Apartheid

Apartheid Apartheid

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114 members of the privileged ethnicity have some kind of ethnic duty to keep the numbers of the indigenous in check by whatever means they have at their disposal, a far from uncommon disposition among members of the ethnic elite. The ruling ethnic minority cannot expect its population to keep shrinking in relative terms without expecting qualitative change. In this sense, there is no smooth or gradual development from full-blown apartheid into colonialism. The violence is less continuous than, for instance, demographic developments are. Similarly, there is no gradual loss of formal state sovereignty. Under apartheid, life in general is overwhelmingly perceived by the members of the self-reified ethnic class as a perpetual zerosum struggle for survival, although there are, especially in the modern world, more than enough means for survival available to all. 1.1. Invasions, Uprisings, Clampdowns, Female Infanticide and Genital Mutilation The Ptolemies controlled Egypt in the first place by their military presence, consisting of military settlers on the land, garrisons in key places, and requisitioning of housing from the indigenous population for the troops. Greeks took over much of the better land. There was for a long time no actual use of force, merely its presence and threat, and the Ptolemaic regime can be described as douce rather than dure. But it was all the same a regime in which force was the ultimate guarantor of foreign domination, and actual force had to be used to repress various rebellions. 191 There were indeed several armed uprisings by the Egyptians, both under Greek and Roman rule, and they were all eventually suppressed in bloody clampdowns. The most famous revolt took place in 207 BCE, when most of Upper Egypt (Egypt south of the Nile delta), and some additional communities in the delta, were liberated until 186 BCE. Upper Egypt under indigenous rule during the Ptolemaic era should not be compared to the South African and Israeli ‘Bantustans’, the small and fragmented ‘states’ or ‘state-like entities’ that were (and are) formed by the oppressive ethnic minorities for the auto-policing of the oppressed majorities, among other reasons in order to appease international criticism of apartheid policies and practices, in particular charges of being anti-democratic, but also in order to lower white and Jewish, respectively, police and security force casualties during armed confrontations, and, last but not least, in order to deny citizenship and related rights to large portions of the indigenous population. No, Upper Egypt was liberated in the real sense of the term, after over 120 years of apartheid, though apparently only due to a momentary military weakness of the Ptolemaic state, which was also busy waging war in Asia at the time. There was also support from Nubia – much like Israel’s or South Africa’s independent neighbors – for the insurgents, who instated two native Upper Egyptian kings. The second and last ruling king during this 21-year long intermezzo, Ankhwennefer, was eventually captured yet pardoned by the Ptolemies, an indication that they realized the importance and potential counter-productivity of martyrization of leaders of the resistance. other words, whereas in reality they are often simply unprovoked acts of violence, carried out for reasons of ethnicist hate or for (perceived) personal or collective Israeli Jewish gain. However, acts of violence perpetrated by Palestinians, which are in fact almost always essentially retaliations, are only very seldom seen or referred to as such abroad, but rather as provocations, as ‘attacks’. This gross misrepresentation is mainly due to the victimization of all of us by apartheid ideology and by frequently coinciding elite interests on a global scale, which go far beyond merely Israeli and Jewish interests. See further Chapter II.9.3. 191 Bagnall 1997: 236f. In comparison with most other contemporary commentators, Bagnall seems to be rather sympathetic towards the Greeks and Romans in Egypt. Among other things, one notices this in the quoted phrase: ‘…force had to be used…’ See also below.

115 Later (and possibly earlier) leaders of revolts, however, were brutally tortured and killed. So were many of their followers. On at least two occasions, Ptolemy V vowed to the ‘rebels’ that he would spare their lives if they gave up their struggle. But he broke his promise and had the subversives executed anyway. The methods of executing Egyptians included the cruellest, slowest, most tormenting and humiliating ways of killing known at the time. Some of the victims were crucified, some were impaled on wooden poles, and others were dragged naked behind horse carts until they died. 192 So much for the ‘douce’ character of the Ptolemaic regime. In 169-168 BCE, another major uprising erupted. It coincided with the invasion of most of the country by Antioch IV, another ethnic Greek who ruled the Seleucid kingdom, based in Syria, yet another inheritance of Alexander’s conquests and yet another society with strong apartheid characteristics. Apparently, all Egyptians, with the exception of a small number of priests, joined the Seleucid invaders to fight the Greek-led Ptolemaic government forces. They were almost successful this time, but the combined Greek-Syrian and Egyptian forces were still unable to take the capital, Alexandria, from the Ptolemies. Due to Roman military intervention and political and diplomatic pressure upon him, Antioch eventually retreated from Egypt. The Egyptians, however, recommenced their uprising shortly afterwards, perhaps with some military aid from Antioch’s forces. The Greeks then mobilized the Jews, the third largest ethnic group in Egypt at this time, who had their own reasons not to support Antioch. He had earlier attacked Jews in Palestine. The violent conflict in Egypt ravaged the country for another five years before Ptolemy VI, the Greeks, and the Jews finally came out victorious. 193 The Jews were richly rewarded for their loyalty towards the Greeks. They now married into the upper Greek classes and gained access to the highest levels in the administration, the military, and the royal court. 194 At least during the immediately following period, the Jews seem to have risen in status above their intermediate ethnicity apartheid counterparts, the Coloreds and Indians in South Africa and the East Asians and (non-Jewish) eastern Europeans in modern Israel. The liberated Upper Egypt from 207 until 186 BCE was the only widely acknowledged Egyptian-led state on that territory during the entire period of Graeco-Roman dominance. Nonetheless, Greeks and Romans failed to ever achieve complete control. Throughout the ten centuries of their rule, lawless bands persisted, especially in Upper Egypt. Despite heavy punishment and perpetual military occupation, hold-ups and robberies were never stamped out: ‘[B]rigandage remained endemic in Roman Egypt, inveterate and ineradicable in good times, a menace increasing to near crisis proportions in bad.’ During the beginning of Roman rule, especially, there were also, again, several desperate Egyptian uprisings. 195 Due to the fact that the dominant group is a minority, crudely basing its dominance on violence or the threat thereof, complete control in the strict sense has remained an illusion within apartheid societies. Therefore, a high level of civilian violent crime, which also characterizes South Africa and Israel, could empirically be considered a necessary ingredient in such societies, even after the formal political system of systematic human rights violations 192 Huß 2001: 506-512 193 Ibid: 553-567. Huß finds it ‘strange’ (553) that the Egyptians joined Antioch IV against the Ptolemaic monarchy, although he is aware of the discrimination and oppression to which the Egyptians were subject at the hands of the Ptolemies and of the other Greeks in Egypt. He could be referring to the fact that Antioch was also Greek and was also an oppressive and ethnicist ruler in a nearby country. But that is mere speculation on my part. And I do not see how the situation of ancient Syrians, who had a vastly different culture and spoke another language than the Egyptians did, could be so important to the Egyptians, more important indeed than their own. Moreover, the proximity between Egypt and Syria two millennia ago should not be judged by today’s massively improved communication practices and standards. 194 Ibid: 590f. For example, a Jew and a Greek now shared command over the Ptolemaic armed forces. See Clauss: Alexandria: Schicksale einer antiken Weltstadt, 2003: 61. 195 Lewis, N. 1983: 203f; cf. Bowman 1996 (1986): 30f; Hölbl 2001: 307

