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bothersome psychological discomfort called cognitive dissonance by rejecting facts that do
not fit our preconceived worldview.
The Mismeasure of Man is rich with examples of contorted logic, number finagling, and
biased decisions about including and/or excluding evidence rather than changing our presupposed
views. For example, Frenchman Paul Broca, who believed that brain size correlated with
intelligence, made all sorts of adjustments to explain away evidence that Germans had bigger
brains than did the French (including the very real factor of brain size relating strongly to body
size). Yet when "mis-measuring" women, he felt no need to correct for such factors (not even
for body size), stating that because we know that women are, on average, not as intelligent as
men,we can thenconcludethat part of the brain sizedifferenceis due to body size andpart to
"her intellectual inferiority" (Gould, 1996, pp. 121-137). Interestingly, while Gould discusses
some fraud by researchers, mostly he discovered inadvertent and unconscious bias.
We surrender to wishful thinking and hubris and reject results too catastrophic to swallow
as improbable. We stay the course due not to rationality, but to sunk costs and the selfdeception
that historian Barbara Tuchman called "wooden-headedness." Wooden-headedness
"consists in assessing a situation in terms of preconceived fixed notions while ignoring or
rejecting any contrary signs. It is acting according to wish while not allowing oneself to be
deflected by the facts" (1984, p. 7).
Some believe that as humans we, like other animals, respond instinctively (not rationally)
to perceived territorial threats. Clearly, as humans, there are rationality problems based on
physical limitations. People react intuitively, emotionally, and irrationally. Our memories falter;
we tire; our intelligence is not unbounded; and we are sometimes aggressive and sometimes
docile, but never purely rational.
One of the most famous and powerful critiques of the rational-comprehensive model came
from Herbert Simon, who we discussed in the previous chapter. Simon stated that this view of
humans attributed to them "a preposterously omniscient rationality" with "little discernible
relation to the actual or possible behavior of flesh-and-blood human beings" (1976, p. xxvii).
In other words, although he sought to rationalize decision making, Simon argued that we
practice bounded rationality. That is, we do not consider every possible alternative and all attendant
consequences, but rather latch on to the first satisfactory solution we come to. He calls
this satisficing. Humans "satisfice because they have not the wits to maximize" (p. xxviiiemphasis
in the original).
He notes that "our perceptions capture only a drastically simplified model of the buzzing,
blooming confusion that constitutes the real world" (p. xxix) and that we ignore "the interrelatedness
of all things (so stupefying to thought and action)" and instead rely on "relatively simple
rules of thumb that do not make impossible demands upon" our intellectual capacity (p. xxx).
A.nalytical Problems As you can see, the analytical problem of complexity contributes
to the human factor problem. Complexity, problems with prediction, problems that relate to
the precious commodity of time, and problems that relate to data, represent the key analytical
problems.
Today, complexity is widely recognized as a central problem of analysis. Hans Morgenthau,
the premier realist scholar who explained how to understand foreign policy, argued that
"The first lesson the student of international politics must learn and never forget" is complexity
(1993, p. 22). Problem situations are interdependent and changing rapidly. The problems
tackled are often vaguely defined, immense and extremely difficult problems, like poverty,
racism, global warming, or teenage pregnancy.
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Explaining why they believe that the incremental approach, not the rational approach,
dominates in the real world, Braybrooke and Lindblom help characterize compleJCity.They
note that we face "a cluster of interlocked problems with interdependent solutions" (1970, p. 54)
and point out that the problems are often not clear; instead there is just a sense that "something
needs to be done" (p. 57). Lofty, vacuous, conflicting, and nondelineated goals, often
too broad to operationalize, can leave policy analysts and decision makers without a guiding
star. (What is the public interest? How do we define literate? What is safe and affordable housing?
How do we measure education?)
The gist of the complexity argument is that the problems we face are so difficult, so undefined,
so complicated, and so interrelated that they defy the utopian rational-comprehensive
approach. Moreover, the specialization, simplification, and cognitive structures we apply to
make the problems fit our intellectual scale can be liabilities as we try to solve complex problems.
The great uncertainty that the chaotic world represents; the vast and tumultuous imaginable
potential outcomes, occasionally carrying life-and-death consequences; the unknowable
factors; and the imperfect anticipation of unintended consequences are all part and parcel of
the analytical limitations on prediction and rationality.
Rationality would require that future results be foreseen (i.e., be known accurately). Yet,
clearly that is not possible no matter how deeply we peer into our crystal balls. Indeed,
humans often spend inordinate amounts of time and money gathering "facts" in the deluded
belief that the decision will make itself if we only can accumulate enough facts, when, in fact,
the limits on what is gatherable and comprehensible are severe, and the reality is that value
questions will still need to be resolved. Recent scientific studies on cognition, popularized by
books like Blink (Gladwell, 2007) and Gut Feelings (Gigerenzer, 2007) have suggested that
simple rules of thumb, less information, and snap judgments based on gut instincts tend to
work better than the rational model.
Whether it is human nature, or a reflection of our political culture, most people in this
country both recognize that there are problems in society and government and believe that
optimal solutions to those problems must exist. But once we start seriously examining social
problems like poverty, drug use, crime, health care, illegal immigration, or terrorism, it almost
immediately becomes evident that simple solutions do not exist for complex, multicausal
problems. In fact, serious study may reveal that we do not even know exactly what the problem
is. Did the war in Iraq help or hinder the war on terror? What causes terrorism? What would
diminish it? How serious is international terrorism compared with other risks?
Moreover, as we study these issues carefully, we may see them as more complex. That is,
gaining a serious understanding does not necessarily make the problem seem clear, the solutions
obvious, and-in fact-the answers you determine may appear politically implausible.
For example, perhaps the solution would not be palpable to the powers that be or run counter
to the dominant social paradigm. And, certainly, different people, people in different roles
and organizations, will come to different problem definitions and solutions.
Further, no one group or individual is likely to be able to derive a solution. This is why it is
important to look at the shoes under the table. The only possible solution may have to involve the
participation and buy in of diverse groups of people and interests, and it may take a verylong time.
This is symptomatic of what Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber (1973) called wickedproblems.
Wicked problems do not have bumper-sticker solutions. They do not have a single, optimal
solution. And, the issues and possible solutions only become clear when a diverse group
of participants with differing values, interests, and points of view come together to deal with
them (which can also change the definition of what the problem is). In short, wicked problems