rayuan jenayah no: c-05-146-2009 di antara azhar bin lazim
rayuan jenayah no: c-05-146-2009 di antara azhar bin lazim
rayuan jenayah no: c-05-146-2009 di antara azhar bin lazim
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20<br />
[46] It must also be borne in mind that there is the evidence of SP6 –<br />
an agent provocateur. Whatever SP6 <strong>di</strong>d, he relayed back the information<br />
to SP5 <strong>di</strong>rectly. Section 40A(1) of the DDA states that <strong>no</strong> agent provocateur<br />
shall be presumed to be unworthy of cre<strong>di</strong>t by reason only of his having<br />
attempted to abet or abetted the commission of an offence if the attempt to<br />
abet or abetment was for the sole purpose of securing evidence against<br />
such person. Accor<strong>di</strong>ng to Yusuf Abdul Rashid J in Public Prosecutor v<br />
Mohamed Halipah [1982] 1 MLJ 155, the evidence of an agent<br />
provocateur need <strong>no</strong> corroboration to found a fin<strong>di</strong>ng by the Court. K C<br />
Vohrah J (later JCA) in Tee Thian See v Pendakwa Raya [1996] 3 MLJ<br />
209, at 217 said that the evidence of an agent provocateur is <strong>no</strong>t that of an<br />
accomplice and does <strong>no</strong>t require corroboration.<br />
[47] In our judgment, the evidence of SP6, stan<strong>di</strong>ng alone, is<br />
sufficient to prove by way of <strong>di</strong>rect evidence that the appellant was<br />
trafficking in cannabis, to wit, 3,917 grammes. And when the evidence of<br />
SP5 is taken into account it adds mileage to the prosecution’s case.<br />
[48] There are eighteen <strong>di</strong>fferent acts stipulated in section 2 of the<br />
DDA that constitute the offence of trafficking. And before the “trafficking”<br />
definition of section 2 of the DDA can be invoked, the prosecution must<br />
prove possession of the dangerous drugs by the appellant. Here, the High<br />
Court rightly held that the appellant had exclusive possession of the