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463 Mass. 353 - Appellee Commonwealth Brief - Mass Cases

463 Mass. 353 - Appellee Commonwealth Brief - Mass Cases

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counsel for Ronald Mendes actually stated in·his<br />

opening statement, "My client is going to concede that<br />

he had marijuana in his house and had cocaine in his<br />

house, but those were for his own personal use .... " (Tr.<br />

The bare appellate record will only rarely<br />

afford a basis for concluding - by any standard -- that<br />

a defendant's decision to testify was not "in response<br />

to" the way that certain facts were proven in the<br />

<strong>Commonwealth</strong>'s case in chief. Indeed, in general, it<br />

stands to reason that appellate courts, in any direct<br />

appeal, will find it exceedingly difficult to determine<br />

why a defendant chose to testify, because that decision<br />

is made (and should be made) under the protection of<br />

the attorney-client privilege. The defendant's<br />

approach is simply unworkable and unfair.<br />

But mainly, there is just nb need to abandon our<br />

traditional harmless error analysis to deal with<br />

Melendez-Diaz errors. This Honorable Court applied our<br />

traditional harmless error analysis, and the Degraca<br />

factors (including "the premise of the defense" factor<br />

and "whether the erroneously admitted evidence was<br />

merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence"<br />

factor); in all sorts of contexts. This Court has had<br />

no problem applying the "premise of the defense"<br />

32

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