BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 91-215 SECRETARY ...
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 91-215 SECRETARY ... BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 91-215 SECRETARY ...
for example, can be assessed by making a number of observations of the use of restraints before initiating the seat belt program and a similar sample after. The change, if any, is a direct measure of the effectiveness of the risk control. The sample would establish the % of personnel using belts as a percentage of total observations. Subsequent samples would indicate our success in sustaining the impact of the risk control. 52.2. Direct Measures of Conditions. In the exact same manner as described in 52.1., it is possible to assess the changes in physical conditions in the workplace. For example, the amount of foreign objects found on the flight line can be assessed before and after a risk control initiative aimed at reducing foreign object damage. 52.3. Measures of Attitudes. Surveys can also assess the attitudes of personnel toward risk-related issues. While constructing survey questions is technical and must be done right, the Air Force often conducts surveys and it may be possible to integrate questions in these surveys, taking advantage of the experts who manage these survey processes. Nevertheless, even informal surveys taken verbally in very small organizations will quickly indicate the views of personnel. 52.4. Measures of Knowledge. Some risk controls are designed to increase knowledge of some hazard or of hazard control procedures. A short quiz, perhaps administered during a safety meeting or standdown day can effectively assess the levels of knowledge before and after a training risk control is initiated. 52.5. Safety and Other Loss Control Audit Procedures. Programmatic and procedural risk control initiatives (such as revisions to standard operating procedures) can be assessed through various kinds of audits. The typical audit involves a standard set of questions or statements reflecting desirable standards of performance against which actual operating situations are compared. 53. Evaluating Overall Organization Performance. If the organization is large enough to accumulate enough exposure (100,000 flight hours, 200,000 personnel hours, 1,000,000 miles driven) to have statistically valid rates, then rates are an excellent results measure of organization performance. Obviously most organizations do not have this much exposure and valid rates cannot be calculated on an annual basis. Even in those organizations that do accumulate the exposure necessary to calculate valid rates, it is important to use them properly. Because of their statistical nature there is considerable normal variation in rates. They go up and down for no other reason than the normal variation in the occurrence of events. It is important not to let this normal variation be interpreted as meaningful. When mishap numbers or rates increase or decrease, as an example, it is important to have an individual with statistical expertise assess the significance of the changes. Normally the servicing safety office can provide this service. In smaller organizations in which rates are not a useful tool, it is possible to assess overall organization risk management success using a cross section of indicators like those described in paragraph 52. See attachment 7 for a more detailed explanation. Even larger organizations, need such measures of process effectiveness to augment the use of mishap rates or numbers as performance result measures. 32
Section I—Conclusion 54. Operational risk management provides a logical and systematic means of identifying and controlling risk. Operational risk management is not a complex process, but it does require individuals, supervisors, and leaders to support and implement the basic principles on a continuing basis. Operational risk management offers individuals and organizations a powerful tool for increasing effectiveness and reducing mishaps. The ORM process is accessible to and usable by everyone in every conceivable setting or scenario. It ensures that all Air Force personnel will have a voice in the critical decisions that determine success or failure in all our missions and activities, on- and off-duty. Properly implemented, ORM will always enhance mission performance. 33 FRANCIS C. GIDEON, JR., Major General, USAF Chief of Safety
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Section I—Conclusion<br />
54. Operational risk management provides a logical and systematic means of identifying and controlling<br />
risk. Operational risk management is not a complex process, but it does require individuals, supervisors,<br />
and leaders to support and implement the basic principles on a continuing basis. Operational risk<br />
management offers individuals and organizations a powerful tool for increasing effectiveness and reducing<br />
mishaps. The ORM process is accessible to and usable by everyone in every conceivable setting or<br />
scenario. It ensures that all Air Force personnel will have a voice in the critical decisions that determine<br />
success or failure in all our missions and activities, on- and off-duty. Properly implemented, ORM will<br />
always enhance mission performance.<br />
33<br />
FRANCIS C. GIDEON, JR., Major General, USAF<br />
Chief of Safety
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