law as well as justice, and not only because of the large numbers of ‘collateral killings’ (which actually also amount to targeting of civilians due to their extremely high numbers, more than three times higher than the victims of Palestinian killers since 2000, and possibly as many as 20 times higher overall) and injuries and other damage caused. Two months after the last quote above, but before the commencement of Palestinian suicide attacks in 2001, Said added: In our case, the fighting is done by a small brave number of people pitted against hopeless odds, i.e. stones against helicopter gunships, Merkava tanks, missiles. Yet a quick look at other movements – say the Indian nationalist movement, the South African liberation movement, the American civil rights movement – tell us first of all that only a mass movement employing tactics and strategy that maximise the popular element ever made any difference on the occupier and/or oppressor. Second, only a mass movement that has been politicised and imbued with a vision of participating directly in a future of its own making, only such a movement has historical chance of liberating itself from oppression or military occupation. The future, like the past, is built by human beings. They, and not some distant mediator or saviour, provide the agency for change. 743 They provide the agency but in doing so they also hold accountability and responsibilities. Nonetheless, the vast majority of Palestinians involved in violent activities during the present Intifada as well as the previous one are in my opinion not guilty of any crimes at all. To resist a crime against humanity such as apartheid is not only brave, but righteous, as well. Not only the Geneva Conventions provide justification for self-defense. 743 Said: The Tragedy Deepens, 2000
299 Moreover, if laws and decrees are immoral, then it is moral to break those laws and decrees. The problem with Palestinian responsibility and accountability appears most obviously when unequivocally civilian people are targeted by Palestinian freedom fighters. This may be seen as not only criminal, but also as counterproductive to liberation. 744 In any event, if the Palestinians had access to weapons like those which Israel uses, then there would be no suicide attacks, and, in my opinion, probably no targeting of civilians by Palestinian fighters. Since decades, Palestinian attacks on military targets have been extremely unsuccesful. In many cases, it is enough for a Palestinian to get killed if s/he even looks at a military installation or a soldier the wrong way. The military superiority of the oppressor rules out a military victory in the case of Palestinian liberation at least as strongly as it did in the South African struggle. Sticks and stones have nothing on ABC weapons, neither do the bombs or firearms used by suicide attackers, nor the firearms used by other Palestinians. It is crucial that apartheid victims – just like victims of colonialism and even of genocide – are not only seen as victims, but also as people who after all can shape their destiny to some extent, and that they can make and do make mistakes. When the MK, the militant wing of the ANC, was formed, a phased strategy of violence was wisely agreed upon and then employed. Sabotage against state and corporate property without any loss of life due to the attacks was the first phase (during which the first MK commander, Nelson Mandela, was captured), guerrilla warfare the second. Terrorism and open revolution only came up as the last strategic resorts. 745 I believe that terrorism was and is neither morally nor strategically acceptable as a weapon against apartheid, neither in South Africa, nor in Israel, nor anywhere else. Its employment against apartheid and civilians in both South Africa and Israel, however, also tells us how bad things have actually become. Terrorism is a crime against humanity, but it is also a symptom. Terrorism should in my opinion always be condemned, prosecuted, avoided, and stopped, but the structural conditions that prompt it should be ameliorated first, especially if those conditions include crimes against humanity. In my opinion, apartheid in the three examined examples of Part II above is a bigger crime against humanity than terrorism (other than state terrorism) is or ever was, so far. Only when such a great crime as apartheid is removed does justice come into the picture. A ‘war against terror’, on the other hand, is and remains a contradiction in terms. It is a war which cannot be won. 744 Dominick: Ambushing the Occupation, 2002. It may be argued that the strategic introduction of Palestinian suicide attacks on Israeli civilians have raised the Jewish death tolls in relative terms from around 10 per cent in the first Intifada to over 20 per cent in the second. In either case, however, the Palestinians are losing the battles on the ground. There are slightly less than twice as many Palestinians as there are Israeli Jews. If the current relative death tolls are extrapolated to the extreme, Israeli Jews will still be around long after the last Palestinian has been killed. And (as far as we know) Israel has not yet started using its weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, Palestinians in general are losing battles in the propaganda war as long as (any) Palestinians employ terrorist tactics, whereas, let us not forget, Jewish Israeli terrorists are not losing wars against Palestinians. The Palestinians are also suffering much larger losses in absolute terms than in the previous Intifada, although the Israeli army appeared even less concerned about human rights from the very beginning of the 2000 uprising, that is, from well before the very first suicide attack in this phase of the conflict. For similar arguments (rejecting suicide attacks on Israeli civilians) regarding these moral, strategic and propaganda issues, see Finkelstein, N.: Personal Reflections On Palestine: Postscript To German Edition Of The Rise And Fall Of Palestine, 2003. See also, however, footnotes 148 and 185, above, on the problematic civilian status of (any adult) Israeli Jews, and of drawing a red line between civilian and other targets, in general. This observation must not be interpreted as an invitation to discard the difference between civilians and others, nor as an apology for terrorism. It is just a fact that a spectrum from civilian to non-civilian represents the difference(s) more accurately than strictly defining criteria could. In the end, though, it is in my view always better to solve conflicts with words and the rule of laws respecting human rights (especially international law) than with weapons. 745 Mandela 1995 (1994): 282-286
