The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

More documents

Recommendations

Info

virtuous cycle where the state is able to gain information from torture and increase the proportion of knowledgeable captives in the pool; and a vicious cycle where misinformation leads the state farther and farther afield, driving knowledgeable captives out. But only one of these equilibria should be stable: as the virtuous cycle deepens, and the probability that the state is torturing a knowledgeable captive increases, the state will eventually reach a point where it is no longer credibly able to play the necessary strategy of torturing when the captive appears to lie, and imprisoning when he appears to tell the truth – leading knowledgeable captives to lie, and the state to accept misinformation. And since the state does not know when it has accepted misinformation when it does not play according to the signal, the end result will be a rapid slide downwards into misinformation. This model explains why we see the explosive cycle of denunciations in the continental witch- trials of the 16 th and 17 th Centuries, as well as the Albigensian inquisition of the 13 th Century. In the case of witchcraft, the state's (or inquisition's) priors were by definition faulty – believing that witches exist, and that only torture could bring them to confess and name their confederates. Because there could be no empirical evidence of witchcraft – that is, of the covenant with Satan, the attendance at the Witches' Sabbaths, or of the use of magic – the inquisition would never find itself in a position where it would know with certainty that it had erred. In the case of heresy, the lack of any evidence other than confessions meant that the process would take in a larger and larger pool of suspects, regardless of guilt - even though the conspiracy in this case was real. The model also provides us with an explanation for why torture fails: torture depends on an investigative apparatus to separate truth from fiction – but historically torture has been most likely to be used in cases where that apparatus is either difficult or impossible to utilize. We would therefore predict that the more a situation involving torture approximates this condition, the more likely it is to devolve into a cycle of denunciations, marked by an increase in the number of captives over time. If the theory is incorrect, then torture should lead to a decreasing number of captives, as the ignorant are winnowed out, and the members of the conspiracy are wound up. 2.5. Evaluating the Model through Case Studies Any statistical evaluation of how well torture works would be hamstrung from the start by the deliberate lack of systematic information on how states torture: states, even when they do gather such information, have no incentive to make it publicly available and even if they did they would have no 31
incentive not to present as favorable a picture as possible. Direct experimentation is likewise impossible for ethical considerations. Consequently, evaluating the logic of this model of informative torture must be done through the comparative method. The cases that I examine in this dissertation are therefore chosen with an eye towards holding constant several important parameters, while allowing what I argue to be the crucial ones to vary, and then noting the results of the use of 'informative' torture in each. In each case, torture is used by the authorities in good faith: that is, they intend the use of torture in order to gain valuable information of prime importance. The uses of torture for other reasons, such as public intimidation, punishment, or political purgation are therefore not considered. 32 In addition, the information sought was not immediately verifiable on its face: as the model suggests, when there is no information asymmetry between the captive and the torturer (e.g., a thief tortures a man in his home until he reveals the combination of his bedroom safe), the success of failure of torture becomes completely dependent on how much pain the torturer can inflict, and how much the captive can withstand. This is not to say that verifying the information is impossible in these cases – only that verification is costly and noisy. The cases vary according to three major theoretical criteria. Firstly, the cases vary according to the presence or absence of an actual conspiracy. This condition is important, since the potential for a deceptive cycle to occur should be much greater when the state's prior beliefs are incorrect from the beginning. Cases where the authorities used torture to root out a real conspiracy include the United States in its battle against the Iraqi insurgency, as well as against al Qa'ida, and the French effort in Algeria to destroy the nationalist FLN, while the FLN's attempt to root out an actual treasonous conspiracy was mistakenly directed against those militants who were not actually in league with the French. During the witch-trials, as with the FLN, the attempt to root out a conspiracy was directed mistakenly against fundamentally innocent individuals: in Salem, however, there was no conspiracy to begin with. Secondly, the cases vary according to the state's information environment – the ability to verify information obtained through torture. The French, with the imposition of the quadrillage system and the creation of a massive information (and informant) network, maintained the strongest capabilities in 32 Examples of these include the use of torture on slaves in the American South, judicial torture for confession alone, and the Soviet show trials under Stalin. In such cases the theater of torture as a means of legitimating authority takes precedence over generating information to be acted on, and consequently the state faces very different incentives than for informative torture. 32
