The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

found that the procedure can cause subjects to want to talk, but that this same process also degrades the
ability to remember and communicate information accurately. (Kleinman 2006)
The problem, for our purposes, of making use of the psychological mechanism lies in the lack
of any clear model of the mind, and how it can be expected to operate under conditions such as torture.
This problem shows up most clearly in the case of regression: while we can empirically see that
regression causes a desire to cooperate with the interrogator, it is far more difficult to determine
whether or not compliance results in the divulgence of accurate information. Sleep deprivation stands
out in this regard as well. In the witch trials in Scotland (1590 through 1680), an estimated 4,400
people confessed to witchcraft under the effects of sleep deprivation – these victims were subsequently
burned at the stake. (Rejali, Ruthven 1978) What is striking in this episode is that here we have an
example where many of the unknowns regarding torture are answered for us: the subjects were
innocent, since there is no such thing as witchcraft, and the method used was standard. And yet, those
subjected to torture were willing to invent, out of whole cloth if necessary, damning evidence that they
must have known would doom them to a painful and shameful death. Clearly, if torture is to be
understood as a means of gaining truth, the Scottish witch hunt must be seen as an indication that
psychological procedures are capable of sowing false information.
If we are to leave aside the psychological mechanism, then how are we to understand torture as
a process? We are left with a rational explanation: the captive is subjected to torture until their
suffering is intense enough that it overshadows (in the utility calculations of the subject) the desire to
withhold information. Wantchekon and Healy (1999) provide an example of what such an approach
would look like. They examine torture as a game: a set of players choose among a set of actions, and
choose those actions that make them best off given the other players' response. Their model focuses on
when torture ends, and is based considerably around confession-based coercion: the torture takes place
not to gain information per se, but rather to gain the captive's consent to the narrative put forward by
the interrogator. The major variable they examine is the 'type' of torturer: professional (dislikes causing
pain), zealot (cares nothing about inflicting pain), and the sadist (who actively enjoys the act of
torture). In this model, the state is only able to benefit from torture because the captive is incapable of
lying – a heroic assumption that ignores a crucial element in how torture operates in the real world.
Chen, Tsai and Leung (2009) present a game theoretic treatment of judicial torture, arguing that even
where torture has no ability to distinguish between the guilty and the innocent, that judges, in the
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