for Suffolk County - Mass Cases

complaint would be a protected enforcement act.ion, and the
other type would not be.
The only reason for Joule to suggest such a dichotomy
between Complaj.nant- and Commission-initiated charges would
be to disrupt the MCAD‘s enforcement function. E’or
example, in a similar case, and lodging a similar argument,
the Massachusetts Bar Association, in its role as an
employer attempting to enforce an arbitration agreement,
suggested that an arbitration could co-exist wi.th a
commission-initiated action, but that thc arbitration award
would be preclusive as to the Comission’s remedies. Reply
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant MBA, MBA v Wel-lington and
- MCAD, Appeals Court No. 2004-P-2137, at 4-5 n.2. Addendum
- D. JoulG’s suggestion is simply a back door attempt to
undermine the MCAU‘s authority, and prevenk it from
ordering remedies.
The dual track suggested by JouG would clearly be
inefficient and disruptive, and inconsistent with thc
contemplated procedures. - Marie, 402 F.3d at 16.
Finally, the dual arbitration/conunission-initiated
charge track suggested by Soul& is unworkable, given the
rule that all section 5 proceedings are exclusi.ve of other
proceedings. G.L. c. 151B, 5 9, I 1. Joule does not
explain how an arbitration could lawfully take place, if
the MCAD is continuing to pursue an commission-initiated
charge. Thus, Joule‘s true objective in asserting the
false alternative of commission-initiated actions is solely
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