The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

characterization by method. Torture, in my definition, is the deliberate infliction of pain on an
individual or set of individuals entirely at the aggressor's mercy. There are two main parts to this
definition. Firstly, torture is deliberate: if the pain is caused accidentally or unknowingly, then it may
certainly count as abuse but cannot be torture. Secondly, and crucially, the victim of torture has no
power to prevent herself from suffering the infliction of pain – that is, even if the captive cooperates,
the decision to inflict pain resides in the hands of the authority alone. Torture can then be subdivided
according to the purpose for which torture is employed: it might be used inter alia to enforce
obedience, to generate confessions, to demonstrate the power of the state or to gather information, or
simply for the sadistic exercise of power over another. This dissertation will focus on torture for
information.
By defining torture in this fashion, and by specifying torture for information as the object of
inquiry, we are able to obviate the question of how much pain is tantamount to torture, as well as which
methods of producing said pain are counted. Pain, whether mental, physical or emotional, is treated the
same by the brain and differs only in the amount. (Los Angeles Times, 04/04/2011) Because the
amount of pain inflicted must be sufficient to persuade the captive to reveal information he prefers not
to, that pain must by definition be unendurable – if it were endurable then the pain would be
completely useless, and as such sadistic. The method chosen of producing that pain is similarly
unimportant: while the quality of pain differs strongly from act to act, and the perception of pain from
person to person, the only thing that matters is the incentive provided to the captive by that pain. It
might be argued that torture for information is a contradiction in terms. This is in fact precisely the
argument made by the Office of Legal Council (OLC), who argued in their infamous memorandum that
an individual would only be guilty of torture if inflicting pain was the “specific intent” of the torturer,
and not a side effect of information gathering. (pp. 36-7) The extreme weakness of this argument is
obvious in that literally no form of torture that has existed historically would qualify under this
definition – even purely sadistic torture is instrumental in that it aims at pleasing the sadist, with the
pain inflicted as a side effect. It might also be claimed that the captive under informational torture in
fact holds the power to end his torment by revealing the requisite information. This argument is
stronger, but is also fatally compromised when we consider that the torturer is under no compulsion to
end the torture once the captive has spoken – there is (and can exist) no contract regulating torture with
the captive as a party, and even if there were, the torturer would have to believe that the captive had
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