for Suffolk County - Mass Cases

More documents

Recommendations

Info

G. JOULE'S OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE OFF-POINT AND ERRONEOUS Joule asserts that c. 1518 claims are gencrally arbitrable, citing Warfield v, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center --r 454 Mass. 390 (2009). However, Warfield dealt with Section 9 claims, and not Sectinn 5 claims, which are distinguishable. Section 9 claims are de now actions before neutral forums such as the Superior Court, Housing Court or Probate Court, and are not governmental enforcement actions. G.L. c. 151B, 5 9, 412. Next, Joulh arques that arbitration would not impair the MCAD's enforcement function, because even if Ms. Simons' action there is dismissed, the MTAD could pursue a commission-initiated action against Joule. Joul& Brief, at 33. The fallacy of this argument bears some explanation. There are two ways to initiate complaints at the MCAD. First, a complainant may file a discrimination charge, or second, the Commission may initiate a case itself. G.L. c. 151B, § 5. Joulfi is suggesting that the complainant- initiated case be dismissed, but that the MCAD retains the option to start a case all over, with a commission- initiated charge. Irrespective of how the complaint is initiated, both avenues represent MCAD enforcement actions, which, if a remedy is ordered, are prosecuted in the name of the Commission. See Stonehill-College, 441 Mass., at 567. There is no justifiable reason to bar one, but not the other. Moreover, JoulP fails to identify why one type of 27
complaint would be a protected enforcement act.ion, and the other type would not be. The only reason for Joule to suggest such a dichotomy between Complaj.nant- and Commission-initiated charges would be to disrupt the MCAD‘s enforcement function. E’or example, in a similar case, and lodging a similar argument, the Massachusetts Bar Association, in its role as an employer attempting to enforce an arbitration agreement, suggested that an arbitration could co-exist wi.th a commission-initiated action, but that thc arbitration award would be preclusive as to the Comission’s remedies. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant MBA, MBA v Wel-lington and - MCAD, Appeals Court No. 2004-P-2137, at 4-5 n.2. Addendum - D. JoulG’s suggestion is simply a back door attempt to undermine the MCAU‘s authority, and prevenk it from ordering remedies. The dual track suggested by JouG would clearly be inefficient and disruptive, and inconsistent with thc contemplated procedures. - Marie, 402 F.3d at 16. Finally, the dual arbitration/conunission-initiated charge track suggested by Soul& is unworkable, given the rule that all section 5 proceedings are exclusi.ve of other proceedings. G.L. c. 151B, 5 9, I 1. Joule does not explain how an arbitration could lawfully take place, if the MCAD is continuing to pursue an commission-initiated charge. Thus, Joule‘s true objective in asserting the false alternative of commission-initiated actions is solely 28
Page 1: COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPRE
Page 4 and 5: - 11. MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC POLICY I
Page 6 and 7: EEOC V. Waffle House, InC., 122 s.
Page 8 and 9: Wal.ker v. Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114
Page 10 and 11: 1. STATEMENT OF ISSUES siyned by th
Page 12 and 13: STATEMENT OF TAE CASE MELA adopts D
Page 14 and 15: undermining the many cases pursued
Page 16 and 17: ARmJmwr The Massachusetts Employmen
Page 18 and 19: MCAD to enforce the law and rectify
Page 20 and 21: Labor Comissioner serves simply as
Page 22 and 23: The Supreme Court held that the arb
Page 24 and 25: The MUD was established to enforce
Page 26 and 27: If the private parties agree to res
Page 28 and 29: case in suppori of the Complainant,
Page 30 and 31: Stonehill College, 141 Mass. at. 56
Page 32 and 33: comprehensive scheme to combat disc
Page 34 and 35: een imposed? Or otherwise assure th
Page 38 and 39: to create a stumbling block. The tr
Page 40 and 41: Moreover, the MCAD wrote in its ami
Page 42 and 43: and remedy violations of the statut
Page 44 and 45: up the substantial right to seek ad
Page 46 and 47: 2. The Threat To Reject. Simmons' F
Page 48 and 49: Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 24, 26 (
Page 50 and 51: nursing home contract was ruled enf
Page 52 and 53: When an employer says, "waive your
Page 54 and 55: Vokovich, 720 F.2d 909, 925 (8th Ci
Page 56 and 57: coerced"). It is up to state law to

for Suffolk County - Mass Cases

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?