The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
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<strong>the</strong> threats <strong>the</strong>y face are real, where <strong>the</strong> state is in<strong>for</strong>med, and has a collective interest in precluding <strong>the</strong><br />
absorption <strong>of</strong> false in<strong>for</strong>mation. Ra<strong>the</strong>r than finding an additive relationship between <strong>the</strong> state's<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation environment and <strong>the</strong> presence or absence <strong>of</strong> conspiracies, I find an apparently<br />
multiplicative one. While <strong>the</strong> in<strong>for</strong>med French in Algeria were able to limit <strong>the</strong> damage done to <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
own side done by <strong>the</strong> cycle <strong>of</strong> denunciations (while still ultimately losing <strong>the</strong> war as a result <strong>of</strong> it), <strong>the</strong><br />
less in<strong>for</strong>med in Americans were to fall hook, line and sinker <strong>for</strong> what – in retrospect – was an obvious<br />
lie told under torture. When <strong>the</strong> threat is imaginary, <strong>the</strong> relationship appears to have been reversed. In<br />
Salem, <strong>the</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> good in<strong>for</strong>mation outside <strong>the</strong> confessions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> accused led to an explosion <strong>of</strong><br />
denunciations, but one which was attenuated once <strong>the</strong> pressures unleashed by this deceptive cycle lead<br />
<strong>the</strong> elites in charge to reexamine <strong>the</strong>ir concepts <strong>of</strong> acceptable evidence. For <strong>the</strong> FLN, however, <strong>the</strong><br />
existence <strong>of</strong> a powerful intelligence apparatus did not prevent <strong>the</strong> colonels from giving precedence to<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation gleaned through <strong>for</strong>ce: in <strong>the</strong> end, <strong>the</strong> cycle <strong>of</strong> denunciations was brought to a halt only<br />
with <strong>the</strong> murder <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> authorities <strong>the</strong>mselves by <strong>the</strong>ir own men, and only after doing irreparable<br />
damage to <strong>the</strong> Army <strong>of</strong> National Liberation itself. Whereas a strong in<strong>for</strong>mation environment appears<br />
to have ameliorated torture's ill effects when <strong>the</strong> threat is real, it appears also to have accelerated <strong>the</strong><br />
acceptance <strong>of</strong> tortured in<strong>for</strong>mation when <strong>the</strong> threat does not truly exist.<br />
In all cases, <strong>the</strong>re are indications that even in<strong>for</strong>med states with an interest in verifying tortured<br />
in<strong>for</strong>mation were susceptible to deception, most dramatically in situations where states were presented<br />
with a choice between trusting <strong>the</strong> verification process or <strong>the</strong> words <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> tortured. In <strong>the</strong> most benign<br />
case, <strong>the</strong> French spent three days torturing a locksmith connected with <strong>the</strong> FLN be<strong>for</strong>e learning <strong>the</strong><br />
location <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> main bomb factory at Impasse de la Grénade – three days <strong>the</strong>y would have saved had<br />
<strong>the</strong>y bo<strong>the</strong>red to translate <strong>the</strong> ream <strong>of</strong> documents captured with <strong>the</strong> locksmith that provided <strong>the</strong><br />
location. (Rejali, p. 489) In <strong>the</strong> most extreme case, <strong>the</strong> United States allowed itself to be convinced <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>the</strong> existence <strong>of</strong> training camps in Iraq set up by <strong>the</strong> Hussein regime to instruct al Qa'ida on chemical<br />
warfare by <strong>the</strong> tortured testimony <strong>of</strong> Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi despite considerable reason to distrust his<br />
report – reasons outlines extensively by <strong>the</strong> Defense Intelligence Agency in February <strong>of</strong> 2002, more<br />
than a year be<strong>for</strong>e <strong>the</strong> invasion <strong>of</strong> Iraq. (DITSUM #044-02) <strong>The</strong> implication is serious: while <strong>the</strong><br />
presence <strong>of</strong> an actual threat, as well as an in<strong>for</strong>med state are necessary conditions <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> successful use<br />
<strong>of</strong> torture <strong>for</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation, <strong>the</strong>y are insufficient. <strong>The</strong> state must also be willing to use its capacity to<br />
investigate, even when this is costly, and even when it contradicts <strong>the</strong> state's prior beliefs. As we have<br />
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