462 Mass. 1 Appellant Ray Brief - Mass Cases
462 Mass. 1 Appellant Ray Brief - Mass Cases 462 Mass. 1 Appellant Ray Brief - Mass Cases
-14- single prosecutionn required the judge to seriously consider alternatives to declaring a mistrial, including counsels' request for a Tuey-Rodriguez instruction. Jones, supra, 379 Mass. at 617. Because the judge did not explore other alternatives to declaring a mistrial, the Commonwealth cannot sustain its heavy burden of demonstrating that there was a "high degreen of necessity requiring a mistrial. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). See Collins v. Commonwealth, 412 Mass. 349, 352 (1992); Commonwealth v. Steward, 396 Mass 76, 79-80 (1985); Barton v. Commonwealth, 385 Mass. 517, 518-519 (1982); Jones v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 607, 615-618 (1980); Commonwealth v. Horrigan, 41 Mass. App. 337, 341 (1996); Commonwealth v. Phetsaya, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 293, 298-300 (1996); Cuoto v. Common wealth, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 913, 913-914 (19841 (all barring retrial on double jeopardy grounds because the trial judge declared a mistrial without carefully considering less drastic alternatives). CONCLUSION For the above stated reasons, the record does not demonstrate a "manifest necessityn for the mistrial.
- Page 1 and 2: COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPRE
- Page 3 and 4: -ii- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases A J
- Page 5: -iv- Statutes G.L. c.211, §3. . .
- Page 9 and 10: Commonwealth (R. 33-34). -4- ARGUME
- Page 11 and 12: -6- See Commonwealth v. Haley, 413
- Page 13: -8- "high degree" of necessity requ
- Page 20: -15- Further prosecution would ther
-14-<br />
single prosecutionn required the judge to seriously<br />
consider alternatives to declaring a mistrial, including<br />
counsels' request for a Tuey-Rodriguez instruction.<br />
Jones, supra, 379 <strong>Mass</strong>. at 617. Because the judge did<br />
not explore other alternatives to declaring a mistrial,<br />
the Commonwealth cannot sustain its heavy burden of<br />
demonstrating that there was a "high degreen of<br />
necessity requiring a mistrial. Arizona v. Washington,<br />
434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). See Collins v. Commonwealth,<br />
412 <strong>Mass</strong>. 349, 352 (1992); Commonwealth v. Steward, 396<br />
<strong>Mass</strong> 76, 79-80 (1985); Barton v. Commonwealth, 385<br />
<strong>Mass</strong>. 517, 518-519 (1982); Jones v. Commonwealth, 379<br />
<strong>Mass</strong>. 607, 615-618 (1980); Commonwealth v. Horrigan, 41<br />
<strong>Mass</strong>. App. 337, 341 (1996); Commonwealth v. Phetsaya,<br />
40 <strong>Mass</strong>. App. Ct. 293, 298-300 (1996); Cuoto v. Common<br />
wealth, 18 <strong>Mass</strong>. App. Ct. 913, 913-914 (19841 (all<br />
barring retrial on double jeopardy grounds because the<br />
trial judge declared a mistrial without carefully<br />
considering less drastic alternatives).<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
For the above stated reasons, the record does not<br />
demonstrate a "manifest necessityn for the mistrial.
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