BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 91-215 SECRETARY ...
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 91-215 SECRETARY ... BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 91-215 SECRETARY ...
A2.B.16.6. RESOURCES. The opportunity assessment depends on a detailed understanding of mission processes so that barriers can be identified. An effective opportunity assessment will necessarily involve the input of operations experts. A2.B.16.7. COMMENTS. Properly implemented, at least half the value of ORM should be realized in the form of expanded mission capabilities. The opportunity assessment is a process by which that benefit is achieved. A2.B.16.8. EXAMPLES. An example of the opportunity assessment in action is provided at Figure A2.35. Figure A2.35. Example Opportunity Analysis. Target: Crew endurance Objective: Extend crew endurance by 15% as a contingency capability. Current capabilities are restricted by the progressively increasing risk of human error as operations are extended. Potential operational benefit. A surge capability of 15% over and above that currently recognized could represent a decisive capability when confronted with a critical operational need. Risk issues to be targeted: 1. Benchmark all available research and operational sources for background on the fatigue issue. 2. Determine the differential endurance capabilities of individual personnel and effective ways to measure this differential in a combat environment. 3. Assess the full potential of medicinal options (particularly recent developments) for performance enhancement. 4. Evaluate the increased use of automated flight to reduce pilot fatigue and evaluate fully the impact of progress made to date. 5. Enhance the quality of rest opportunities for crews through application of technology. 6. Exploit research on the impact of fatigue and the critical risk issues it creates. 7. Establish fatigue-connected risk assessments for major operational activities and use these as guides for use on specific operations. For example, use time multipliers for high task activities or missions. 8. Refine understanding of the types of fatigue (e.g. physical, mental, jet lag, etc.) and the varying risk implications of each. 9. Develop easy-to-use job aids, tools, and model programs to guide field personnel in the full scope of fatigue management issues. 10. Develop programmatic matrices that effectively assess in an ongoing way the impact of all fatigue management initiatives. 84
SECTION A2.C. THE ADVANCED HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TOOLS A2.C.1. The five tools that follow are advanced hazard identification tools designed to support strategic hazard analysis of higher risk and mission critical operations. These advanced tools are often essential when in-depth hazard ID is needed. These advanced tools provide the mechanism needed to push the limits of current hazard identification technology. For example, the management oversight and risk tree (MORT) represents the full-time efforts of dozens of experts over decades to fully develop an understanding of all of the sources of hazards. A2.C.2. As might be expected, these tools are complex and require significant training to use. Full proficiency also requires experience in using the tools. As a result, these tools are generally used exclusively by loss control professionals. Of course personnel with an engineering, scientific, or other technical background are certainly capable of using these tools with a little read-in. Even though the tools are used by professionals much of the data that must be fed into the procedures must come from operators. A2.C.3. In an organization with a mature ORM culture, all personnel in the organization will be aware that higher risk justifies more extensive hazard identification. They will feel comfortable calling for help from various loss control professionals, confident that these individuals have the advanced hazard ID tools needed to cope with the most serious risk situations. These advanced tools will play a key role in the mature ORM culture in helping the organization reach its hazard ID goal: No significant hazard undetected. 85
- Page 33 and 34: Section I—Conclusion 54. Operatio
- Page 35 and 36: HAZOP—Hazard operability Hrs—Ho
- Page 37 and 38: Risk—An expression of consequence
- Page 39 and 40: A2.A.3. THE OPERATIONS ANALYSIS AND
- Page 41 and 42: A2.A.3.8.2. Any one event of the ab
- Page 43 and 44: ase of experience and expertise. Of
- Page 45 and 46: the involvement of operators and th
- Page 47 and 48: Figure A2.8. Example Deployment Sce
- Page 49 and 50: 4 levels is usually very limited. T
- Page 51 and 52: A2.A.7.6. RESOURCES. A key resource
- Page 53 and 54: Figure A2.16. Sample Change Analysi
- Page 55 and 56: Figure A2.18. Example of Change Ana
- Page 57 and 58: Figure A2.19. Example of Cause and
- Page 59 and 60: A2.B.3. THE HAZARD AND OPERABILITY
- Page 61 and 62: A2.B.4. THE MAPPING TOOL A2.B.4.1.
- Page 63 and 64: A2.B.5. THE INTERFACE ANALYSIS A2.B
- Page 65 and 66: A2.B.6. THE MISSION PROTECTION TOOL
- Page 67 and 68: A2.B.7. THE SAFETY QUIZ A2.B.7.1. F
- Page 69 and 70: A2.B.8. THE NEXT MISHAP ASSESSMENT
- Page 71 and 72: A2.B.10. THE INTERVIEW TOOL A2.B.10
- Page 73 and 74: A2.B.11. THE INSPECTION TOOL A2.B.1
- Page 75 and 76: A2.B.12. THE MISHAP/INCIDENT INVEST
- Page 77 and 78: Figure A2.30 Sample Job Hazard Anal
- Page 79 and 80: training and observation time. Succ
- Page 81 and 82: A2.B.15.6. RESOURCES. Effective use
- Page 83: A2.B.16. THE OPPORTUNITY ASSESSMENT
- Page 87 and 88: Figure A2.37. Types of Energy. Elec
- Page 89 and 90: A2.C.5. THE FAULT TREE ANALYSIS A2.
- Page 91 and 92: A2.C.6. THE FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT
- Page 93 and 94: A2.C.7. THE MULTILINEAR EVENTS SEQU
- Page 95 and 96: A2.C.8. THE MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AN
- Page 97 and 98: Attachment 3 RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS,
- Page 99 and 100: A3.2.3. Lack of a range of rankings
- Page 101 and 102: Attachment 4 RISK CONTROL OPTION AN
- Page 103 and 104: SECTION A4.B. THE RISK CONTROL OPTI
- Page 105 and 106: Figure A4.2. Example Risk Control O
- Page 107 and 108: elatively small investments in risk
- Page 109 and 110: Figure A5.2. Example Maximizing Ban
- Page 111 and 112: Attachment 6 RISK CONTROL IMPLEMENT
- Page 113 and 114: Attachment 7 SUPERVISE AND REVIEW D
SECTION A2.C. <strong>THE</strong> ADVANCED HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TOOLS<br />
A2.C.1. The five tools that follow are advanced hazard identification tools designed to support strategic<br />
hazard analysis of higher risk and mission critical operations. These advanced tools are often essential<br />
when in-depth hazard ID is needed. These advanced tools provide the mechanism needed to push the<br />
limits of current hazard identification technology. For example, the management oversight and risk tree<br />
(MORT) represents the full-time efforts of dozens of experts over decades to fully develop an<br />
understanding of all of the sources of hazards.<br />
A2.C.2. As might be expected, these tools are complex and require significant training to use. Full<br />
proficiency also requires experience in using the tools. As a result, these tools are generally used<br />
exclusively by loss control professionals. Of course personnel with an engineering, scientific, or other<br />
technical background are certainly capable of using these tools with a little read-in. Even though the tools<br />
are used by professionals much of the data that must be fed into the procedures must come from operators.<br />
A2.C.3. In an organization with a mature ORM culture, all personnel in the organization will<br />
be aware that higher risk justifies more extensive hazard identification. They will feel comfortable calling<br />
for help from various loss control professionals, confident that these individuals have the advanced hazard<br />
ID tools needed to cope with the most serious risk situations. These advanced tools will play a key role in<br />
the mature ORM culture in helping the organization reach its hazard ID goal: No significant hazard<br />
undetected.<br />
85
Change language