Apartheid
Apartheid Apartheid
180 movement. The British introduced the vote in regional elections for a few property-owning Blacks with a certain minimal income and at least the rudiments of literacy in the Cape province, but this was revoked in 1936. 366 One of the most racist aspects of South Africa’s legal system was the exploitation of black non-citizen migrant workers, eventually including millions of black Bantustan ‘citizens’, and the simultaneous heaping of privileges on white immigrants. Already during the 19 th century this policy was implemented for diamond and gold mine workers from the neighboring countries, especially from Lesotho, Rhodesia, and Mozambique. Before 1994, immigration policy was a naked instrument of racial domination. Until 1991, the official definition of an immigrant was that he or she had to be able to be assimilated into the white population. By definition, therefore, Africans were not considered immigrants. Rather, they came to South Africa as temporary workers, entering through back-door channels as contract migrants... 367 From the 1960s, the ten Homelands were made into ‘self-governing’ areas, and four were granted ‘independence’ by the South African government during the 1970s, and a further one in 1981. South Africa itself was the only country that ever recognized these ‘countries’, too weak – economically, politically and even culturally – to become truly independent in any sense of the word. White capitalists were forbidden by the South African government from investing directly in any business venture in the Homelands. In actual fact, the creation of the Homelands was a trick, invented by the apartheid regime for two main purposes. The first was to answer the powerful wave of decolonialization that had swept through Africa during the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s, leaving South Africa, South West Africa (until 1991) and Rhodesia (until 1980) as the only three countries out of the fifty-four countries of the African continent under formal white minority rule from 1975 onwards. Only a single African country had really been politically independent fifty years earlier, Ethiopia. The South African government hoped to appease critics abroad with this strategy but failed to do so. Secondly, the South African government saw the creation of Homelands as an opportunity to expel unwanted masses of Blacks from the country, to deny them any rights and benefits and indirectly to condemn them to a slow death. By 1980, population density in the Homelands, which were undeveloped and had land of very little agricultural value, was 23.8 per square mile. In South Africa as a whole (including the Homelands) it was 9.1. It was the manifest strategy and policy of the government to force almost all Blacks into the Homelands, and to treat Blacks that were or could be needed by the economy in South Africa as visitors, with less rights than South African (black) citizens, i.e. with practically no rights. Just to make sure, the South African Whites placed their collaborators on the thrones or at the helms of the Homelands, with undemocratic governments, of course. That way, absolutely no political trouble could be expected from them, despite the deliberate preprogramming of acute crises, including mass starvation, coups d’état and counter-coups. 368 Still, there were some pieces of agriculturally useful land within the designated Homelands. But the former had been taken and occupied long ago by white farmers. Instead of handing them back to the Blacks, however, the government created borders around existing white farms, as well as continuous and easy access to these from the rest of South Africa. And as a result: ‘Nearly every Homeland consisted of several pieces of land, separated by whiteowned farms. Bophuthatswana had nineteen fragments, some hundreds of miles apart; 366 Mandela 1995 (1994): 96; Wilson: African Decolonization, 1994 367 Crush: South Africa: New Nation, New Migration Policy? 2003 368 Thompson 1990: 191ff; Lester 1996: 126ff
