a critical evaluation on the concept of justice in planning process

accomplished in a rational way, is criticized for a) its utilitarian consideration of public
interest, b) due to its approach of “planners as scientist”, reduction of the activity to a
technical scientific process as broken off from policy and c) for its value-free
characteristics (Harper&Stein; 1995; 14) .
The assent of a single “public interest” accepted in connection with utilitarian
ethics theory underlying the planning discipline and the belief that social benefits will
be increased via this assent appear to be the matters of discussion. This utilitarian
consideration of public interest is emphasized as corresponding to “...advocate liberal
values, such as freedom or pluralism, and institutions but only as a means to achieve
their goal” (Harper&Stein; 1995; 13-14).
As for the interest presented by Rawlsian theory, it evolves upon the acceptation
of inequality as differently from the Rational Comprehensive Model. The justice as
fairness approach attains the accepted context of “greater benefits of least advantaged”
as contrary to that of “greater happiness of the greater number” (Harper&Stein; 1995,
McConell; 1995).
The interest defined in Rawlsian theory, on the other hand, displays the assent of
unequality together with the ways in which these can be overcome. “Justice as fairness”
approach is thought to be used within the planning discipline as the “greatest benefits of
the least advantaged allocation of priority in implementing plan so that disadvantaged
complicated first” (McConel; 1995).
2. In Rational Comprehensive Model, the inadequacy of a previously-determined
abstract understanding of distribution mechanism disregarding distributional justice in
distribution of resources is emphasized:
Concerning the distribution of resources within the process of rational planning,
the approach of “... predefined standarts such as per capita allocation without
conscious attention to distributional fairness” is criticized stating that such an approach
reduces the decision-making costs, but does not take social geography throughout urban
space into consideration. These criteria are regarded as insufficient to accept that
resources are justly distributed throughout the urban area (Talen, 1998, 22).
From the Rawlsian perspective, on the other hand, the distribution to be held in
relation to the spatial standards (such as those related with open areas, transportation,
benefiting from transportation facilities etc.) by consideration of relative equality in
society takes place among the proposals concerning the methodology of planning
(McConnel; 1995, 33-43).
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