SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DIRK GKEINEDER - Mass Cases
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DIRK GKEINEDER - Mass Cases SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DIRK GKEINEDER - Mass Cases
determining whether the prejudice flowing from the erroneous testimony requires a new trial. Under that test, Greineder is clearly entitled to relief.lb c. Grelneder is entitled to relief under Gallarelli. Greineder's pre-trial motion for all scientific test results was allowed by agreement. Docket #14, E. 4/10/00 at 5; 8. 24. Under Gallarelli, that request was sufficiently specific to encompass Rebeiro's accurate opinion, as revealed in her post-trial affidavit. The Commonwealth's failure to produce this exculpatory evidence resulted in a trial tainted by the presentation of false, unreliable expert testimony. This Court cannot be sure that such nondisclosure "did not influence the jury or had but a very slight effect," so Greineder is entitled to relief. d. Grelneder ia entitled to relief under the newly-discovered evidence standard . Even under the newly-discovered evidence standard, Judge Chernoff abused his discretion in denying relief. Given the centrality of this testimony to the Commonwealth's case, it cannot fairly be said that the erroneous evidence was not a "real factor" in the jury's 16 In his Findinss, the motion judge noted that if "a strict due process standard of review" were applied, it "might well result in an order for a new trial." F1ndinq-B at 61 n.11, 8. 972. 34
deliberations. Judge Chernoff is correct that " It1 he jury could have diacounted all the footprint evidence and still found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed his wife." &. 978. That, however, is not the test. Rather, the question is whether the admission Of critical, unrebutted expert testimony emphasized by the prosecutor in closing argument likely affected the jury's week-long deliberations. Under that legal standard, Greineder is clearly entitled to relief. As another court wrote in a similar context: The .. . expert's testimony was damning - and it was false.. . . [the defendant] has the right to be tried, insofar as possible, on the basis of true and correct evidence; to deny him this right is to deny him a fair trial.. . . IT] o allow a conviction to be based even in part on such manifestly inaccurate and prejudicial testimony ,.. would be a serious injustice. State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 (Minn. 1982). VI. THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING GREINEDER'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED UPON THE DELIBERATING JURY'S EXPOSURE TO EXTWEOUS INFORDdATION. A. Statement of Relevant Pacts. The specific facts relating to this claim, including the evidence adduced at a post-trial evidentiary hearing, are set forth at pp. 3-16 of Defendant's Post-Hearinq Memorandum of Law Resuectinq ExDoaure of Deliberating JUZY t o Extraneous Information. A. 738-751. Judge Chernoff denied the portion of Greineder's motion for new trial raising this claim by order dated May 5, 2006. A. 35
- Page 1 and 2: NORFOLK. ss. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSAC
- Page 3 and 4: 3. Greineder's direct testimony. .
- Page 5 and 6: VI. VII. d. Greineder is entitled t
- Page 7 and 8: 4 . Counsel's failure to move to su
- Page 9 and 10: Miller v. Harvey, 566 F.2d 879 (4th
- Page 11 and 12: Commonwealth v. Carter, 39 Mass. Ap
- Page 13 and 14: Commonwealth v. Martinez, 425 Mass.
- Page 15 and 16: FitzDatrick v. Allen, 410 Mass. 791
- Page 17 and 18: STATEMENT OF THE CASE Dirk K. Grein
- Page 19 and 20: First of all, we are in Room 8. The
- Page 21 and 22: logistical reasons for closure.3 As
- Page 23 and 24: inculpatory DNA test results linkin
- Page 25 and 26: testified that Greineder could not
- Page 27 and 28: This Court held in Bmmonwealth v. N
- Page 29 and 30: of his Miranda rights. a. at 112-12
- Page 31 and 32: up Ms. Greineder . Greineder replie
- Page 33 and 34: waives that right and makes volunta
- Page 35 and 36: that Greineder had never mentioned
- Page 37 and 38: they render the trial fundamentally
- Page 39 and 40: Prior to trial, the Commonwealth ma
- Page 41 and 42: gets to that point [i.e., to commit
- Page 43 and 44: States, 17 F.2d 973, 976 (5th Cir.
- Page 45 and 46: 399 Mass. 17, 21 n.5 (1987). In Gal
- Page 47 and 48: 1. Rebeiro's trial testimony was fa
- Page 49: As noted above, many jurisdictions
- Page 53 and 54: where the jury had experimented wit
- Page 55 and 56: jury, if “a judge learns that a j
- Page 57 and 58: consideration of the factors outlin
- Page 59 and 60: moments" of insight, which "helped"
- Page 61 and 62: Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 2
- Page 63 and 64: In evaluating a claim of ineffectiv
- Page 65 and 66: DNA test results withstands scrutin
- Page 67 and 68: In any event, if filing such a moti
- Page 69 and 70: subject to exclusion on that ground
- Page 71 and 72: esults were effectively unchallenge
- Page 73 and 74: emains unrebutted, and Dr. Brenner'
- Page 75 and 76: precisely what the Constitution pro
- Page 77 and 78: A search warrant for a residence co
- Page 79 and 80: circumatances, the court could prop
- Page 81: process can arise from a combinatio
determining whether the prejudice flowing from the<br />
erroneous testimony requires a new trial. Under that<br />
test, Greineder is clearly entitled to relief.lb<br />
c. Grelneder is entitled to relief<br />
under Gallarelli.<br />
Greineder's pre-trial motion for all scientific test<br />
results was allowed by agreement. Docket #14, E. 4/10/00<br />
at 5; 8. 24. Under Gallarelli, that request was<br />
sufficiently specific to encompass Rebeiro's accurate<br />
opinion, as revealed in her post-trial affidavit. The<br />
Commonwealth's failure to produce this exculpatory<br />
evidence resulted in a trial tainted by the presentation<br />
of false, unreliable expert testimony. This Court cannot<br />
be sure that such nondisclosure "did not influence the<br />
jury or had but a very slight effect," so Greineder is<br />
entitled to relief.<br />
d. Grelneder ia entitled to relief<br />
under the newly-discovered evidence<br />
standard .<br />
Even under the newly-discovered evidence standard,<br />
Judge Chernoff abused his discretion in denying relief.<br />
Given the centrality of this testimony to the<br />
Commonwealth's case, it cannot fairly be said that the<br />
erroneous evidence was not a "real factor" in the jury's<br />
16 In his Findinss, the motion judge noted that if "a<br />
strict due process standard of review" were applied, it "might well<br />
result in an order for a new trial." F1ndinq-B at 61 n.11, 8. 972.<br />
34
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