Appellant McCowen Brief - Mass Cases

justice system was the fair and balanced prosecution of
the accused.
Accordingly, "suppression of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Even in the absence
of a discovery request by the defendant, the prosecution
must disclose any and all obviously materially exculpatory
information in its possession. United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976). Evidence is materially
exculpatory if there is a reasonable probability that its
disclosure to the defendant would have resulted in a
different outcome. united States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
682 (1985).
Maasachusetts courts have adopted a broader
definition of the disclosure obligations than those
inherent in the Brady/Bagley standard. In Massac:husetts,
these obligations extend to "all evidence which tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or, stated
affirmatively, supporting the innocence of the
defendant." Commonwealth v. Healey, 438 Mass. 672, 679
(2003). A finding of a Brady violation is akin to
finding "an appearance that justice may not have been
done", Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, thus, warranting a new
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