Clemons and McBeth - MavDISK

62
The Nature of the
Political System
The Nature of
Organizations
TABLE3.2
Jccasionally make risky choices for pwposes of self-interest, the parochial interests of the
:>rganizationor subunit may dominate decision making.
In fact, one reality of decision making in the policy realm is the rarity of decisions being
made solely by an individual. Accordingly, it is significant that the values of the group can
sway independent reason, that the capabilities of decision-making groups vary, and that
groupthink (subordinates fearing to dissent, exclusion of dissenters, pressure to reach consensus
and preserve congeniality and cohesion, being impervious to information discordant
with the desired outcome) is an ever-present danger in small working groups (Janis, p. 1982).
Thus, the nature of the political system (and the messy, multiple-entry, never-ending,
incremental policy process it creates) and the nature of organizations and their impact on decision
making and policy analysis (represented by ideas like role theory, parochial interests, and
groupthink) do not suggest the rational model as a good description of, or explanation of, the
world it models. Yehezkel Dror (cited in Crew 1992, pp. 73-74) characterizes organizational
clecision making as political, not rational, in the sense that it is marked by the following:
Bargainingandcoalition fonnulation, in which exchanges of favors, power calculations,
personal relations, and similar variables are often the most important factors.
The absence of clear operational goals, the presence of little data, and a very limited search
for alternatives.
The tendency to follow the line of least resistance; innovation and originality being rather
scarce.
The concentration of resources on acute and pressing issues to the neglect of long-tenn
considerations.
A tendency to minimize risks and to achieve defensibility.
Dror's description wil1 sound familiar to anyone who has had significant experience dealing
.vith organizations. Table 3-2 is a brief summation of the critique of the rational model fo-
:using on the nature of the political system and the nature of organizations.
PARTI . THEORY AND PRACTICE CHAPTER3 . CRITIQUES OF THE RATIONAL ApPROACH 63
SUMMARY OF THE POlITICAL/INSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE begin this section by asking a related and simple question: does it matter who decides policy?
Policyanalystsoperate in an American political system characterized
by pluralism, federalism, fragmentation, checks and balances, incrementalism,
and some degree of democracy.
The political system encourages incremental instead of comprehensive
policy change.
Clear mandates rarely occur.
Policy occurs rather than is made.
Decision makers are guided by SOPs that create distinctive organizational
cultures, behavioral patterns, and decision premises.
Different organizations have different interest in policy determination
and this contributes to different problem definitions.
Organizational self-interest and survival come into play.
11/.Ideological/Philosophical
3roup theory rests on an accepted truism: groups compete to shape policy. Elite theory sug-
~ested elites might make policy different from the policy that the masses might produce. We
1
We contend that the ideological/philosophical critique of the rational model is powerful.
We assume that your answer is "yes, of course" (or perhaps, more colloquially: "duh"). It
would matter, if earlier you agreed with the description of a political system that helps set up
policy battles due to its pluralistic nature and its failure to produce clear mandates. Or perhaps
you accepted our contention that different institutions, different subunits, and different groups
of humans could arrive at very different conclusions. It could be you think some individuals
are more likely to be wooden-headed, or more intuitive, or better at sorting through volumes of
data. Maybe you agreed with the idea that policy problems and facts are subjective and socially
constructed, and that they are not objective, not neutral, and not able to decide policy. Certainly,
the critiques raised earlier do relate to the critiques found in this new category.
However, your answer probably did not depend on reading the earlier sections. The final set
of critiques argue vociferously that it obviously matters who decides because of the following:
Wehave differentbelief systems and different visions of the future.
We valueand assumedifferentthings.
We make subjectiveinterpretationsandjudgment calls.
Policy decisionscommonlycreate winners and losers.
In other words, fundamentally, policy analysis/policymaking is not about rationality, but
about competing ideas, alternative views concerning morality and ethics, differing philosophies,
and about who should get stuck with the bads or get rewarded with the goods.
We will examine first the less visible ways that the who? affects the data we utilize, and
then the more direct ways analysis and decision making are shaped by subjectivity.
Data and Who? Experts and analysts are not exempt from biases, nor are they capable of
being dispassionate; that is why it matters who is in the room when decisions are being made.
Small-group theory also has made it clear that not all participants participate equally and not all
participants' contributions are weighed equally.
Onjuries, forexample,socialstatusirrelevantto thetaskat handcan influencethecourseof
deliberations (e.g., see Bales, 1950). Moreover, personality and personal relations playa large role.
Dei! Wright (1988), author of a seminal article on intergovernmental relations (IGR) cautioned:
Strictly speaking. . . there are no relations among governments; there are only relations among
officials who govern different units. The individual actions and auirudes of public officials are
at the core of JGR. (p. 17)
In his discussions of the Bush administration's failures during the breakup of Yugoslavia,
Robert Hutchings (1997) points to the rejection a priori of military options due to the opposition
of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs and due to the fact that the recent successof
the Persian GulfWargave their opinions extra credibility(p. 308). As Deborah Stone
(1988) elaborates:
The rational ideal not only overstates the purity of information, it also exaggerates the
rationality of people in using infonnation. . . . We are as much influenced by the source of
infonnation-the person's race, looks, social manners, reputation, and credentials, or
whether the source is a person or some other medium-as by the content. (p. 256)
People are, consciously or not, driven by their belief systems, their ideology. Despite
the rational model, we cannot, and arguably should not, leave our values behind. Our values,