rayuan jenayah no: a-05-120-2009 antara mohd kamal bin osman

14
Prosecutor [1981] 1 MLJ 64, 69, Lord Diplock had this to say about proof
of knowledge by way of an inference:
“Proof of the purpose for which an act is done, where such purpose
is a necessary ingredient for the offence with which an accused is
charged, presents a problem with which criminal courts are very
familiar. Generally, in the absence of an express admission by the
accused, the purpose with which he did an act is a matter of
inference from what he did.”
[33] Augustine Paul J (later FCJ) in Mohd Farid bin Mohd Sukis &
Anor [2002] 3 AMR 3457; [2002] 3 MLJ 401, after citing a few authorities,
observed that “proof of knowledge is very often a matter of inference”.
[34] Again, the same learned Judge observed in Public Prosecutor
v Reza Mohd Shah bin Ahmad Shah [2002] 4 MLJ 13, at page 20:
“There are many circumstances from which knowledge can be
inferred. One instance is the inference to be drawn from the act of a
person in absconding or fleeing from the scene of a crime.”
[35] We pause here to state categorically that in the context of the
present appeal, the very act of the appellant in attempting to run after
hearing SP4 shouted the word “Polis” was sufficient to conclude that the
appellant had possession of the drugs found in the black coloured plastic
bag (exhibit “P5C”) that was put inside the carrier basket of the said
motorcycle even without resorting to the presumption under section 37(d)
of the DDA.