SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DIRK GKEINEDER - Mass Cases
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DIRK GKEINEDER - Mass Cases SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DIRK GKEINEDER - Mass Cases
A: No. in such a way so that your feet are behind you? Q: Did you come to that realization this weekend, by any chance, sir? A: No. z. 21/103. 6. Prosecutor's closing argument. In his closing, the prosecutor argued that Greineder's testimony that he tried to pick up Ms. Greineder three times was concocted to support Stuart James' blood spatter testimony and stressed that Greineder had not provided this account previously. n. 25/63. He returned to this theme later, claiming that Greineder's story did not emerge "until ".. Stuart James told him" about the spatter evidence. Id. at 78. Finally, he contended that Greineder's "story" of trying to pick up Ms. Greineder three times was the product of "a year- and-a-half of careful construction." =. at 87-88. B. Sununary of Applicable Law. 1. Ban on exploiting post-arrest silence. 'I [A] defendant's silence after Miranda warnings have been given may not be used to support an inference of guilt." Commonwealth v. Brown, 451 Mass. 200, 208 (ZOOS), citinq Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-618 (1976). That "absolute prohibition is not negated when a defendant 16
waives that right and makes voluntary statements to investigators." Commonwealth v. Richgtte, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 524, 526 (2003). If a defendant does make a statement, direct contradictions between that statement and the defendant's trial testimony can be brought out. Commonwealth v. Lavalley, 410 Mass. 641, 648-650 (1991). The prosecutor may not emphasize what a defendant "failed to say," but may only "argue that what he did say was wholly incompatible with the defense proffered at trial. '' Richotte, 59 Mass. App. Ct. at 529. 2. Ban on comment on pre-arreat silence. This Court has held: [Ilmpeachment of a defendant with the fact of his prearrest silence should be approached with caution, and, wherever it is undertaken, it should be prefaced by a proper demonstration that it was 'natural' to expect the defendant to speak in the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 386 Mass. 54, 63 (1982). It may not always be "natural" for a witness to disclose even exculpatory information since "the witness ... may not realize the significance of the information he possesses." a., at 58 n.4. 3. Ban on suggesting that a defendant has tailored testimony to fit trial evidence. A defendant has the right to "wait until after the prosecution ha[sl made its case before revealing his story." Commonwealth v. Beauchama, 424 Mass. 682, 690-691 17
- Page 1 and 2: NORFOLK. ss. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSAC
- Page 3 and 4: 3. Greineder's direct testimony. .
- Page 5 and 6: VI. VII. d. Greineder is entitled t
- Page 7 and 8: 4 . Counsel's failure to move to su
- Page 9 and 10: Miller v. Harvey, 566 F.2d 879 (4th
- Page 11 and 12: Commonwealth v. Carter, 39 Mass. Ap
- Page 13 and 14: Commonwealth v. Martinez, 425 Mass.
- Page 15 and 16: FitzDatrick v. Allen, 410 Mass. 791
- Page 17 and 18: STATEMENT OF THE CASE Dirk K. Grein
- Page 19 and 20: First of all, we are in Room 8. The
- Page 21 and 22: logistical reasons for closure.3 As
- Page 23 and 24: inculpatory DNA test results linkin
- Page 25 and 26: testified that Greineder could not
- Page 27 and 28: This Court held in Bmmonwealth v. N
- Page 29 and 30: of his Miranda rights. a. at 112-12
- Page 31: up Ms. Greineder . Greineder replie
- Page 35 and 36: that Greineder had never mentioned
- Page 37 and 38: they render the trial fundamentally
- Page 39 and 40: Prior to trial, the Commonwealth ma
- Page 41 and 42: gets to that point [i.e., to commit
- Page 43 and 44: States, 17 F.2d 973, 976 (5th Cir.
- Page 45 and 46: 399 Mass. 17, 21 n.5 (1987). In Gal
- Page 47 and 48: 1. Rebeiro's trial testimony was fa
- Page 49 and 50: As noted above, many jurisdictions
- Page 51 and 52: deliberations. Judge Chernoff is co
- Page 53 and 54: where the jury had experimented wit
- Page 55 and 56: jury, if “a judge learns that a j
- Page 57 and 58: consideration of the factors outlin
- Page 59 and 60: moments" of insight, which "helped"
- Page 61 and 62: Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 2
- Page 63 and 64: In evaluating a claim of ineffectiv
- Page 65 and 66: DNA test results withstands scrutin
- Page 67 and 68: In any event, if filing such a moti
- Page 69 and 70: subject to exclusion on that ground
- Page 71 and 72: esults were effectively unchallenge
- Page 73 and 74: emains unrebutted, and Dr. Brenner'
- Page 75 and 76: precisely what the Constitution pro
- Page 77 and 78: A search warrant for a residence co
- Page 79 and 80: circumatances, the court could prop
- Page 81: process can arise from a combinatio
A: No.<br />
in such a way so that your feet are<br />
behind you?<br />
Q: Did you come to that realization this<br />
weekend, by any chance, sir?<br />
A: No.<br />
z. 21/103.<br />
6. Prosecutor's closing argument.<br />
In his closing, the prosecutor argued that<br />
Greineder's testimony that he tried to pick up Ms.<br />
Greineder three times was concocted to support Stuart<br />
James' blood spatter testimony and stressed that<br />
Greineder had not provided this account previously. n.<br />
25/63. He returned to this theme later, claiming that<br />
Greineder's story did not emerge "until ".. Stuart James<br />
told him" about the spatter evidence. Id. at 78. Finally,<br />
he contended that Greineder's "story" of trying to pick<br />
up Ms. Greineder three times was the product of "a year-<br />
and-a-half of careful construction." =. at 87-88.<br />
B. Sununary of Applicable Law.<br />
1. Ban on exploiting post-arrest silence.<br />
'I [A] defendant's silence after Miranda warnings have<br />
been given may not be used to support an inference of<br />
guilt." Commonwealth v. Brown, 451 <strong>Mass</strong>. 200, 208 (ZOOS),<br />
citinq Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-618 (1976). That<br />
"absolute prohibition is not negated when a defendant<br />
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