The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

More documents

Recommendations

Info

ut not towards effectiveness or even some set of proven techniques provides strong evidence that the effectiveness of torture is not those elites' primary concern. But if torture can only work under conditions where it is not used, and if there is no evidence that torture has become any more effective over the many years and iterations of its use, then why do states torture at all? There are several possibilities here. First off, it may be that elites are convinced that torture works for atheoretical reasons, and so discount evidence that it has failed. The shadowy nature of torture makes this quite possible – the elites who decide whether or not to institute a torture regime are likely to rely on the torturers themselves for indications of how well the process is working – and the torturers would have considerable incentive to portray the workings of torture in the most successful light. That misinformation is difficult to separate from truth adds to this concern: unless the authorities become aware of the misinformation they are accepting, they are likely to believe that every confession or revelation they get is a success – resulting in greater and greater confidence in a system the further it goes off the rails. Another possibility is that torture is not in fact used for information after all – perhaps elites use torture for other means, such as intimidation or punishment – using the informational motive as a smoke-screen. Alternatively, perhaps elites use the decision to engage in torture as a signal to their supporters of being “tough” and unsentimental against a powerful threat, in order to paint their domestic opponents as weak or even “on the other side” when they oppose its use. The essential fact is that, while torture may be ineffective or even toxic for the society that uses it to gather information, there appears to be few necessarily negative effects for the elites who choose to use it – at least as long as the process does not spiral out of control. Finally, it cannot be discounted that the elites may derive their beliefs about how torture works not from science or history, but from the larger culture. An excellent example of precisely this mechanism can be found in one of the stranger moments of the War on Terror. The television show '24', starring Kiefer Sutherland, was noted for its near constant portrayals of successful torture used to locate information – by one estimate by the Parents Television Council, torture was employed on an average of once every two hours in screen time. (Lithwick, July 31 st , 2008) In 2007, a round table was held between producers of the show and the dean of the US Military Academy (West Point) and other high ranking military officers. At this meeting, the producers were encouraged to ease of their positive representations of torture because they were impairing the training of interrogators who were putting into practice the images they'd seen on TV. (Moritz, February 10 th , 2007) Furthermore, the fictional 141
Jack Bauer was used as justification for torture by highly placed members of the US government: '24' was used as an inspiration by officials such as Diane Beaver, John Yoo and Homeland Security chief Michael Chertoff. No less a personage than US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argued at a public venue that “Jack Bauer saved Los Angeles … he has saved hundreds of thousands of lives (…) [a]re you going to convict Jack Bauer?” (Lithwick) If even elites themselves are vulnerable to mistaking fantasy for reality when it comes to torture, then it should be no surprise that torture should persist even if it fails in real life. As noted by Rejali (2007), torture has been subject to evolutionary constraints: as democracy has spread, and the international anti-torture regime has gained moral suasion during the last half of the twentieth century, torture increasingly took on a non-scarring form, leading even authoritarian governments to prefer methods like electricity, water and stress positions to boiling and butchery. But torture has not evolved in any more effective or painful direction – methods do not spread according to how well they work but according to taste, tradition and historical memory. Neither has science pierced the veil that separates the experience of pain from one body to the next. In fact, torture remains what it always has been – pain – and resembles nothing so much as the false promise that 'will', however conceived, can triumph over petty reality. Ultimately, if the state cannot or will not pay the cost of distinguishing truth from fiction, then there is no reason ever to tell the truth under torture – and any pain inflicted is simply more suffering added to a world that already has seen more than enough. 142
