The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

December 28 th . At the funeral service the next day, a bomb planted at the cemetery to inflict mass
casualties on the mourners went off early, preventing civilian deaths, but leading to a major ratonnade
('rat hunt') against the local Muslim population that killed four and injured 50. In addition to this
campaign to divide the settlers from the Muslims, the FLN had planned an eight-day general strike to
commence on the 28 th of January to coincide with the opening of the UN session in New York. It was
at this point, on January 7 th , that the Resident Minister, Lacoste, had called upon Gen. Massu's 10 th
Paratroop Division to take control of all civil and military powers in the City. It was at this point that
the 'Battle' began in earnest.
The Battle itself can be divided into three major periods: the initial application of martial law in
January, leading to the widespread use of torture, and that led to the partial dismantling of the terror
organization by March; the period between March and June that saw the FLN reconstitute itself under
the full leadership of Yacef, while the French established their counter-terror information systems (the
DPU and the DOP in particular) and the reassignment of the bulk of the 10 th Division back to the bled;
and the recrudescence of terror from June to September, when Yacef himself was finally captured and
October, when Ali la Pointe was killed. But before we examine this saga, we should begin by noting
the aims and goals of the two sides in the conflict. For the FLN, the goal was to create a no-go area in
the Casbah that would allow the FLN to establish a “counter-state” resistant to French intelligence, and
use their organizational capacity to raise taxes and launch attacks that would widen the gulf separating
the settlers from the Muslims around them, while pressing the Algerian claim in the international
community. 80 For the French, the goal was primarily to identify and then dismantle the FLN
organization – not to find the bombs per se, but to find the bombers, and the members of the political
branch whose operation made them possible. 81 In other words, the French were looking for information
that was not necessarily time-sensitive in the 'ticking-bomb' sense: rather, they were seeking
information on the FLN structure, and on the individuals who filled in that structure. This means that
80 The importance of media attention for the FLN was deeply connected to the need to split France from her allies. By
making the world aware of the Algerian claim to nationhood, and of the brutal nature of the French response, it was
hoped that the US would pressure France toward the bargaining table, in order to head off the possibility of a Sovietallied
Algeria. This was what in fact occurred – no less a person than then-Senator John F. Kennedy came out in favor
of a peaceful settlement. (Connelly, 2001)
81 This focus on the more-vulnerable OPA meant that nearly anyone picked up from the Casbah might know who the local
OPA taxmen were, and therefore any suspect arrested could be subjected to torture, if the authorities believed them to be
withholding information. “Over and over, intelligence officers put to the smallest fry a single question: 'Who in your
district collects the organization's funds?' Disclosure of the collector's name swiftly brought his arrest and the question,
'To whom do you turn in your money?'” (Trinquier, p. 43-51, as quoted by Talbott, p. 85)
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