SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DIRK GKEINEDER - Mass Cases

on direct examination. Commonwealth v. Markvart, 437
Mass. 331, 338-339 (2002). (” [Aln expert‘s direct
examination is not a vehicle for the introduction of
facts in evidence (other than those the expert directly
observed). . . .“) Thus, in Commonwealth v. Evans, 438 Mass.
142, 152 (2002), this Court held that the trial court
erred in permitting a laboratory technician to testify
about the results of testing performed by someone else.
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. McNickles, 434 Mass. 839,
855-857 (2001), the Court concluded that Dr. Cotton
ahould not have been permitted to testify on direct
examination about observations made by other Cellmark
analysts. :f. Commonwealth v. Saarks, 433 Mass. 654, 659-
660 (2001) (no error in admitting Dr. Cotton’s testimony
about test results where she conducted “an independent
review of the empirical data separate and apart from the
review undertaken by [the analyst]“ which “encompassed
all that the original [staff scientist had done] .“);
Commonwealth v. Rill, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 690, 694-697
(2002) (to the same effect) .‘
Hill (and presumably Suarks) involved older DNA testing
methodologies where Cellmark’s case folder contained all of the raw
empirical data relied upon by the technical analysts in interpreting
test results. See Hill, 54 Mass. App. Ct. at 695, n.5. In the
instant case, however, both the testing methodology employed and the
contents of Cellmark’s case folder were dramatically different.
Here, the printed electropherograms constituted ahridged versions of
the raw, electronic data produced by the testing process, and
explanations for the subjective, discr@tionary interpretations made
by the technical analyst, critical to shaping Cellmark’s reported
(continued.. .)
6 -
10