The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

spoken truly, and fully, before ending the torture. In other words, the torture does not end until the
torturer decides that it does – the captive really is at the mercy of the torturer, even when they do
choose to reveal the truth. This definition can be expanded to include other forms of coercive
interrogation insofar as they mimic the logic of torture. In cases where a captive is given a choice
between revealing information (that the authorities may or may not be able to verify) and facing some
extreme punishment such as death, we can talk about the logic of torture being fulfilled.
I argue that torture can only work theoretically if several conditions are met. Firstly, the
conspiracy that the state uses torture to combat is real. If the state is chasing phantoms, then it is highly
likely to find them – torture would be applied only to those with no real information to give, and the
end result would be that any noisy verification system would simply result in a deceptive cycle.
Secondly, I argue that the authorities engaged in torture must be capable of verifying the information
revealed under torture. As we saw above, there is little support for the idea that torturers can parse
truth from fiction on their own, and the technological means for doing so simply do not exist. Absent
such ability, the authorities cannot know when the captive has lied, and so the captive has no incentive
to tell the truth. Thirdly, the authorities must be credibly able to commit to verification, otherwise the
captive is best off lying and counting on the authorities to simply believe him. Lastly, the agents of
authority must be reliable: if the state rewards the torturer for the quantity – and not the quality – of
information educed, then the torturer will have no interest in forcing the captive to speak truthfully, and
in the case of ignorant captives would have a positive incentive to force them to lie. Unless the state is
capable of satisfying all four conditions, torture cannot work: and when torture fails, it may result in a
deceptive cycle that undermines the state itself.
In order to make this argument, I proceed as follows. The next section of this chapter examines
the history of torture in the West as a phenomenon, noting how torture was believed to operate, and
how it worked in practice. I examine torture among the ancient Greeks before moving to the
reintroduction judicial torture in the early Renaissance and its eventual abandonment during the
Enlightenment. From there I examine the rebirth of torture during colonialism and the rise of the anti-
liberal states (both fascist and communist) in the first half of the twentieth century, and conclude with
the rise of the international anti-torture regime during the final years of the Cold War. As we shall see,
in all cases torture was inextricably linked with intelligence gathering: torture was more likely to occur
in eras and cases where empirical evidence was hard to come by or utilize – and where the ability to
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