for Suffolk County - Mass Cases
for Suffolk County - Mass Cases for Suffolk County - Mass Cases
up the substantial right to seek administrative and judicial remedies." - Warfield, 454 Mass. at 399 6 n.13 (emphasis added) JoulG's brief twice quotes this phrase from n. 13 of the Warfj-eld case out of context, and falsely asserts that it stands for the proposition that an arbitration agreement wil.1. succes.sfully trump section 5 clai.ms. Brief, at 12, 31. Ilowever, the Warfield court was not sayiny that mandatory axbitration agreements are always valid as against administrative remedies. Rather, Warfield was making the point that MELA is making here, that to the extent that a mandatory arbitration agreement is enforced, it represents a limitation on c. 151B rights. Joul& Principal - Furthermore, the context of the statement in n. 13 is the Supreme Judicial Court's suggestion that public policy may preclude enforcement of such waivers of c. 1518 rights. A fuller version of the quote follows: An agreement to arbitration employment discrimination claims represents a limited waiver of Tights under G.L. c. 151B. An employee who agrees to arbitration such a claim of course does not forgo the substantive fights afforded by the statute [citation omitted], but does give up the substantial right to seek administrative or judicial remedies. Because it is not raised here, we do not reach the question whether, in view of our public policy proscribing employment discrimination, any additional protections beyond unambiguous language may be necessary before an employment contract may provide for limitations on the rights and remedies spelled out in G.L. c. 151B. Warfield, 451 Mass. at 399 n. 13 (emphasis added). Thus, mandatory arbitration impairs c. 151R rights, and raises 35
public policy concerns, which may justify "additional protcctions" restricting such waivers. Id. - 'J'he case of Blanchette v. School Cormnittee of -1 -. Westwood, -__ 421 Mass. 176 (1998), made the analogous holding t-hat the abill.ty to choose a judicial forum (SectJon 9 claim) iinplicates a c. 151B right. Hlanchette involved the quest-ion of whether an employee pursuing a c. 151B claim waived her right to a judicial forum by pursuing a union arbitration uf a re1at.p.d grievance. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Che ri.ght to a court determination was preserved, stating: - .- We note first that Blanchette did not waive her right to pursue hex statutory civil rights claim in a judicial forum merely by being a member of a union that was'covered by a collective bargaining agrement. ... The larger question js whether Blanchette, by her own individual actions, waived her right to pursue her statutory civil rights claim in a judicial forum. . . Blanchette may have been able explicitly and voluntarily to waive her right to pursue her statutory civil rights claim in a judicial forum. Blanchette, .- 42'1 Mass. at 183-184 (emphasis added). If c. 151B confers a "right" to pursue a section 9 claim, then there must be a similar ri.ght to litiyate under section 5. Thus, it is established beyond dispute that the right to pursue a section 5 claim in the MUD, is a c. 151B right. 36
- Page 1: COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPRE
- Page 4 and 5: - 11. MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC POLICY I
- Page 6 and 7: EEOC V. Waffle House, InC., 122 s.
- Page 8 and 9: Wal.ker v. Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114
- Page 10 and 11: 1. STATEMENT OF ISSUES siyned by th
- Page 12 and 13: STATEMENT OF TAE CASE MELA adopts D
- Page 14 and 15: undermining the many cases pursued
- Page 16 and 17: ARmJmwr The Massachusetts Employmen
- Page 18 and 19: MCAD to enforce the law and rectify
- Page 20 and 21: Labor Comissioner serves simply as
- Page 22 and 23: The Supreme Court held that the arb
- Page 24 and 25: The MUD was established to enforce
- Page 26 and 27: If the private parties agree to res
- Page 28 and 29: case in suppori of the Complainant,
- Page 30 and 31: Stonehill College, 141 Mass. at. 56
- Page 32 and 33: comprehensive scheme to combat disc
- Page 34 and 35: een imposed? Or otherwise assure th
- Page 36 and 37: G. JOULE'S OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE OFF-
- Page 38 and 39: to create a stumbling block. The tr
- Page 40 and 41: Moreover, the MCAD wrote in its ami
- Page 42 and 43: and remedy violations of the statut
- Page 46 and 47: 2. The Threat To Reject. Simmons' F
- Page 48 and 49: Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 24, 26 (
- Page 50 and 51: nursing home contract was ruled enf
- Page 52 and 53: When an employer says, "waive your
- Page 54 and 55: Vokovich, 720 F.2d 909, 925 (8th Ci
- Page 56 and 57: coerced"). It is up to state law to
public policy concerns, which may justify "additional<br />
protcctions" restricting such waivers. Id.<br />
-<br />
'J'he case of Blanchette v. School Cormnittee of<br />
-1 -.<br />
Westwood, -__ 421 <strong>Mass</strong>. 176 (1998), made the analogous holding<br />
t-hat the abill.ty to choose a judicial <strong>for</strong>um (SectJon 9<br />
claim) iinplicates a c. 151B right. Hlanchette involved the<br />
quest-ion of whether an employee pursuing a c. 151B claim<br />
waived her right to a judicial <strong>for</strong>um by pursuing a union<br />
arbitration uf a re1at.p.d grievance. The Supreme Judicial<br />
Court held that Che ri.ght to a court determination was<br />
preserved, stating:<br />
- .-<br />
We note first that Blanchette did not waive her right<br />
to pursue hex statutory civil rights claim in a<br />
judicial <strong>for</strong>um merely by being a member of a union<br />
that was'covered by a collective bargaining agrement.<br />
...<br />
The larger question js whether Blanchette, by her own<br />
individual actions, waived her right to pursue her<br />
statutory civil rights claim in a judicial <strong>for</strong>um. . .<br />
Blanchette may have been able explicitly and<br />
voluntarily to waive her right to pursue her statutory<br />
civil rights claim in a judicial <strong>for</strong>um.<br />
Blanchette, .- 42'1 <strong>Mass</strong>. at 183-184 (emphasis added). If c.<br />
151B confers a "right" to pursue a section 9 claim, then<br />
there must be a similar ri.ght to litiyate under section 5.<br />
Thus, it is established beyond dispute that the right to<br />
pursue a section 5 claim in the MUD, is a c. 151B right.<br />
36
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