SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DIRK GKEINEDER - Mass Cases

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DIRK GKEINEDER - Mass Cases SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT DIRK GKEINEDER - Mass Cases

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In Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2007), the court found that the closure of the courtroom during jury selection "call [SI into question the fundamental fairness of [defendant's] trial.!' s. at 65. Such a violation of the right to a public trial constitutes structural error, entitling a defendant to relief without a showing of actual prejudice. la. at 65- 66. Relief is necessary because a public trial is a "basic protection" whose "precise effects are unmeasurable, but without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function." s, at 64. Sea also Commonwealth v. Martin, 417 Mass. 187, 196 (1994). C. Application of Law to Facts. 1. The first portion of the trial was improperly closed to the public. The trial court barred the public from attending individual voir dire, thereby violating Greinederls constitutional right to a public trial. The closure was not limited to questioning regarding claims of personal hardship by jurors, cf. Gordon, 422 Mass. at 823, but covered the entirety of voir dire. The court made none of the findings necessary to justify such a closure. It neither explained why closure was necessary to "preserve higher values" nor how blanket closure was "narrowly tailored" to serve those values. It did not state that alternatives had been considered and rejected or find any 4

logistical reasons for closure.3 As the court did not make the necessary contemporaneous findings, closure cannot be justified after the fact. United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1361 (3d Cir. 1994). 2. Greineder i s entitled to relief. Although there was no objection at trial to the private jury selection procedure, a constitutional right of this magnitude i s not waived merely by a failure to object. “[Llike other fundamental trial rights, a right to a public trial may be relinquished only upon a showing that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived such a right.“ Walton v. Brilev, 361 F.3d 431, 433 (7th Cir. 2004). There is no evidence that Greineder voluntarily waived a known constitutional right. There was no colloquy. Federal case law has established that loss of the right to a public trial cannot be deemed nonprejudicial. Indeed, as the court explained in Owens, the error is a structural one, so prejudice is presumed. Even if this Court holds that Greineder should have objected to the closure at trial, his failure to do so constituted ineffective assietance of counsel. ~ e e Commonwealth v. Randolah, 438 Mass. 290. 294-296 (2002). As in m: 3 Since the individual voir dire took place in a courtroom and the other jurors were waiting elsewhere, there was clearly enough space to accommodate some members of the public. 5

In Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48 (1st Cir.<br />

2007), the court found that the closure of the courtroom<br />

during jury selection "call [SI into question the<br />

fundamental fairness of [defendant's] trial.!' s. at 65.<br />

Such a violation of the right to a public trial<br />

constitutes structural error, entitling a defendant to<br />

relief without a showing of actual prejudice. la. at 65-<br />

66. Relief is necessary because a public trial is a<br />

"basic protection" whose "precise effects are<br />

unmeasurable, but without which a criminal trial cannot<br />

reliably serve its function." s, at 64. Sea also<br />

Commonwealth v. Martin, 417 <strong>Mass</strong>. 187, 196 (1994).<br />

C. Application of Law to Facts.<br />

1. The first portion of the trial was<br />

improperly closed to the public.<br />

The trial court barred the public from attending<br />

individual voir dire, thereby violating Greinederls<br />

constitutional right to a public trial. The closure was<br />

not limited to questioning regarding claims of personal<br />

hardship by jurors, cf. Gordon, 422 <strong>Mass</strong>. at 823, but<br />

covered the entirety of voir dire. The court made none<br />

of the findings necessary to justify such a closure. It<br />

neither explained why closure was necessary to "preserve<br />

higher values" nor how blanket closure was "narrowly<br />

tailored" to serve those values. It did not state that<br />

alternatives had been considered and rejected or find any<br />

4

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