The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

two major FLN operatives: a mason who had been involved in the construction of the bomb factories,
and the chief bomb transporter for Algiers. Under torture, the main bomb manufactory was identified
at No. 5 Impasse de la Grénade – information that had been in the documents captured on the
locksmith, but which had languished untranslated by those busy torturing. On the 19 th , after a failed
raid the previous day that allowed the FLN operatives to escape, a second raid resulted in the capture of
the bulk of the FLN's explosive materials. (Rejali, p. 489)
At a meeting of the CCE (the FLN's central committee) in Algiers, the decision was taken to
evacuate the city. The leadership of the FLN would decamp to Tunis (under the protection of the newly
independent government of Bourghiba) after a period of 10 days, in order to set up the successor
leadership in the city. Control over the ZAA was handed to Yacef in its entirety, with Ben M'Hidi
following Abane and the rest abroad. Before he could effect this move, however, Ben M'Hidi was
arrested at a safehouse by Bigeard's men (who had been on the trail of another FLN leader, Ben
Tobbal). Taken into custody, Ben M'Hidi was not tortured, but neither did he reveal much useful
information. 85 On the 6 th of March, the Forces of Order announced that Ben M'Hidi had committed
suicide – in reality, he had been strangled under Aussaresses' orders at a settler-owned farm outside the
city. (Aussaresses, p. 142) With the FLN leadership on the run, and one of its most charismatic and
effective leaders dead, the city returned to a deceptive state of calm for the next few months. During
this time, the DPU network mentioned above was instituted, and the focus shifted from military to
intelligence work, with the bulk of the 10 th returned to the bled. Meanwhile, the FLN organization –
which had only been partially dismantled - was being reorganized by Yacef; and, after an appalling
incident of slaughter by the DPU in early May (where 80 Muslims were machine-gunned at a Turkish
bathhouse by French soldiers after a faulty tipoff from an informant), he would make the decision to
engage in a new round of bombings – but these would be purely indiscriminate, set in public areas
frequented by both settlers and Muslims.
The Second Battle of Algiers
On June 3 rd , Yacef's bombers set off a round of bombs hidden inside the base of lampposts near
85 While the vast bulk of the literature is clear on this point, Paul Aussaresses (135) claims that he in fact revealed much
useful information regarding the logistical arm of the FLN. However, the lack of any detail on what this intelligence
may have entailed, combined with Aussaresses necessary bias towards a victorious France betrayed by the fourth
republic, make this claim difficult to take at face value.
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