The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

seen, in 16 th Century Massachusetts, mid 20 th Century Algeria, and 21 st Century America, the
authorities were simply unable to credibly commit to doing so, allowing captives to delay, deceive, and
ultimately damage the states who persecuted them.
The deceptive cycle that I find in each case indicates that states are simply not often in a
position to credibly commit to investigating the information that captives reveal. This is not to say that
torture can never work: indeed, it is entirely possible for captives to reveal true information to the state,
just as it is possible for the state to reject true information because it does not fit their prior beliefs. But
it is to say that torture is unlikely to work if the players involved act rationally, even under optimal
conditions. And since there is no reason to believe in torture's efficacy from a psychological
perspective, this leaves very little reason to believe that torture can work systematically. For torture has
never been a question of 'just this once' under extreme circumstances: torture is a system of gaining
information, and as such it must be evaluated as a system. And that system is least likely to work under
precisely those conditions when it can most be justified: when the state lacks other investigative
alternatives, when the captive is certain to be knowledgeable, and when time is of the essence. The
ticking bomb scenario – far from justifying torture in extremis – is instead its downfall: for all the
captive has to do is lie while the bomb ticks silently across town.
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