BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 91-215 SECRETARY ...
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 91-215 SECRETARY ... BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 91-215 SECRETARY ...
A2.A.4. THE PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS A2.A.4.1. FORMAL NAME. Preliminary Hazard Analysis A2.A.4.2. ALTERNATIVE NAMES. The PHA, Preliminary Hazard List, the PHL A2.A.4.3. PURPOSE. The PHA provides an initial overview of the hazards present in the overall flow of the operation. It provides a hazard assessment that is broad, but usually not deep. The key idea of the PHA is to at least briefly consider risk in every aspect of an operation. The PHA helps overcome the strong tendency in traditional, intuitive risk management to focus immediately on risk in one aspect of an operation. This often leads to overlooking more serious issues hidden in other aspects of the operation. The PHA will often serve as the total hazard ID process when risk is low or routine. In higher risk operations, it serves to focus and prioritize follow-on hazard analyses by displaying the full range of risk issues. A2.A.4.4. APPLICATION. The PHA is used in virtually all risk management applications except the most time critical. Its broad scope is an excellent guide to the identification of issues that may require more detailed hazard ID tools. A2.A.4.5. METHOD. The PHA/PHL is usually based on the operations analysis or flow diagram. The analyst or group takes each event in turn from the operations analysis. They apply their experience and intuition, use reference publications and standards of various kinds, and consult with personnel who may have useful input. The extent of the effort is dictated by resource and time limitations and by the estimate of the degree of overall hazard inherent in the operation. Hazards that are detected are often listed directly on a copy of the operations analysis as shown at Figure A2.5. Alternatively, a more formal PHA format such as the one at Figure A2.6 can be used. The output of the PHA/PHL is either hazards noted on the operations analysis or the more formal completed PHA worksheet listing all of the hazards of each phase of the operation. The completed PHA is used to identify hazards requiring more in-depth hazard identification or it may lead directly to the remaining five steps of the ORM process if hazard levels are judged to be low. A key to an effective PHA/PHL is to assure that all events of the operation are covered. Figure A2.5. Building The Pha Directly From The Operations Analysis Flow Diagram. Operational Phase Hazards List the operational phases vertically down the page. Be sure to leave plenty of space on the worksheet between each phase to allow several hazards to be noted for each phase. A2.A.4.6. RESOURCES. The two key resources for the PHA are the expertise of personnel actually experienced in the operation and the body of regulations, standards, technical orders (TOs) and operations instructions (OIs) that may be available. The PHA can be accomplished in small groups to broaden the 42 List the hazards noted for each operational phase here. Strive for detail within the limits imposed by the time you have set aside for this tool.
ase of experience and expertise. Of course a copy of a quality PHA accomplished for an earlier, similar operation will really kick-start the process. A2.A.4.7. COMMENTS. The PHA is relatively easy to use and takes very little time. Its significant power to impact risk arises from the forced consideration of risk in all phases of an operation. This means that a key to success is to link the PHA closely to the operations analysis. A2.A.4.8. EXAMPLES. The following (Figure A2.6) is an example of a PHA. Figure A2.6. Example PHA. MOVING A HEAVY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. The example below uses an operations analysis for moving a heavy piece of equipment as the start point and illustrates the process of building the PHA direct from the operations analysis. Operation: Move a 3 ton machine from one building to another Start point: The machine is in its original position in building A End point: The machine is in its new position in building B ACTIVITY / EVENT HAZARD Raise the machine to permit positioning of the forklift 43 Machine overturns due to imbalance Machine overturns due to failure of lifting device Machine drops on person or equipment due to failure of lifting device or improper placement (person or lifting device) Machine strikes overhead obstacle Machine is damaged by the lifting process Position the forklift Forklift strikes the machine Forklift strikes other items in the area Lift the machine Machine strikes overhead obstacle Lift fails due to mechanical failure (damage to machine, objects, or people) Machine overturns due to imbalance Move machine to the truck Instability due to rough surface or weather condition Operator error causes load instability The load shifts Place machine on the truck Improper tiedown produces instability Truck overloaded or improper load distribution Drive truck to building B Vehicle accident during the move Poor driving technique produces instability Instability due to road condition Remove machine from the truck Same factors as “Move it to the truck” Place the machine in proper position in building B Same factors as “Raise the machine” except focused on lowering the machine.
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ase of experience and expertise. Of course a copy of a quality PHA accomplished for an earlier, similar<br />
operation will really kick-start the process.<br />
A2.A.4.7. COMMENTS. The PHA is relatively easy to use and takes very little time. Its significant<br />
power to impact risk arises from the forced consideration of risk in all phases of an operation. This means<br />
that a key to success is to link the PHA closely to the operations analysis.<br />
A2.A.4.8. EXAMPLES. The following (Figure A2.6) is an example of a PHA.<br />
Figure A2.6. Example PHA.<br />
MOVING A HEAVY PIECE <strong>OF</strong> EQUIPMENT. The example below uses an operations<br />
analysis for moving a heavy piece of equipment as the start point and illustrates the process<br />
of building the PHA direct from the operations analysis.<br />
Operation: Move a 3 ton machine from one building to another<br />
Start point: The machine is in its original position in building A<br />
End point: The machine is in its new position in building B<br />
ACTIVITY / EVENT HAZARD<br />
Raise the machine to permit positioning of the<br />
forklift<br />
43<br />
Machine overturns due to imbalance<br />
Machine overturns due to failure of lifting device<br />
Machine drops on person or equipment due to<br />
failure of lifting device or improper placement<br />
(person or lifting device)<br />
Machine strikes overhead obstacle<br />
Machine is damaged by the lifting process<br />
Position the forklift Forklift strikes the machine<br />
Forklift strikes other items in the area<br />
Lift the machine Machine strikes overhead obstacle<br />
Lift fails due to mechanical failure (damage to<br />
machine, objects, or people)<br />
Machine overturns due to imbalance<br />
Move machine to the truck Instability due to rough surface or weather<br />
condition<br />
Operator error causes load instability<br />
The load shifts<br />
Place machine on the truck Improper tiedown produces instability<br />
Truck overloaded or improper load distribution<br />
Drive truck to building B Vehicle accident during the move<br />
Poor driving technique produces instability<br />
Instability due to road condition<br />
Remove machine from the truck Same factors as “Move it to the truck”<br />
Place the machine in proper position in building B Same factors as “Raise the machine” except<br />
focused on lowering the machine.