Page 1 and 2: THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEG
Page 3 and 4: This work is dedicated to my wife,
Page 5 and 6: TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT vii 1. T
Page 7 and 8: ABSTRACT In the aftermath of the Se
Page 9 and 10: judged by their effects. The deonto
Page 11 and 12: etter than chance on average, no ma
Page 13 and 14: from fiction, and also in the time
Page 15 and 16: the cases differ in how well inform
Page 17 and 18: characterization by method. Torture
Page 19 and 20: gather such evidence was strong, to
Page 21 and 22: ineffective. Something must prevent
Page 23 and 24: The description which it would be n
Page 25 and 26: powerful themselves. 21 While histo
Page 27 and 28: known by the misnomer 'torture-ligh
Page 29 and 30: substitute for intelligence gatheri
Page 31 and 32: This lack of good data on torture t
Page 33 and 34: found that the procedure can cause
Page 35 and 36: captive who has faced torture, and
Page 37: state cannot credibly commit to pla
Page 41 and 42: units, those engaged in the applica
Page 43 and 44: of causal mechanisms in a very dire
Page 45 and 46: the threats they face are real, whe
Page 47 and 48: 3.1. Introduction. CHAPTER 3 THE WI
Page 49 and 50: discovered by Sir Thomas Newton and
Page 51 and 52: two, and the execution of the convi
Page 53 and 54: years preceding the outbreak at Sal
Page 55 and 56: these women - non-Church members, p
Page 57 and 58: Hubbard) and four grown and married
Page 59 and 60: innocent, and recalled that when he
Page 61 and 62: crowd was deeply and troublingly mo
Page 63 and 64: it was precisely in these terms tha
Page 65 and 66: came to an end. Misogyny was all to
Page 67 and 68: only the witch-trials that brought
Page 69 and 70: partners in their own (apparent) de
Page 71 and 72: possibility would be to question th
Page 73 and 74: John Bridges (whose own wife and da
Page 75 and 76: she again broke down and named seve
Page 77 and 78: forcing the already convicted to re
Page 79 and 80: We can thus see Tituba's confession
Page 81 and 82: Samuell Parris. 70 The strongest ev
Page 83 and 84: order to purge political dissidents
Page 85 and 86: torture as a failure based on this
Page 87 and 88: torture - the state will apply it e
Page 89 and 90:
time, the government in Paris was c
Page 91 and 92:
for two reasons - first, because Me
Page 93 and 94:
The Soummam conference in the Summe
Page 95 and 96:
one of the primary justifications f
Page 97 and 98:
DOP in particular is instructive fo
Page 99 and 100:
us stops in the city center. These
Page 101 and 102:
one that would turn the dangers of
Page 103 and 104:
dismantling of the ZAA organization
Page 105 and 106:
found in the literature: the revela
Page 107 and 108:
In fact, the use of torture did hav
Page 109 and 110:
e.g.), by March (when the DPU had b
Page 111 and 112:
Paul Teitgen appears to have been c
Page 113 and 114:
the French public. 95 Secondly, the
Page 115 and 116:
conditions theoretically necessary
Page 117 and 118:
the reasons for holding the detaine
Page 119 and 120:
y military interrogators. (Washingt
Page 121 and 122:
fact come verbatim from a 1957 jour
Page 123 and 124:
ole in the acquisition of intellige
Page 125 and 126:
to those believed to have informati
Page 127 and 128:
name for metanetwork analysis. 102
Page 129 and 130:
other words, the CIA High Value Det
Page 131 and 132:
Padilla was accused by KSM of plott
Page 133 and 134:
and an enemy of the United States,
Page 135 and 136:
alternative mechanism) by Darius Re
Page 137 and 138:
York Times, 09/12/2005) Insofar as
Page 139 and 140:
these interrogations were conducted
Page 141 and 142:
al-Qaeda is structured, names of in
Page 143 and 144:
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION: The Misleadin
Page 145 and 146:
problem by the authorities - and ye
Page 147 and 148:
situations (France in Algeria and V
Page 149 and 150:
Jack Bauer was used as justificatio
Page 151 and 152:
Biderman, Albert D. “Effects of C
Page 153 and 154:
Crelinstein, Ronald and Alex Schmid
Page 155 and 156:
History Teacher. 30:4 (1997): pp. 4
Page 157 and 158:
International Council on Security a
Page 159 and 160:
Lewis, Neil A. “Red Cross Finds D
Page 161 and 162:
Obuchowski, Chester W. “Algeria:
Page 163 and 164:
Schiemann, John W. “Interrogation
Page 165 and 166:
Barack Obama is Inviting the Next A
Page 167 and 168:
United States, Department of Defens
Page 169:
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Patrick Armshaw
show all

The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?