The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
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DOP in particular is instructive <strong>for</strong> our purposes: tasked with <strong>the</strong> coercive interrogation <strong>of</strong> suspects<br />
arrested by <strong>the</strong> DPU, this meant that nearly all prisoners were potentially subject to torture – suspects<br />
who were not tortured were those who talked immediately, while those who held out (or appeared to<br />
hold out) were <strong>the</strong>n tortured. Far from being tightly concentrated on high-value suspects, <strong>the</strong> DOP<br />
found itself quickly overwhelmed by <strong>the</strong> large number <strong>of</strong> interrogees: thus, most military units ended<br />
up engaging in torture at one time or ano<strong>the</strong>r. (Horne, p. 199) This was so because <strong>the</strong> French were not<br />
only interested in <strong>the</strong> high-value targets, but in <strong>the</strong> OPA structure itself. While <strong>the</strong> average resident <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> Casbah would be highly unlikely to know <strong>the</strong> names and positions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> ALN cell members, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
would have been in much greater contact with <strong>the</strong> OPA – tax-collectors in particular would <strong>of</strong> necessity<br />
be in greater contact with <strong>the</strong> populace than <strong>the</strong> terrorists whose activities <strong>the</strong>y made possible. Thus,<br />
by degrees, <strong>the</strong> circle <strong>of</strong> suspicion was widened to include potentially every Muslim in Algiers: by <strong>the</strong><br />
end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> battle, somewhere between 30 to 40% <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> male Muslim population <strong>of</strong> Algiers (at least<br />
24,000 individuals) would be arrested, and potentially subject to torture. (Heggoy, p. 240)<br />
<strong>The</strong> First Battle <strong>of</strong> Algiers<br />
With <strong>the</strong> census in place, and <strong>the</strong> police files incorporated by Col. Godard, <strong>the</strong> Forces <strong>of</strong> Order<br />
were in a strong position to act against suspected FLN members. After <strong>the</strong> failure <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> general strike<br />
by early February, combined with <strong>the</strong> massive round-up <strong>of</strong> suspects during January, <strong>the</strong> FLN quickly<br />
found itself in a precarious situation. After a second major round <strong>of</strong> bombings on January 26 th , a<br />
waitress at <strong>the</strong> Coq Hardi was able to identify <strong>the</strong> militant who had left <strong>the</strong> bomb as a young woman –<br />
and gave an accurate description <strong>of</strong> Djamila Bouazza, one <strong>of</strong> Yacef's bomb planters. At <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong><br />
January, a locksmith was arrested with bomb-schematics and <strong>the</strong> location <strong>of</strong> an FLN hideout in papers<br />
carried on his person – after three days <strong>of</strong> torture, he revealed what he knew. While <strong>the</strong> raid on <strong>the</strong><br />
hideout produced nothing useful <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> French (<strong>the</strong> delay in getting <strong>the</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation had allowed Yacef<br />
to evacuate <strong>the</strong> premises, and hide <strong>the</strong> evidence), it was a clear indication that <strong>the</strong> net was closing in. 84<br />
On <strong>the</strong> 10 th <strong>of</strong> February, bombs exploded at two stadiums killed 10 and wounded 45 – but after <strong>the</strong><br />
military found <strong>the</strong> coat used to hide <strong>the</strong> bombs, <strong>the</strong>y were able to trace it back to <strong>the</strong> bombers<br />
<strong>the</strong>mselves, who were promptly arrested and tortured. (Horne, p. 193) On <strong>the</strong> 15 th , <strong>the</strong> French captured<br />
84 Rejali (2009) notes that <strong>the</strong> focus on gaining in<strong>for</strong>mation through torture came at <strong>the</strong> expense <strong>of</strong> basic police-work: <strong>the</strong><br />
documents revealed everything that <strong>the</strong> locksmith was to admit under interrogation, but <strong>the</strong> French military neglected to<br />
translate <strong>the</strong>se documents in ime to gain an advantage.<br />
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