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299<br />
Moreover, if laws and decrees are immoral, then it is moral to break those laws and decrees.<br />
The problem with Palestinian responsibility and accountability appears most obviously when<br />
unequivocally civilian people are targeted by Palestinian freedom fighters. This may be seen<br />
as not only criminal, but also as counterproductive to liberation. 744 In any event, if the<br />
Palestinians had access to weapons like those which Israel uses, then there would be no<br />
suicide attacks, and, in my opinion, probably no targeting of civilians by Palestinian fighters.<br />
Since decades, Palestinian attacks on military targets have been extremely unsuccesful. In<br />
many cases, it is enough for a Palestinian to get killed if s/he even looks at a military<br />
installation or a soldier the wrong way.<br />
The military superiority of the oppressor rules out a military victory in the case of<br />
Palestinian liberation at least as strongly as it did in the South African struggle. Sticks and<br />
stones have nothing on ABC weapons, neither do the bombs or firearms used by suicide<br />
attackers, nor the firearms used by other Palestinians. It is crucial that apartheid victims – just<br />
like victims of colonialism and even of genocide – are not only seen as victims, but also as<br />
people who after all can shape their destiny to some extent, and that they can make and do<br />
make mistakes.<br />
When the MK, the militant wing of the ANC, was formed, a phased strategy of<br />
violence was wisely agreed upon and then employed. Sabotage against state and corporate<br />
property without any loss of life due to the attacks was the first phase (during which the first<br />
MK commander, Nelson Mandela, was captured), guerrilla warfare the second. Terrorism and<br />
open revolution only came up as the last strategic resorts. 745 I believe that terrorism was and is<br />
neither morally nor strategically acceptable as a weapon against apartheid, neither in South<br />
Africa, nor in Israel, nor anywhere else. Its employment against apartheid and civilians in both<br />
South Africa and Israel, however, also tells us how bad things have actually become.<br />
Terrorism is a crime against humanity, but it is also a symptom. Terrorism should in my<br />
opinion always be condemned, prosecuted, avoided, and stopped, but the structural conditions<br />
that prompt it should be ameliorated first, especially if those conditions include crimes against<br />
humanity. In my opinion, apartheid in the three examined examples of Part II above is a<br />
bigger crime against humanity than terrorism (other than state terrorism) is or ever was, so far.<br />
Only when such a great crime as apartheid is removed does justice come into the picture. A<br />
‘war against terror’, on the other hand, is and remains a contradiction in terms. It is a war<br />
which cannot be won.<br />
744 Dominick: Ambushing the Occupation, 2002. It may be argued that the strategic introduction of Palestinian<br />
suicide attacks on Israeli civilians have raised the Jewish death tolls in relative terms from around 10 per cent in<br />
the first Intifada to over 20 per cent in the second. In either case, however, the Palestinians are losing the battles<br />
on the ground. There are slightly less than twice as many Palestinians as there are Israeli Jews. If the current<br />
relative death tolls are extrapolated to the extreme, Israeli Jews will still be around long after the last Palestinian<br />
has been killed. And (as far as we know) Israel has not yet started using its weapons of mass destruction.<br />
Moreover, Palestinians in general are losing battles in the propaganda war as long as (any) Palestinians employ<br />
terrorist tactics, whereas, let us not forget, Jewish Israeli terrorists are not losing wars against Palestinians. The<br />
Palestinians are also suffering much larger losses in absolute terms than in the previous Intifada, although the<br />
Israeli army appeared even less concerned about human rights from the very beginning of the 2000 uprising, that<br />
is, from well before the very first suicide attack in this phase of the conflict. For similar arguments (rejecting<br />
suicide attacks on Israeli civilians) regarding these moral, strategic and propaganda issues, see Finkelstein, N.:<br />
Personal Reflections On Palestine: Postscript To German Edition Of The Rise And Fall Of Palestine, 2003. See<br />
also, however, footnotes 148 and 185, above, on the problematic civilian status of (any adult) Israeli Jews, and of<br />
drawing a red line between civilian and other targets, in general. This observation must not be interpreted as an<br />
invitation to discard the difference between civilians and others, nor as an apology for terrorism. It is just a fact<br />
that a spectrum from civilian to non-civilian represents the difference(s) more accurately than strictly defining<br />
criteria could. In the end, though, it is in my view always better to solve conflicts with words and the rule of laws<br />
respecting human rights (especially international law) than with weapons.<br />
745 Mandela 1995 (1994): 282-286