for Suffolk County - Mass Cases
for Suffolk County - Mass Cases for Suffolk County - Mass Cases
een imposed? Or otherwise assure that the statute has been properly interpreted and complied with? It could not. Realistically, once arbitrakion is initiated, the MCAD’s enforcement role is at an end. The prosecutorial role is supported by the fact-finding role, and vice versa. capacity to hold a hearing, without also undermining iks prosecutorial function. The MCAD may not be divested of its One example will highlight this point. At the MCAU, after probable cause is found, pro se complainants are assigned an attorney to assist them, without cost, in the taking of discovery and the presentation of evi.dence at trial. However, if arbitration is ordered, these pra se complainants will be on their own, and rendered efEectively unable to prosecute their cases. This Court should not turn a blind eye to the real world effects that such a decision would have. Feeney, 454 Mass. at 200-205 (prohibition of class action claims in arbitration clause would have the real world effect of obliterating many wage claims of modest size, and so the waiver violates public policy). Therefore, the MCAD must retain its fact-finding function in order to be successful in its enforcement function. 25
F. MCAU AND EEOC PROCEEDINGS ARE INTERWOVEN, AND INTERFERENCE WITH MCAD ACTIONS WILL CREATE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS INVOLVING INEFFICIEN'T, DUPLICATIVE PROCEEDINGS A ruling in favor of JoulG would create an intractable, bureaucratic tangle, with respect to the parallel proceedings that take place between the MCAD and EEOC. The MCAD and EEOC have a work-sharing agreement which permits claims filed with one to be cross-filed with the other, and which permits the parallel processing of claims. The EEOC typically defers to the MCAD's investigation and adopts the MCAD's findinys. Allowing employers to interfere with MCAD enforcement of c. 15lB will necessarily impair EEOC processing of those claims. If EEOC proceedings remain despite an arbitration agreement, but MCAD proceedings dissolve, there would be a nightmarish procedural challenge. go ahead, without the MCAD's salutary input. Meanwhile, arbitrations would proceed as well. It would result in inefficient, duplicative proceedings which by all means should be avoided. Marie, 402 F.3d at 16 (duplicative arbitration and EEOC enforcement action would be hefficient, disruptive to EEOC procedures, and contrary to the purposes of the FAA). It would create enormous burdens on employees, who would have to participate in dual tracks. Such complexities are unnecessary, and are intrusive on the contemplated process, and should dri.ve this Court to reject Joule's position. 26 EEOC proceedings would
- Page 1: COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUPRE
- Page 4 and 5: - 11. MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC POLICY I
- Page 6 and 7: EEOC V. Waffle House, InC., 122 s.
- Page 8 and 9: Wal.ker v. Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114
- Page 10 and 11: 1. STATEMENT OF ISSUES siyned by th
- Page 12 and 13: STATEMENT OF TAE CASE MELA adopts D
- Page 14 and 15: undermining the many cases pursued
- Page 16 and 17: ARmJmwr The Massachusetts Employmen
- Page 18 and 19: MCAD to enforce the law and rectify
- Page 20 and 21: Labor Comissioner serves simply as
- Page 22 and 23: The Supreme Court held that the arb
- Page 24 and 25: The MUD was established to enforce
- Page 26 and 27: If the private parties agree to res
- Page 28 and 29: case in suppori of the Complainant,
- Page 30 and 31: Stonehill College, 141 Mass. at. 56
- Page 32 and 33: comprehensive scheme to combat disc
- Page 36 and 37: G. JOULE'S OTHER ARGUMENTS ARE OFF-
- Page 38 and 39: to create a stumbling block. The tr
- Page 40 and 41: Moreover, the MCAD wrote in its ami
- Page 42 and 43: and remedy violations of the statut
- Page 44 and 45: up the substantial right to seek ad
- Page 46 and 47: 2. The Threat To Reject. Simmons' F
- Page 48 and 49: Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 24, 26 (
- Page 50 and 51: nursing home contract was ruled enf
- Page 52 and 53: When an employer says, "waive your
- Page 54 and 55: Vokovich, 720 F.2d 909, 925 (8th Ci
- Page 56 and 57: coerced"). It is up to state law to
een imposed?<br />
Or otherwise assure that the statute has<br />
been properly interpreted and complied with?<br />
It could not. Realistically, once arbitrakion is<br />
initiated, the MCAD’s en<strong>for</strong>cement role is at an end. The<br />
prosecutorial role is supported by the fact-finding role,<br />
and vice versa.<br />
capacity to hold a hearing, without also undermining iks<br />
prosecutorial function.<br />
The MCAD may not be divested of its<br />
One example will highlight this point. At the MCAU,<br />
after probable cause is found, pro se complainants are<br />
assigned an attorney to assist them, without cost, in the<br />
taking of discovery and the presentation of evi.dence at<br />
trial. However, if arbitration is ordered, these pra se<br />
complainants will be on their own, and rendered efEectively<br />
unable to prosecute their cases. This Court should not<br />
turn a blind eye to the real world effects that such a<br />
decision would have. Feeney, 454 <strong>Mass</strong>. at 200-205<br />
(prohibition of class action claims in arbitration clause<br />
would have the real world effect of obliterating many wage<br />
claims of modest size, and so the waiver violates public<br />
policy). There<strong>for</strong>e, the MCAD must retain its fact-finding<br />
function in order to be successful in its en<strong>for</strong>cement<br />
function.<br />
25