SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DIRK GKEINEDER - Mass Cases

438 Mass. 672, 434-435 (2003). Two important features of
the Bradv rule expand its scope beyond intentional
nondisclosure by a malicious prosecutor. First, knowledge
by any member of the prosecutorial team is imputed to the
prosecutor. See, a, Kvles v. Whitlev, 419 U.S. 419,
437 (1995); Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816, 823
(1998). As this Court has noted, prosecutorial misconduct
can include the "inept and 'bungling' performance of the
police, which is attributed to the [prosecutor] ."
Commonwealth v. Olszewski, 401 Mass. 749, 753 (1988).
Second, there is no requirement of bad faith to establish
a violation of due process. United States v. Aqurs, 427
U+S. 37, 110 (1976); Bradv, 373 U.S. at 87-88 (violation
does not turn on whether nondisclosure waa product "of
guile"). Reversal is required if there is a "reasonable
probability## that, had the material been disclosed, the
result would have been different. United States v.
Bacrlev, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). The "question is not
whether the defendant would . . . have received a different
verdict," but rather whether the defendant received a
fair trial. Kvles, 419 U.S. at 434.
Under Massachusetts law, the standard of prejudice
required for relief depends on whether a specific request
was made for the information. Commonwealth v. Tucceri,
412 Mass. 401, 407 (1992); Commonwealth v. Gallarelli,
28