Page 1 and 2:
THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEG
Page 3 and 4:
This work is dedicated to my wife,
Page 5 and 6:
TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT vii 1. T
Page 7 and 8:
ABSTRACT In the aftermath of the Se
Page 9 and 10:
judged by their effects. The deonto
Page 11 and 12:
etter than chance on average, no ma
Page 13 and 14:
from fiction, and also in the time
Page 15 and 16:
the cases differ in how well inform
Page 17 and 18:
characterization by method. Torture
Page 19 and 20:
gather such evidence was strong, to
Page 21 and 22:
ineffective. Something must prevent
Page 23 and 24:
The description which it would be n
Page 25 and 26:
powerful themselves. 21 While histo
Page 27 and 28:
known by the misnomer 'torture-ligh
Page 29 and 30:
substitute for intelligence gatheri
Page 31 and 32:
This lack of good data on torture t
Page 33 and 34:
found that the procedure can cause
Page 35 and 36:
captive who has faced torture, and
Page 37 and 38:
state cannot credibly commit to pla
Page 39 and 40:
incentive not to present as favorab
Page 41 and 42:
units, those engaged in the applica
Page 43 and 44:
of causal mechanisms in a very dire
Page 45 and 46:
the threats they face are real, whe
Page 47 and 48:
3.1. Introduction. CHAPTER 3 THE WI
Page 49 and 50:
discovered by Sir Thomas Newton and
Page 51 and 52:
two, and the execution of the convi
Page 53 and 54:
years preceding the outbreak at Sal
Page 55 and 56:
these women - non-Church members, p
Page 57 and 58:
Hubbard) and four grown and married
Page 59 and 60:
innocent, and recalled that when he
Page 61 and 62:
crowd was deeply and troublingly mo
Page 63 and 64:
it was precisely in these terms tha
Page 65 and 66:
came to an end. Misogyny was all to
Page 67 and 68:
only the witch-trials that brought
Page 69 and 70:
partners in their own (apparent) de
Page 71 and 72:
possibility would be to question th
Page 73 and 74:
John Bridges (whose own wife and da
Page 75 and 76:
she again broke down and named seve
Page 77 and 78:
forcing the already convicted to re
Page 79 and 80:
We can thus see Tituba's confession
Page 81 and 82:
Samuell Parris. 70 The strongest ev
Page 83 and 84:
order to purge political dissidents
Page 85 and 86:
torture as a failure based on this
Page 87 and 88:
torture - the state will apply it e
Page 89 and 90:
time, the government in Paris was c
Page 91 and 92:
for two reasons - first, because Me
Page 93 and 94:
The Soummam conference in the Summe
Page 95 and 96:
one of the primary justifications f
Page 97 and 98: DOP in particular is instructive fo
Page 99 and 100: us stops in the city center. These
Page 101 and 102: one that would turn the dangers of
Page 103 and 104: dismantling of the ZAA organization
Page 105 and 106: found in the literature: the revela
Page 107 and 108: In fact, the use of torture did hav
Page 109 and 110: e.g.), by March (when the DPU had b
Page 111 and 112: Paul Teitgen appears to have been c
Page 113 and 114: the French public. 95 Secondly, the
Page 115 and 116: conditions theoretically necessary
Page 117 and 118: the reasons for holding the detaine
Page 119 and 120: y military interrogators. (Washingt
Page 121 and 122: fact come verbatim from a 1957 jour
Page 123 and 124: ole in the acquisition of intellige
Page 125 and 126: to those believed to have informati
Page 127 and 128: name for metanetwork analysis. 102
Page 129 and 130: other words, the CIA High Value Det
Page 131 and 132: Padilla was accused by KSM of plott
Page 133 and 134: and an enemy of the United States,
Page 135 and 136: alternative mechanism) by Darius Re
Page 137 and 138: York Times, 09/12/2005) Insofar as
Page 139 and 140: these interrogations were conducted
Page 141 and 142: al-Qaeda is structured, names of in
Page 143 and 144: CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION: The Misleadin
Page 145 and 146: problem by the authorities - and ye
Page 147: situations (France in Algeria and V
Page 151 and 152: Biderman, Albert D. “Effects of C
Page 153 and 154: Crelinstein, Ronald and Alex Schmid
Page 155 and 156: History Teacher. 30:4 (1997): pp. 4
Page 157 and 158: International Council on Security a
Page 159 and 160: Lewis, Neil A. “Red Cross Finds D
Page 161 and 162: Obuchowski, Chester W. “Algeria:
Page 163 and 164: Schiemann, John W. “Interrogation
Page 165 and 166: Barack Obama is Inviting the Next A
Page 167 and 168: United States, Department of Defens
Page 169: BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Patrick Armshaw
show all

The Torturer's Dilemma: Analyzing the Logic of Torture for Information

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?