The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

6. This did not occur: as torture became a larger part of the information agthering apparatus, the
number of captives instead increased radically, regularly exceeding after March 1957 the
total number of ALN fighters.
7. If the French could not detect when ignorant captives lied in order to end their suffering, then
there is little reason to believe that they could detect the lies of the knowledgeable captives.
Even with the far-reaching and effective intelligence apparatus represented by the DPU, the French
state was still accepting large amounts of misinformation. In other words, having the ability to judge
information gained under torture is not enough – the state must make a credible commitment to do so.
4.3. The Battle of Algiers
Algerian Nationalism Divided
The Algerian nationalist movement by the outbreak of the Revolution on November 1 st , 1954
was far from a monolithic entity, and in fact it was the outbreak of the Revolution itself that would
begin the process of consolidation that would leave the FLN as the only organization in a position to
bargain for Independence with the French government. The nationalist movement up until that point
can be characterized by three strains, engaged in cooperation and competition with each other: the
Association des Ulema, a primarily cultural and educational religious group subscribing to a form of
Islamic-nationalism, headed by Abdelhamid Ben Baddis; the liberal, reformist Union Democratique du
Manifeste Algerien (UDMA) headed by the evolué Ferhat Abbas; and the radical, marxist-oriented
strain centered (until the 1950s) around Messali Hadj. (Horne, p.38) In addition, there existed as well
an Algerian Communist Party (PCA) that had been spun off from the PCF, and that was composed of
both Muslim and pied noir membership. The FLN would eventually dominate all four of these groups,
either through political marginalization, engaging their active support, or intimidation and violence, but
not all at once, and not without considerable struggle.
While it would be beyond the scope of this investigation to determine the historical roots of
Algerian nationalism (one might date the beginnings to the rebellion led by Abd el-Qadir in the
aftermath of France's invasion in 1830), it is crucial to examine how the various strains of Algerian
nationalism were able or unable to coordinate and cooperate with each other in order to understand the
importance of the FLN's eventual triumph as the sole organ for the Revolution. The earliest moment of
inter-Nationalist cooperation for our purposes is the battle over the Blum-Viollette bill in 1936. At that
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