The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

a diminishing tenth of the population - could effectively veto the will of the 90% Muslim majority.
(Horne, p. 69) After UDMA and especially PPA victories in municipal elections, the 1948 elections for
the Assembly and the National Assembly were rigged – as all elections in the second (Muslism) college
would be until the end of l'Algérie Française. (Knight, 1958) But this apparent success by the Pieds
Noir in keeping the Muslim population disenfranchised would have the Janus-like effect of crushing
the moderate and legal nationalist movements as effective political forces, while leading radical
members of the Messalist MTLD to organize for direct action. This splinter group, the Organisation
Spécial (OS) would bring together radicals who shared a belief that only violence would force the
French to respond to nationalist demands, and generally a common history of having served in the
French army during World War 2. The OS would operate until its break-up by the French security
forces in 1950 – an event that further split the movement, this time breaking apart the MTLD itself into
pro- and anti-Messalist factions, and leading to considerable internecine warfare. This split would in
turn allow for the creation of a “Third Force” that would seize the initiative with a general uprising on
November 1 st , 1954 – the FLN, composed of ex-OS members in conjunction with the maquisards led
by Belkacem Krim in the Kabylia mountains. (Heggoy, p. 49-59)
Crucially, the FLN at the beginning of the Revolution lacked strong popular support, or even
recognition: it would have to build this support by taking advantage of the derelict state of French
administration in the bled (the countryside) to build their own counter-state, and by absorbing or
eliminating other claimants to the nationalist mantle. Abbas was brought into the FLN through both
intimidation and cooptation: his nephew had been among those killed during the massacre at
Philippeville in 1955, and he was told at a meeting with Ramdane Abane a few weeks later that he
needed to fold his UDMA into the Front. After a few attempts to make contact with de Gaulle, he
disbanded the organization and joined the FLN in January, 1956. (Horne, p. 140-1) At the other
ideological extreme, the PCA was absorbed after the failure of the independent maquis rouge and the
death of its leader, a deserter from the French Army named Henri Maillot. While the PCA was willing
to wage revolution for independence, the party preferred to maintain a separate armed organization, and
the FLN would only allow communists to join the Front as individuals, and not as a group. After
Maillot's death, the PCA ceased to be an effective alternative to the FLN. (ibid. p. 137-8) Of the
various potential alternatives to the FLN, only the Mouvement Nationale Algérienne (MNA) – the
successor to the MTLD – was to maintain its independence for any significant length of time. This was
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