Clemons and McBeth - MavDISK

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Once again these categories are interrelated and influence each other. The factors discussed
as falling under the intellectual/analytical umbrella also interact with these factors,
and indeed both are intertwined with the ideological/philosophical factors to be discussed
subsequently.
Political System While there is no political system that could guarantee or deliver rationality,
the political system that exists in the United States-for all its strengths-can be cited
as proof of, and a contributor to, the nonrationality of the policy process and policy outcomes.'
The most commonly proclaimed essential characteristics of the polity known as the
United States of America are political pluralism, federalism, fragmentation, legalism, checks
and balances, incrementalism, and an element of democracy. These characteristics are also the
key parameters of the political system. This is not the place for a discussion of these aspects,
but rather for examining the impact these characteristics have on policy.
Policymaking in the United States generally requires consensus building to put majorities together.
It is easier to stop policy development than to change or create it. Dramatic and radical
change is rare. As Braybrooke and Lindblom explain, "NonincrementaI alternatives usually do
not lie within the range of choice possible in the society or body politic." (The) "nonincrementaI
(is) often politically irrelevant. . . we always begin somewhere, not ad nihilo" (pp. 73, 89, 83).
Clear mandates are extremely rare and for any given issue there are multiple stakeholders,
with legitimate and conflicting claims (both individuals and groups) who can affect, and are
affected by, policy decisions.
As the earlier discussions of group and elite theory suggested, not all players, or policies,
are created equal. Nondecisions are cornmon. Nondecisions occur when issues are taken off,
or never placed onto, the table. The policy process offers many opportunities for contestants
to get into the game, and it should be thought of as a never-ending, ongoing process in which
the outcomes of earlier battles are relevant to, but not determinant of, today's policy outcomes.
The result is a messy process where, as John Kingdon (1984/1995) suggests, policy tends
to occur more than be made, and policies that can gain the necessary level of political support,
not necessarily the most rational policies, are the ones that win out.
Writing about the making of environmental policy, Dean Mann (1986) powerfully captured
the relationship between policy and the political system of the United States that produces it.
He described the pattern of policymaking as being marked by "a process of dramatic advances,
incomplete movement in the 'right' direction, frequent and partial retrogression, sometimes
illogical and contradictory combinations of policies, and often excessive cost. . . ." He concluded
this discussion with the observation that this ". . . should come as no surprise to students of
American politics" (p. 4). The political system is based on value conflict, politics, self-interest,
the public interest, and coalition building; it is fragmented and tied to political culture, and,
as a result, the making of policy is far from rational.
While a perfect following of the rational model seems impossible, a famous example of a
rather rational and comprehensive policy is the energy policy that President Jimmy Carter, a
nuclear engineer and policy wonk, devised. However, his political strategy was not nearly as
well developed as his policy plan. While Carter knew the details and substance of the issue, he
did not understand the need for stroking egos, striking fear in opponents, or swapping political
'This discussion builds on, and makes more specific to the United States. the earlier explanation of political
systems in Chapter J.
PARTI . THEORY AND PRACTICE CHAPTER3 . CR/TlQUES OF THE RATIONAL ApPROACH 59
favors. The Carter White House failed to generate and gamer the political support necessary for
his policy. It failed to become law not because of its substance, but because of poor politics.'
In another political system, the head of government might have been able to simply impose
his or her policy on their society. Instead, the nature of the political system of the United States
has produced an energy policy that much more closely fits the portrait painted of the making of
environmental policy by Dean Mann. To the extent that the United States has an energy policy
(and not having a public policy is a policy), it was created through bursts of partial progress and
steps backward and features legislation and goals that contradict other legislation and goals.
The Nature of Organizations The ideas that we have bundled under the rubric of the
nature of organizations offer little comfort to anyone wishing to believe in the rational model.
As descriptions of large organizations though, they ring true to astute observers and participants.
Organizations and their leaders designate authority and divide work. They train employees
and establish organizational objectives. They limit access to information and standardize
and fragment the information sought and recorded through, for example, the use of standardized
forms. They limit the amount of time, money, and personnel available to work on any
given problem. They institute rigid routines and standard operating procedures (SOPs). As
Alexander George and others have demonstrated, the way decision makers and organizations
are organized to process information is also important (1980). Permanent, professional policy
shops and temporary ad hoc committees thrown together to quickly address a crisis are
quite likely to produce different advice.
The effect of all this is to create agency cultures, behavioral patterns, and decisional
premises that guide decision makers. So, while in one very real sense individuals decide, in
another equally real sense organizations, or subunits within organizations, decide.
A related idea is role theory, and the contention of Miles' Law-discussed in Chapter 1that
one's stance on any given issue is determined by one's position (where you stand depends
on where you sit). This may be stated too deterministically, but it is a crucial insight into decision
making and the impact that the particular organization, or branch of an organization,
involved in the decision can have. Units and subunits tend to view policies that are good for
them and their particular clients as sacred cows, while issues that do not affect them may be
ignored or marginalized. All things being equal, the top Air Force brass is undoubtedly less
likely than the top Army brass to doubt the efficacy of aerial bombing. As McNamara detailed,
this was indeed the case. The effect of role on policy analysis is not an easy one to deal with
even for an ethical analyst. Consider briefly the following mini-case.
'This paragraph draws upon Charles O. Jones's policy classic, An Introduction 10 tlte Study of Public Policy,
3rd ed. (1984), pp. 107-108.
D ead the following scenarios and decide what you would do as an analyst. These sceftnarios
raise severalimportantissues, includingthe following:
Who does the analyst really work for?
Can the analyst really be a neutral party?
(continued)