The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information
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<strong>the</strong> arguments <strong>of</strong> many A<strong>the</strong>nian litigants, and this privilege was based on <strong>the</strong> idea that, whereas<br />
citizens might lie if <strong>the</strong>y thought <strong>the</strong>y could get away with it, slaves under torture could only tell <strong>the</strong><br />
truth.<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>the</strong>oretical underpinnings <strong>of</strong> this system are provided by Aristotle in his Politics, while<br />
defining what a slave is: “He is by nature a slave who is capable <strong>of</strong> belonging to ano<strong>the</strong>r (and that is<br />
why he does so belong), and who participates in reason so far as to apprehend it but not to possess it;<br />
<strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> animals o<strong>the</strong>r than man are subservient not to reason, by apprehending it, but to feelings.” 11 <strong>The</strong><br />
juxtaposition <strong>of</strong> slave and animal is not accidental: slaves are assumed to be lacking in reason, which is<br />
why <strong>the</strong>y are not free, but may be motivated to tell <strong>the</strong> truth as an animal is motivated to pull a plow,<br />
through sensation and particularly through pain. Ano<strong>the</strong>r way <strong>of</strong> understanding this reasoning is to say<br />
that a slave, lacking reason, cannot lie while under torture – he hasn't <strong>the</strong> wit to do so (duBois, p.66).<br />
This is <strong>the</strong> view <strong>of</strong> torture described by Arrigo (2004) as <strong>the</strong> “animal instinct” model. And yet even<br />
Aristotle, no foe <strong>of</strong> slavery, recognized <strong>the</strong> possibility that torture could not guarantee truth – that <strong>the</strong><br />
slave was not a simple mechanism to be activated by pain, but might withstand or even turn torture to<br />
his advantage. 12 <strong>The</strong> essential problem lay in <strong>the</strong> porous boundary between <strong>the</strong> slave and <strong>the</strong> citizen in<br />
a non-racialized slave society, where slaves could buy <strong>the</strong>ir freedom and citizens (through capture in<br />
war) could become slaves. <strong>Torture</strong> was a marker <strong>of</strong> social status, <strong>the</strong> watchman on <strong>the</strong> walls separating<br />
freedom from slavery. Slaves could be tortured, citizens could not. 13 <strong>The</strong> fact that torture was used<br />
explicitly as a means <strong>of</strong> finding <strong>the</strong> truth in a lawsuit does not change <strong>the</strong> fact that such a process<br />
depends on slaves finding <strong>the</strong>mselves <strong>for</strong>ced into truthfulness under circumstances where all agreed<br />
that free men might lie. And because <strong>the</strong> line between slave and citizen was permeable on both sides,<br />
such an assumption could not but be chimerical: if <strong>the</strong>re is no essential (but only legal) difference<br />
between <strong>the</strong> free and <strong>the</strong> enslaved, <strong>the</strong>n how could such an assumption hold? Here already we can see<br />
one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> main aspects <strong>of</strong> a system <strong>of</strong> torture <strong>for</strong> in<strong>for</strong>mation: <strong>the</strong>re must exist some fundamental<br />
difference between those on whom torture can be used, and those on whom it is assumed to be<br />
concerned. For more on <strong>the</strong> evolution <strong>of</strong> this term, see duBois (1991).<br />
11 Politics, Book I, sec. 1245b. Text available online at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?<br />
doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0058:book%3D1:section%3D1254b .<br />
12 Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 15. Translation by John H. Freese. Text available online at<br />
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Rhetoric_(Freese)/Book_1<br />
13 <strong>The</strong> ambiguity reflected in <strong>the</strong> writings <strong>of</strong> Aristotle on <strong>the</strong> usefulness <strong>of</strong> tortured testimony is appropriate in a nonracialized<br />
system <strong>of</strong> slavery: any free man might be made a slave, if captured in war, while slaves might become free<br />
through manumission. In such a society, where freedom is never entirely assured, torture was a way <strong>of</strong> reifying <strong>the</strong><br />
distinction.<br />
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