181 KwaZulu comprised twenty-nine major and forty-one minor fragments.’ 369 The parallel to the situation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip at the outset of the Second Intifada could hardly be more obvious or stark: “Divided into about 63 noncontiguous cantons, completely encircled and besieged by Israeli troops, punctuated by 140 settlements (many of them built under Ehud Barak’s premiership) with their own road network banned to ‘non-Jews’, as Arabs are referred to, along with such unflattering epithets as thieves, snakes, cockroaches and grasshoppers…” 370 Seventy fragments of land here, sixtythree there. This small numerical difference is inessential, especially when compared with the dehumanization of the chosen enemy, but also with the arrogance of these forms of land theft. Land confiscation, expulsion, non-contiguity, and surroundedness are the keys here, and there. As far as I know, only South Africa, modern Israel, and the USA, with its native reservations, have ever come up with such a comprehensive system of stripping an indigenous majority of people of their land and their rights. It is no wonder that no other countries have been as close to modern Israel – politically, militarily and culturally – as apartheid South Africa and the USA. 3.3. The ‘Law of Return’ and the Neo-Bantustans ‘Israel’s Law of Return had [originally] enabled anyone who either had a Jewish mother or who had converted to Judaism to acquire immediate Israeli citizenship. However, in 1970 the Law was amended to enable anyone who only had a Jewish father, a Jewish grandparent or simply a Jewish spouse also to claim Israeli citizenship.’ 371 It was obvious to authorities by this time that Israel’s repopulation program was going to run into the South African (and Ptolemaic) dilemma. The indigenous were multiplying faster than they could be expelled or killed. At the same time as the Bantustan policy of apartheid South Africa was being hatched, Israel also decided to split up the indigenous by means of selective and eliminative citizenship. Political incorporation is one of the most effective means of neutralizing a political challenge. The granting of citizenship to Palestinians inside the 1948 boundaries was, indeed, astute. This, however, was less a reflection of Israeli leaders’ adroitness and more a reflection of Palestinians’ weakness. The political incorporation of Palestinians posed no threat to the existence of the Jewish state: On the eve of the [1987] intifada, Palestinians composed 18 percent of Israel’s population and less than 13 percent of Palestinians worldwide. The astuteness of Israeli policy makers does appear, however, in the 369 Thompson 1990: 191. See also Mandela 2002 (1965): 55-57. 370 Said, August 16-22, 2001 (see footnote 233). Israel has grudgingly allowed certain measures of democracy and self-government in its Bantustans, under the influence of idealist US liberals and others. However, the ‘democracy’ and ‘self-government’ allowed the Palestinians does not extend to curtail Israeli measures of ethnic cleansing, such as daily killings and land theft with impunity. Nor are Palestinian refugees, the vast majority of Palestinians, allowed to partake in any elections or governments of their fragmented home country. See Löwstedt: The Most Important Difference between the Palestinian and the Iraqi Elections? 2005. 371 Szamuely 1999. According to some Israeli immigration officials, several hundred Arab families that had fled or moved to Jordan after the establishment of the state of Israel had now returned and taken up Israeli citizenship for themselves and their families in 2001. Interior Minister Eli Yishai saw this as a ‘devious way of getting Arab refugees to return to Israel’, and a threat to the ‘Jewish character’ of the state, although Israeli law actually allows any former citizen to return. Yishai therefore instructed ‘ministry legal advisers to look into ways of changing legislation in order to reduce the number of Arabs who receive Israeli citizenship by marrying Israeli citizens’ and for establishing quotas for the return of former citizens. See Mualem: Yishai: Let’s Restrict Citizenship for Arab Spouses, 2002. The article also quotes Deputy Interior Minister David Azulai telling the Knesset in the same week that 246,037 non-Jews had received Israeli citizenship since 1988. Of these, 221,428 were from the former Soviet Union, and most probably without exception in solidarity or collaboration with Israeli Jews in their war against the Palestinians.
