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463 Mass. 353 - Appellee Commonwealth Brief - Mass Cases

463 Mass. 353 - Appellee Commonwealth Brief - Mass Cases

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767 (2005), where the defendant's decision to testify<br />

was forced on him by a police illegality that should<br />

have resulted in invocation of the exclusionary<br />

principles. Suppression extends to the "fruits" of the<br />

police illegality, such as "derivative evidence, both<br />

tangible and testimonial, that is the product of the<br />

primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an<br />

indirect result of the unlawful search, up to the point<br />

at which the connection with the unlawful search<br />

becomes 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'"<br />

Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536-537 (1988)<br />

(citations omitted) . In Charras, the "taint"<br />

associated with the police illegality extended far and<br />

even the defendant's own testimony was considered to be<br />

a "derivative" of it, under the special circumstances<br />

of that case. Charras, 443 <strong>Mass</strong>. at 766.<br />

This case is not like Charras. The certificates<br />

of analysis would have been admissible in evidence if<br />

the analyst had appeared in court. The certificates<br />

were not subject to suppression and there is no<br />

exclusionary principle that would bar its admission at<br />

a retrial. The evidence that was illegally seized in<br />

Charras and which forced the defendant to have to<br />

testify was inadmissible because it had been illegally<br />

36

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