The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

of causal mechanisms in a very direct manner. In this sense, the approach I am using pulls from several
different methodologies. Firstly, the basic logic of torture for information was conceived of through a
process similar to what Bates et al. (1998) have termed an “analytic narrative.” The goal is to make use
of a more or less formal model of the process under consideration in order to derive testable
hypotheses, and then to use a case or selection of cases as a means to elucidate how this logic operates
in the real world. While this method provides an excellent way to make plain the causal mechanisms
underlying a theory, it suffers from limitations in its applicability to cases not under direct
consideration: it may be, after all, that the causal mechanism identified in the model does not truly
apply outside the narrow confines of the cases chosen. In order to rectify this limitation, the
comparative case study methodology outlined by Lijphart (1971) and George and Bennet (2005) can be
applied. Rather than focusing on an individual case to outline how the theorized causal mechanism
operates, using several cases that vary according to the independent variables that appear decisive in
the model allows us to more properly test if these mechanisms are merely case specific, or if they
appear in multiple situations.
The generalizability of this program is strengthened by the fact that the official unit of analysis,
the torture regime, is itself comprised of multiple individual moments and instances of torture. In
examining whether or not torture 'works', we are also asking how torture operates in each of these
cases. And because the logic of torture is so intimately bound up in informational asymmetries,
necessitating a single strategy to be employed by the state against the knowledgeable and ignorant
captives between whom it is impossible to distinguish, how the state reacts to lies told by ignorant
captives can inform us how it reacts in general to 'knowledgeable' lies as well. If the state can separate
the necessary lies told by the ignorant, then this will give us considerable reason to believe that it is
also capable of keeping knowledgeable captives from telling voluntary lies. If the state simply believes
everything it hears under torture, then we can similarly be confident that knowledgeable captives will
lie with impunity. In other words, the testable implications of the model are multiplied not only by
choosing several cases to examine, but also by the nature of the torture regimes themselves.
The method I follow for each case is as follows. Firstly, I examine the history of each case:
how the authorities came to convinced of the existence of a conspiracy, and how torture came to be
used to uncover it. I then examine how well the authorities wee able to gain true information about that
conspiracy, while attempting to parse out how much success was due to the use of torture. Finally, I
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