The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

DOP in particular is instructive for our purposes: tasked with the coercive interrogation of suspects
arrested by the DPU, this meant that nearly all prisoners were potentially subject to torture – suspects
who were not tortured were those who talked immediately, while those who held out (or appeared to
hold out) were then tortured. Far from being tightly concentrated on high-value suspects, the DOP
found itself quickly overwhelmed by the large number of interrogees: thus, most military units ended
up engaging in torture at one time or another. (Horne, p. 199) This was so because the French were not
only interested in the high-value targets, but in the OPA structure itself. While the average resident of
the Casbah would be highly unlikely to know the names and positions of the ALN cell members, they
would have been in much greater contact with the OPA – tax-collectors in particular would of necessity
be in greater contact with the populace than the terrorists whose activities they made possible. Thus,
by degrees, the circle of suspicion was widened to include potentially every Muslim in Algiers: by the
end of the battle, somewhere between 30 to 40% of the male Muslim population of Algiers (at least
24,000 individuals) would be arrested, and potentially subject to torture. (Heggoy, p. 240)
The First Battle of Algiers
With the census in place, and the police files incorporated by Col. Godard, the Forces of Order
were in a strong position to act against suspected FLN members. After the failure of the general strike
by early February, combined with the massive round-up of suspects during January, the FLN quickly
found itself in a precarious situation. After a second major round of bombings on January 26 th , a
waitress at the Coq Hardi was able to identify the militant who had left the bomb as a young woman –
and gave an accurate description of Djamila Bouazza, one of Yacef's bomb planters. At the end of
January, a locksmith was arrested with bomb-schematics and the location of an FLN hideout in papers
carried on his person – after three days of torture, he revealed what he knew. While the raid on the
hideout produced nothing useful for the French (the delay in getting the information had allowed Yacef
to evacuate the premises, and hide the evidence), it was a clear indication that the net was closing in. 84
On the 10 th of February, bombs exploded at two stadiums killed 10 and wounded 45 – but after the
military found the coat used to hide the bombs, they were able to trace it back to the bombers
themselves, who were promptly arrested and tortured. (Horne, p. 193) On the 15 th , the French captured
84 Rejali (2009) notes that the focus on gaining information through torture came at the expense of basic police-work: the
documents revealed everything that the locksmith was to admit under interrogation, but the French military neglected to
translate these documents in ime to gain an advantage.
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