- Page 129 and 130: 129 an entity capable of self-deter
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- Page 135 and 136: 135 Palestinian children in Israeli
- Page 137 and 138: 137 Between 1987 and 2003, the IAEA
- Page 139 and 140: Times: ‘There is hardly a single
- Page 141 and 142: 141 were complete. Due to this, Whi
- Page 143 and 144: 143 the state of Israel’s in-vitr
- Page 145 and 146: 145 murders are thus often given fu
- Page 147 and 148: 147 as a majoritarian democracy is
- Page 149 and 150: 149 Authority, which does not prose
- Page 151 and 152: 151 Demography (ICD) and its polici
- Page 153 and 154: 153 Egypt today by one of its forem
- Page 155 and 156: 155 human shields during Israeli ar
- Page 157 and 158: 157 hand’. This is precisely the
- Page 159 and 160: 159 suffering from dementia. 305 Th
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- Page 163 and 164: 163 were quite obviously not to be
- Page 165 and 166: 165 Moreover, as we shall see in Ch
- Page 167 and 168: talent and principle this must incl
- Page 169 and 170: colonies within and around the city
- Page 171 and 172: 171 In the following year, the Isra
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- Page 187 and 188: 4. Land 187 Land dispossession and
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- Page 197 and 198: order to enjoy elementary rights. W
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- Page 201 and 202: 201 keeping such a brutal industry
- Page 203 and 204: 203 and often extremely unhealthy w
- Page 205 and 206: 205 In most cases, these passes are
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- Page 211 and 212: 211 in and by itself apartheid in t
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- Page 223 and 224: 223 Manetho’s account. 501 From M
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180<br />
movement. The British introduced the vote in regional elections for a few property-owning<br />
Blacks with a certain minimal income and at least the rudiments of literacy in the Cape<br />
province, but this was revoked in 1936. 366<br />
One of the most racist aspects of South Africa’s legal system was the exploitation of<br />
black non-citizen migrant workers, eventually including millions of black Bantustan<br />
‘citizens’, and the simultaneous heaping of privileges on white immigrants. Already during<br />
the 19 th century this policy was implemented for diamond and gold mine workers from the<br />
neighboring countries, especially from Lesotho, Rhodesia, and Mozambique.<br />
Before 1994, immigration policy was a naked instrument of racial<br />
domination. Until 1991, the official definition of an immigrant was<br />
that he or she had to be able to be assimilated into the white<br />
population. By definition, therefore, Africans were not considered<br />
immigrants. Rather, they came to South Africa as temporary workers,<br />
entering through back-door channels as contract migrants... 367<br />
From the 1960s, the ten Homelands were made into ‘self-governing’ areas, and four<br />
were granted ‘independence’ by the South African government during the 1970s, and a further<br />
one in 1981. South Africa itself was the only country that ever recognized these ‘countries’,<br />
too weak – economically, politically and even culturally – to become truly independent in any<br />
sense of the word. White capitalists were forbidden by the South African government from<br />
investing directly in any business venture in the Homelands.<br />
In actual fact, the creation of the Homelands was a trick, invented by the apartheid<br />
regime for two main purposes. The first was to answer the powerful wave of decolonialization<br />
that had swept through Africa during the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s, leaving South<br />
Africa, South West Africa (until 1991) and Rhodesia (until 1980) as the only three countries<br />
out of the fifty-four countries of the African continent under formal white minority rule from<br />
1975 onwards. Only a single African country had really been politically independent fifty<br />
years earlier, Ethiopia. The South African government hoped to appease critics abroad with<br />
this strategy but failed to do so. Secondly, the South African government saw the creation of<br />
Homelands as an opportunity to expel unwanted masses of Blacks from the country, to deny<br />
them any rights and benefits and indirectly to condemn them to a slow death. By 1980,<br />
population density in the Homelands, which were undeveloped and had land of very little<br />
agricultural value, was 23.8 per square mile. In South Africa as a whole (including the<br />
Homelands) it was 9.1.<br />
It was the manifest strategy and policy of the government to force almost all Blacks<br />
into the Homelands, and to treat Blacks that were or could be needed by the economy in South<br />
Africa as visitors, with less rights than South African (black) citizens, i.e. with practically no<br />
rights. Just to make sure, the South African Whites placed their collaborators on the thrones or<br />
at the helms of the Homelands, with undemocratic governments, of course. That way,<br />
absolutely no political trouble could be expected from them, despite the deliberate preprogramming<br />
of acute crises, including mass starvation, coups d’état and counter-coups. 368<br />
Still, there were some pieces of agriculturally useful land within the designated<br />
Homelands. But the former had been taken and occupied long ago by white farmers. Instead<br />
of handing them back to the Blacks, however, the government created borders around existing<br />
white farms, as well as continuous and easy access to these from the rest of South Africa. And<br />
as a result: ‘Nearly every Homeland consisted of several pieces of land, separated by whiteowned<br />
farms. Bophuthatswana had nineteen fragments, some hundreds of miles apart;<br />
366 Mandela 1995 (1994): 96; Wilson: African Decolonization, 1994<br />
367 Crush: South Africa: New Nation, New Migration Policy? 2003<br />
368 Thompson 1990: 191ff; Lester 1996: 126ff