Apartheid
Apartheid Apartheid
290 taken from earlier Bantu-speaking ‘occupiers’, although the latter had hardly colonialized the land, but rather assimilated with the indigenous – at any rate to a much greater extent than the Whites would do. The pastoralist and hunter-gatherer Khoisan, who first inhabited the region and the farthest southern Bantu-speaking, agriculturalist and pastoralist people, the Xhosa, had accomplished a ‘high degree’ of assimilation before the Whites arrived in South Africa, according to Lester. In this regard, most of sub-Saharan Africa, in fact, seems to have functioned quite well prior to white invasions, with an informal system in which new immigrants initially assumed a ‘subservient’ status to groups already settled. 721 One could even go so far as to call this system a natural and morally superior opposite of apartheid. Obviously, the indigenous people, or the earlier settlers, generally know the land, the climate, the histories and cultures of neighbors, etc., better and should often be the authorities on such issues (though of course not on all issues). However, one runs the risk of adopting an unqualified and patronizing attitude towards immigrants in this way. The immigrants may know some of the histories and cultures of neighbors better because they just came from there. It is obviously better from a human rights perspective, and perhaps even from a collective survival perspective, that nobody is subservient. Another main difference between apartheid societies is the large extent of desecularization in Egypt under Greek and Roman rule. It enabled priests to become the class favored by the apartheid authorities, with privileges that mirrored those of certain indigenous political and business leaders in Israel and South Africa. This condition also reflects the high degree of admiration that the Greeks had held towards Egyptian culture prior to invasion in 332 BCE, especially during the eighth to early fifth centuries BCE. Perhaps it could be compared to Jewish admiration (and assimilation) of Islamic and Arab culture during the time of the European Middle Ages and later. Only South African apartheid did not have this lengthy pre-history of ancestors of the subsequent invaders actually condoning and admiring the culture that their descendants would eventually oppress and to some extent even destroy. Ptolemaic Egypt represents a unique and dramatic, though short-lived success of apartheid. It became the leading military, political, economic and cultural power in the world during the first two centuries of its existence. Neither South Africa nor Israel ever reached that kind of position. Of course, it cannot be compared with the hegemonic scope of US world dominance today, nor with British dominance during the 18 th and 19 th centuries, nor with that of the Roman Empire. Yet Ptolemaic Egypt does share a great deal with the USA. In this comparison, the Greeks play the role of the British pilgrims, colonialists and pioneers. It was ruled by emigrées from the leading military power of the previous era, who had made themselves independent in a land across the ocean. The USA was, and to some extent: still is, more genocidal in kind, but all the overlaps, with apartheid and even with colonialism were (are) there, as well. The USA is still largely run by white, Anglo-Saxon, protestant males, who may well have learned a lesson or two in oppression and hanging on to and extending their power and wealth from taking their Ptolemaic predecessors as role models. Like the USA, South Africa and especially Israel appear to display more genocidal aspects (in the concrete, physically violent sense) than Ptolemaic Egypt did, but the historical record that we now possess with regard to Egypt is still not extensive enough to support (or contradict) this assumption. A so far spectacular difference between South Africa and Israel/Palestine is the relative Israeli failure to cause Arab-on-Arab violence in comparison to South Africa proper, where Black-on-Black (ANC-Inkatha) violence cost more lives than the White-Black conflict itself between 1948 and 1994. It is hardly the case that Israel has not tried. In Lebanon, the Israelis and their US allies registered their greatest success to date with this divide-and-rule strategy. In Israeli and Palestinian areas, however, they have (so far) failed to cause serious rifts, although the creation of Palestinian Bantustans – and Palestinian security forces 721 Lester 1996: 35 and Reader 1998 (1997): 258, respectively
291 dependent on Israeli and US directives – has led to some violence between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists, respectively, and to violence between Fatah loyalists of the president and Hamas loyalists of the government. But at the same time Palestinians have a remarkably low level of civilian crime. 722 A second great difference is that the Israelis themselves have not suffered as serious inner tensions as the other apartheid benefactors that we have investigated. The British fought the Afrikaners in South Africa, the Romans fought the Greeks in Egypt, but the Israelis did not have to fight a war against the British for control of Palestine. The Israelis have also so far avoided a civil war between Jews, which could have been – or could still become – possible, for example between the privileged Ashkenazy (European) and the Sephardic (non-European) Jews. On the other hand, the rivalry between radical Zionists and moderate Jews did lead to the 1995 assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by a radical Zionist Jew – uncannily similar to the 1966 assassination of South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, by a man who (similarly) thought Verwoerd’s policies toward the black population were too liberal. There has also been some violence between settlers and government agents over a few dismantled settlements in the illegally occupied Palestinian territories, although these incidents were always accompanied by expanding settlements elsewhere in the territories, and never, as far as I know, led to any killings of Jews. In fact, the dismantling was primarily or only done for strategic reasons. 723 These conflicts appear to have been largely orchestrated for the international media in order for them to show Israeli ‘sacrifices’ for ‘peace’. A civil war between Israeli Jews is probably as unlikely as a civil war between Afrikaners ever was, but it cannot be ruled out. Apartheid will always breed and foster all kinds of violence. 