Clemons and McBeth - MavDISK

50 PARTI . THEORY AND PRACTICE
The idea that geography influences politics is sometimes called geopolitics. In essence, it
is a model that claims to help explain why countries behave as they do. If we judge geopolitics
by the first two criteria, then its description of how countries behave should match up with the
behavior of countries that we have observed historically and in the present; that explanation of
why they behave this way or that way should help us understand that behavior-perhaps even
prompting us to say, "Ah-hah, now I get it."
The third criterion is the most difficult one. This criterion states that if models are sound,
they ought to be able to predict. The model must, like a crystal ball, predict the future as well
as the past: 20120 hindsight is not enough. Imagine a model formed by observing someone
tossing a dime 50 times with the dime landing face down each time (in other words producing
the result we call tails). The observer suggests that the protruding head image of President
Eisenhower creates wind currents that steer the coin so that his face ends up pointed downward,
thus producing the constant result of landing with likable Ike upside down.
If this was the first time you had watched such coin tossing involving a dime, it would,
in fact, seem to be a model that accurately described; certainly the results you witnessed
would not contradict the observer's theory. Moreover, it might seem a reasonable explanation
for such an unexpected result. Thus, you might nod your head up and down, saying something
profound like "uh-huh" or "yep." However, if you continue to flip the dime, the odds are that
within a very short time you would have significant evidence that this particular modelwhile
great at "predicting" the past-was not such a hot prognosticator of the future. Moreover,
at this point the verisimilitude of the model would start to fade, and you would recognize
that, as an explanation, it was not very satisfactory.
Concluding Thoughts
The problem with the rational model is not just that it cannot consistently predict the future, nor
that it often fails to describe in a way that matches our observations, nor that it often seems
unable to produce the desired ah-hah. Part of the problem is that there are many other (noncational)
models that seem to describe, explain, and predict policy and the policy process as well
as or better than the rational model, especially when we are operating outside of quadrant I. But,
this is not to suggest analysts should throw the proverbial baby out with the dirty bath water.
Chapter 8 is in some ways an appendix to the chapter you just finished. We call Chapter 8
''The Positivist Toolbox." Everyone who opens the toolbox will have access to five key positivist
tools of analysis: sampling and mail surveys, extrapolation and forecasting, measures of central
tendency, discounting, and cost-benefit analysis. The positivist tools are powerful. As befits
power tools, these each corne with basic operating instructions as well as warnings about misuse.
In Chapter 3 we offer a brief introduction to nonrational models and critique the rational
model more extensively. Before reading on, however, make sure you understand the rational
model because, whatever else one says about the rational model, it can and does playa significant
role in policy analysis. Remember to use the criteria for model evaluation as you learn more
about the rational approach by studying alternatives to, and critiques of, this important approach.
Glossary Terms
extemaJilies (p. 43) Government by Gentlemen
(p. 39)
laissez-faire (p. 38)
operationalizing (p. 43)
CHAPTER 3
CRITIQUES OF THE RATIONAL ApPROACH
Mini-Case
"PolicyAnalysis,Ethics,and Role"
It might be comforting to imagine a world in which public policy was the result of pure rationality,
although for some, that thought might also be quite frightening. Further, for policy
analysts and public servants, trying to utilize the strengths of a rational process might be a
really good idea. In Chapter 5, we will corne back to exactly this issue.
Certainly most of us try to make our decisions rationally. Yet, the rational-comprehensive
model of decision making is flawed in theory and in practice. Although the dominant model in
terms of prestige, publishing, and the classroom, the rational model is subject to withering attacks
both as a description and as an explanation of the policy process and the resulting policies.
Worse, it sets up both unattainable and politically naive guidelines for the public analyst
or public manager. In the end, this wonderful-sounding approach is simply not fully satisfying
to the scholar, the practitioner, or democracy advocates.
We begin with three models and an axiom from political science that will serve as brief introductory
examples of the explanatory power of nonrationality. Following that introduction,
the rather extensive arguments that have been marshaled against the rational model will be
provided. In general, these arguments fall into three broad categories: intellectuaVanalytical,
politicaVinstitutional, and ideologicaVphilosophical.
Examples of the Power of Nonrational Explanations
Doyourememberourdiscussionof pluralism?If you do, thenthe idea of grouptheory should
sound familiar. Group theory is a model that argues that public policy is the result not of
rationality but of the competition between groups that struggle with each other to shape public
policy. The size and composition ofthe "members" of the group, the group's monetary wealth
and access to policymakers, and its organizational health are all factors that influence the
strength of these groups. For example, groups that are better organized and vote in higher numbers
(like senior citizens) tend to get better policy results than groups that are poorly organized and
fail to vote in significant proportions (like college students).
Other models focus on how decisions are made. One of the most common suggests that incrementalism
is more common than rationality. Incrementalism, a model first given a thorough
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