The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

one of the primary justifications for torture – that there is not enough time to gather that information
through other means – was not operative: but at the same time, the fact that the French would have time
to verify the information would also vitiate one of the primary dangers of torture – that the captive
could simply hold out for long enough that the information would become worthless.
The Structure of Forces
The FLN operation in Algiers had been designed with an eye towards secrecy. In classic
terrorist fashion, the organization had been constructed as a series of hierarchical and interlocking cells,
with a strong degree of decentralization in order to minimize the security risks involved. (Heggoy, p.
128-9) The organization itself was split between a political arm, the OPA, and a military arm, which
was in turn split along functional lines, with separate cells for building, distributing and planting
bombs, and another group of cells of armed gunmen responsible for assassinations and executions of
dangerous elements in the Muslim community. The main function of the OPA was organizing the
populace, and above all raising taxes. It is important to recognize that the French saw no effective
difference between the OPA and the military wing: the goal of the French army was to stop the FLN,
not individual bombs, and so the net cast by the military would be quite broad. In total, the number of
FLN was relatively limited: the political arm included some 5,000 members, while the military arm
never numbered more than 1500 – including about 100 gunmen and 50 members of the various bomber
cells. (Talbott, p. 80) Thus, there were about The gunmen and the bombing cells operated with
different methods: in general, discriminate violence (against 'traitors', internal opponents and settler
leaders) was the modus operandi of the gunmen – collective violence against settlers was practiced by
the bombers. The numerical predominance of the OPA over the military wing stemmed from the
necessity of covering the Casbah with agents who could be used to gather information, raise revenue,
and deliver messages from one cell to another: for terror purposes, a much smaller force would be
necessary. 82
Upon taking full power in Algiers, Massu organized his forces to cover the city with static
forces to watch potential FLN targets and to control movement across the city. This system, known as
quadrillage, was intended first of all to reduce the mobility of FLN agents, and secondly, to allow
masked Muslims working with the French to identify suspected FLN as they passed through. In
82 For a breakdown of the cell structure for the FLN/ALN in the ZAA, see Pierre, p. 4-5
88