724 The Israelis have been most successful at the practice of apartheid repopulation. They were able to mobilize veritable armies of Jewish immigrants along with the many Jews fleeing anti-Jewish persecution in Europe and in Arab countries. Moreover, Israel has no doubt achieved a high Jewish birth rate in comparison with, for instance, the South African white birth rate. Of course, their birth rate is still lower than the Palestinian one, and there is nothing to suggest that this will change as long as apartheid remains a basic fact of life in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. Related to the Israeli immigration and birth rate performances is the relatively successful ethnic cleansing of Israel from 1948 and of the illegally occupied territories since then. It was the determinant factor in the repopulation of Palestine. Only the Khoisan suffered a lasting similar fate in South Africa. 2. Struggle The Israeli success, however, is bought at a price. More than four million Palestinian refugees around the world and the friends they have made in exile and others aware of the injustices and the plethora of illegal measures against Palestinians, especially Arabs and Muslims, are now doing what they can to work against Israeli apartheid. Israel may indeed be heading towards the same kind of international isolation that apartheid South Africa 722 At least 11 people were killed in clashes between Hamas and Fatah security forces in May and June 2006. Al- Mughrabi: One Dead as Fatah, Hamas Clash, 2006. See also Reinhart: The Hamas Government Should Be Recognized, 2006. Prior to that, in the worst fighting between Palestinians since 1994, at least six people were killed and more than 80 wounded in a gun battle between militants and Palestinian police in the Jabaliya refugee camp in Gaza in December 2001. A PLO security crackdown on suicide attackers and their sponsors, demanded by Israel and the west, had prompted the hostilities. Al-Mughrabi: Hamas Suspends Suicide Bombings, Palestinians Fight, 2001. The great exception to the low level of civilian crime is of course femicide. See Chapter II.1.3, above. 723 Miftah: In the Spotlight: Settlement Dismantling: Don’t Let Them Fool You, 2002 724 Heller, J.: Echoes of Rabin Assassination Sound in Israel, 2002
- Page 239 and 240: 239 Learning Hebrew, on the other h
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- Page 325 and 326: 325 Deans, Jason: Flood of Complain
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291<br />
dependent on Israeli and US directives – has led to some violence between the Palestinian<br />
Authority and Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists, respectively, and to violence between Fatah<br />
loyalists of the president and Hamas loyalists of the government. But at the same time<br />
Palestinians have a remarkably low level of civilian crime. 722<br />
A second great difference is that the Israelis themselves have not suffered as serious<br />
inner tensions as the other apartheid benefactors that we have investigated. The British fought<br />
the Afrikaners in South Africa, the Romans fought the Greeks in Egypt, but the Israelis did<br />
not have to fight a war against the British for control of Palestine. The Israelis have also so far<br />
avoided a civil war between Jews, which could have been – or could still become – possible,<br />
for example between the privileged Ashkenazy (European) and the Sephardic (non-European)<br />
Jews.<br />
On the other hand, the rivalry between radical Zionists and moderate Jews did lead to<br />
the 1995 assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by a radical Zionist Jew – uncannily similar to<br />
the 1966 assassination of South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, by a man who<br />
(similarly) thought Verwoerd’s policies toward the black population were too liberal. There<br />
has also been some violence between settlers and government agents over a few dismantled<br />
settlements in the illegally occupied Palestinian territories, although these incidents were<br />
always accompanied by expanding settlements elsewhere in the territories, and never, as far as<br />
I know, led to any killings of Jews. In fact, the dismantling was primarily or only done for<br />
strategic reasons. 723 These conflicts appear to have been largely orchestrated for the<br />
international media in order for them to show Israeli ‘sacrifices’ for ‘peace’. A civil war<br />
between Israeli Jews is probably as unlikely as a civil war between Afrikaners ever was, but it<br />
cannot be ruled out. <strong>Apartheid</strong> will always breed and foster all kinds of violence. 724<br />
The Israelis have been most successful at the practice of apartheid repopulation. They<br />
were able to mobilize veritable armies of Jewish immigrants along with the many Jews fleeing<br />
anti-Jewish persecution in Europe and in Arab countries. Moreover, Israel has no doubt<br />
achieved a high Jewish birth rate in comparison with, for instance, the South African white<br />
birth rate. Of course, their birth rate is still lower than the Palestinian one, and there is nothing<br />
to suggest that this will change as long as apartheid remains a basic fact of life in Israel and<br />
the occupied Palestinian territories. Related to the Israeli immigration and birth rate<br />
performances is the relatively successful ethnic cleansing of Israel from 1948 and of the<br />
illegally occupied territories since then. It was the determinant factor in the repopulation of<br />
Palestine. Only the Khoisan suffered a lasting similar fate in South Africa.<br />
2. Struggle<br />
The Israeli success, however, is bought at a price. More than four million Palestinian<br />
refugees around the world and the friends they have made in exile and others aware of the<br />
injustices and the plethora of illegal measures against Palestinians, especially Arabs and<br />
Muslims, are now doing what they can to work against Israeli apartheid. Israel may indeed be<br />
heading towards the same kind of international isolation that apartheid South Africa<br />
722 At least 11 people were killed in clashes between Hamas and Fatah security forces in May and June 2006. Al-<br />
Mughrabi: One Dead as Fatah, Hamas Clash, 2006. See also Reinhart: The Hamas Government Should Be<br />
Recognized, 2006. Prior to that, in the worst fighting between Palestinians since 1994, at least six people were<br />
killed and more than 80 wounded in a gun battle between militants and Palestinian police in the Jabaliya refugee<br />
camp in Gaza in December 2001. A PLO security crackdown on suicide attackers and their sponsors, demanded<br />
by Israel and the west, had prompted the hostilities. Al-Mughrabi: Hamas Suspends Suicide Bombings,<br />
Palestinians Fight, 2001. The great exception to the low level of civilian crime is of course femicide. See Chapter<br />
II.1.3, above.<br />
723 Miftah: In the Spotlight: Settlement Dismantling: Don’t Let Them Fool You, 2002<br />
724 Heller, J.: Echoes of Rabin Assassination Sound in Israel, 2002