SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DIRK GKEINEDER - Mass Cases

counsel's failure to object to closing the
trial for an entire day of jury selection, one
of the most important phases of a criminal
trial, deprived Owens of a substantial fair
trial right .... [We do not see how the
failure to object to the closure could have
been sound trial strategy.
483 F.3d at 64. Trial counsel's failure to object
deprived Greineder of his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel, so reversal is required.
The closure, an unconstitutional, structural. error,
also created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of
justice under M.G.L.c. 278, 533E. Greineder is entitled
to relief, even if the error is deemed unpreserved. I€
such an error was deemed sufficient in Owens to meet the
rigorous 52255 standard for relief, it certainly entitles
a defendant to relie€ under 533E. A structural error, one
that "infect[al the entire trial process," Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999), by definition
carries with it a risk of miscarriage of justice.'
11. THE TRIAL COURT'S ADMISSTON, OVER OBJECTION, OF
INCULPATORY DNA TEST RESULTS VIOLATED GREINEDER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND THE
PROSCRIPTION AGAINST HEARSAY.
A. Statement of Relevant Facts.
A key piece of the Commonwealth's case was
In -, 434 Mass. 023, 832-833
12001), this Court held that excluding the public from jury
selection did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage
of justice. After m, however, a showing of prejudice is not
required as a matter of federal law. See Commonwealth v. Muruhv, 448
Maas. 452, 462 (2007) (Massachusetts courts "give great deference to
decisions of Federal courts if they seem persuasive").
6