462 Mass. 1 Appellant Ray Brief - Mass Cases
462 Mass. 1 Appellant Ray Brief - Mass Cases 462 Mass. 1 Appellant Ray Brief - Mass Cases
-7- Barbioni, 62 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1995) (manifest necessity for a mistrial where the judge received two notes from the jury indicating the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict and the judge polled the jurors individually to ensure that each juror believed there was a deadlock that could not be resolved by any further instructions or deliberations); A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 392 Mass. 52, 55 (1984) (manifest necessity for a mistrial where judge received a note from the foreperson indicating the jury was unable to agree and the jury affirmed that they were deadlocked during an inquiry in open court)j Thames, supra, 365 Mass. at 480 (manifest necessity for a mistrial where judge received two messages from the jury indicating that they were unable to agree and judge learned that the jury had a disposition of eleven to one in favor of conviction during an inquiry of the foreperson in open court) . Because the judge did not take any measures to assist the jury in coming to a unanimous verdict or to ensure that the jury was truly deadlocked before declaring a mistrial, the Commonwealth cannot sustain its heavy burden of demonstrating that there was a
-8- "high degree" of necessity requiring a mistrial. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). C. The judge's decision to declare a mistrial is not entitled to deference on appeal because the judge did not give careful consideration to the available alternatives and the defendant's interest in retaining the chosen jury. The rationale underlying the prohibition against double jeopardy is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to _live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957). Due regard for the defendant's fundamental constitu- tiona! right to be free from double jeopardy requires that a trial judge's power to declare a mistrial be "used with the greatest caution, under urgent circum- stances, and for very plain and obvious causes." United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824). "The discretion of a trial judge where double jeopardy is concerned is more restricted than the discretion commonly granted to trial-judges for ... more routine
- Page 1 and 2: COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPRE
- Page 3 and 4: -ii- TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases A J
- Page 5: -iv- Statutes G.L. c.211, §3. . .
- Page 9 and 10: Commonwealth (R. 33-34). -4- ARGUME
- Page 11: -6- See Commonwealth v. Haley, 413
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"high degree" of necessity requiring a mistrial.<br />
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978).<br />
C. The judge's decision to declare a mistrial<br />
is not entitled to deference on<br />
appeal because the judge did not give<br />
careful consideration to the available<br />
alternatives and the defendant's<br />
interest in retaining the chosen jury.<br />
The rationale underlying the prohibition against<br />
double jeopardy<br />
is that the State with all its resources and<br />
power should not be allowed to make repeated<br />
attempts to convict an individual for an<br />
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to<br />
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling<br />
him to _live in a continuing state of<br />
anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing<br />
the possibility that even though innocent he<br />
may be found guilty.<br />
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957).<br />
Due regard for the defendant's fundamental constitu-<br />
tiona! right to be free from double jeopardy requires<br />
that a trial judge's power to declare a mistrial be<br />
"used with the greatest caution, under urgent circum-<br />
stances, and for very plain and obvious causes."<br />
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824). "The<br />
discretion of a trial judge where double jeopardy is<br />
concerned is more restricted than the discretion<br />
commonly granted to trial-judges for ... more routine
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