The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

Independent Variables
(Outcome)
Weak Information
Environment +
Unreliable Agents
Table 1: Continued
Conspiracy Real/
State's Priors Correct
USA at Abu Ghraib
(medium/strong cycle)
Conspiracy Unreal/
State's Priors Incorrect
European Witch-Hunts
(strongest cycle)
There are several other ways in which the data could present itself, however, and both would
have alternate implications for my theory. Firstly, it might be found that the variables examined appear
to have little to no effect on the outcome – perhaps how informed a state is makes no difference in its
ability to confront a conspiratorial treat, real or imagined: if this is the case, then something might be
revealed about how well torture operated in these cases, but it would clearly falsify my theory.
Alternatively, it might be found that one factor or another predominated to the exclusion of the other:
perhaps an informed state will be able to prevent the cycle from occurring at all, as it carefully vets the
stories told by captives, whether ignorant or knowledgeable. If this is the case, then torture is entirely
unproblematic, as it would indicate that states possess both the capability of testing information, and
the will to do so – a severe blow to my theory. Finally, and most intriguingly, perhaps the relationship
between these two causal mechanisms is not purely additive, but interactive: it may be that an informed
state unknowingly facing a false threat is actually more likely to spiral into deception than an
uninformed one in the same circumstances, even if being informed trumps being uninformed when
facing an actual conspiracy. If so, then states making use of torture may face an additional danger –
that an informed state applying torture under false assumptions might choose to believe information
gathered through torture over information gleaned through more prosaic detection methods. Where this
is the case, it becomes clear that the captive's every incentive is to take advantage of the state's naïveté.
While the comparative case study method does limit the ability to derive conclusions from the
data we examine, this method does offer one major compensation: the ability to perceive the presence
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