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Editor’s Note
İHSAN DAĞI
The closure case against the ruling AK Party pending before the constitutional
court occupied the center stage of Turkish politics throughout the
summer. After months of speculation on the fate of the party, the court finally
reached a verdict in late July, deciding not to close down the AK Party,
and averting what had otherwise promised to be an unprecedented level
of political uncertainty, social and economic turmoil, and potential chaos.
With the closure case now behind it, the AK Party is expected to be more
restrained, and to act responsibly – as it did during the proceedings of the
case – while building up its democratic and secular credentials through a
reform policy in keeping with the EU accession process. For some time, the
ruling AK Party had been under pressure for neglecting, if not abandoning,
the EU membership process. In response to critics the government may
refocus its energy on the issues that have stalled Turkey’s accession.
While still recovering from the closure threat, Turkey’s political leaders
found themselves in the midst of a difficult diplomatic mission: calming the
Caucasus down in the wake of the August war between Russia and Georgia.
Paradoxically, the crisis in the Caucasus came both as a reminder of the
foreign policy challenges that lie ahead in the region for Turkey, and of Turkey’s
geopolitical capacity to address current and potential crisis spots in the
volatile surrounding regions.
The conflict in the Caucasus involved three indispensable partners for
Turkey: Georgia and the United States on the one hand, and Russia on the
other. Georgia is the only land corridor linking Turkey with the Caspian
region and Central Asia; moreover, the critical Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline
runs through its territory. Maintaining cooperation with Georgia therefore
remains crucial for Turkey’s strategic weight, as it provides the means for
reaching out to the Caspian and Central Asian hinterlands. The close eco-
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