114<br />

members of the privileged ethnicity have some kind of ethnic duty to keep the numbers of the<br />

indigenous in check by whatever means they have at their disposal, a far from uncommon<br />

disposition among members of the ethnic elite. The ruling ethnic minority cannot expect its<br />

population to keep shrinking in relative terms without expecting qualitative change. In this<br />

sense, there is no smooth or gradual development from full-blown apartheid into colonialism.<br />

The violence is less continuous than, for instance, demographic developments are. Similarly,<br />

there is no gradual loss of formal state sovereignty. Under apartheid, life in general is<br />

overwhelmingly perceived by the members of the self-reified ethnic class as a perpetual zerosum<br />

struggle for survival, although there are, especially in the modern world, more than<br />

enough means for survival available to all.<br />

1.1. Invasions, Uprisings, Clampdowns, Female Infanticide and Genital<br />

Mutilation<br />

The Ptolemies controlled Egypt in the first place by their military<br />

presence, consisting of military settlers on the land, garrisons in key<br />

places, and requisitioning of housing from the indigenous population<br />

for the troops. Greeks took over much of the better land. There was for<br />

a long time no actual use of force, merely its presence and threat, and<br />

the Ptolemaic regime can be described as douce rather than dure. But<br />

it was all the same a regime in which force was the ultimate guarantor<br />

of foreign domination, and actual force had to be used to repress<br />

various rebellions. 191<br />

There were indeed several armed uprisings by the Egyptians, both under Greek and<br />

Roman rule, and they were all eventually suppressed in bloody clampdowns. The most<br />

famous revolt took place in 207 BCE, when most of Upper Egypt (Egypt south of the Nile<br />

delta), and some additional communities in the delta, were liberated until 186 BCE.<br />

Upper Egypt under indigenous rule during the Ptolemaic era should not be compared<br />

to the South African and Israeli ‘Bantustans’, the small and fragmented ‘states’ or ‘state-like<br />

entities’ that were (and are) formed by the oppressive ethnic minorities for the auto-policing<br />

of the oppressed majorities, among other reasons in order to appease international criticism of<br />

apartheid policies and practices, in particular charges of being anti-democratic, but also in<br />

order to lower white and Jewish, respectively, police and security force casualties during<br />

armed confrontations, and, last but not least, in order to deny citizenship and related rights to<br />

large portions of the indigenous population.<br />

No, Upper Egypt was liberated in the real sense of the term, after over 120 years of<br />

apartheid, though apparently only due to a momentary military weakness of the Ptolemaic<br />

state, which was also busy waging war in Asia at the time. There was also support from Nubia<br />

– much like Israel’s or South Africa’s independent neighbors – for the insurgents, who<br />

instated two native Upper Egyptian kings. The second and last ruling king during this 21-year<br />

long intermezzo, Ankhwennefer, was eventually captured yet pardoned by the Ptolemies, an<br />

indication that they realized the importance and potential counter-productivity of<br />

martyrization of leaders of the resistance.<br />

other words, whereas in reality they are often simply unprovoked acts of violence, carried out for reasons of<br />

ethnicist hate or for (perceived) personal or collective Israeli Jewish gain. However, acts of violence perpetrated<br />

by Palestinians, which are in fact almost always essentially retaliations, are only very seldom seen or referred to<br />

as such abroad, but rather as provocations, as ‘attacks’. This gross misrepresentation is mainly due to the<br />

victimization of all of us by apartheid ideology and by frequently coinciding elite interests on a global scale,<br />

which go far beyond merely Israeli and Jewish interests. See further Chapter II.9.3.<br />

191 Bagnall 1997: 236f. In comparison with most other contemporary commentators, Bagnall seems to be rather<br />

sympathetic towards the Greeks and Romans in Egypt. Among other things, one notices this in the quoted<br />

phrase: ‘…force had to be used…’ See also below.

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